

## Метаэтика. Избранная библиография. Часть II. – XX век

### II. METAETHICS OF THE 20th CENTURY (SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY)

#### 1. Bruce A. Ackerman

*Social Justice in the Liberal State* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980)

#### 2. Robert Ackermann

"Consistency and Ethics" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 69, 1969.

#### 3. E. M. Adams

"A Critique of the Emotive Theory of Ethical Terms" in *Journal of Philosophy* 46, 1949.

EMA complains that Ayer and Stevenson do not adequately analyse approbation, failing properly to distinguish it from mere liking. If we do analyse it we find it involves a cognitive element in the form of a judgement of rightness. So it is incoherent to analyse judgements of rightness in terms of approval.

"Word-Magic and Logical Analysis in the Field of Ethics" in *Journal of Philosophy* 47, 1950.

"The Nature of Ethical Inquiry" in *Journal of Philosophy* 48, 1951.

"Cartesianism in Ethics" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 16, 1956.

"Mr Hare on the Role of Principles in Deciding" in *Mind* 65, 1956.

"The Nature of 'Ought'" in *Philosophical Studies* 7, 1956.

"'Ought' Again" in *Philosophical Studies* 8, 1957.

"Hall's Analysis of 'Ought'" in *Journal of Philosophy* 55, 1958.

"The Theoretical and the Practical" in *Review of Metaphysics* 13, 1960.

*Ethical Naturalism and the Modern World-View* (London: Oxford University Press, 1961).

"Classical Moral Philosophy and Metaethics" in *Ethics* 74, 1964.

"A Defense of Value Realism" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 4, 1966.

"Gewirth on Reason and Morality" in *Review of Metaphysics* 33, 1980.

"The Subjective Normative Structure of Agency" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*

"Rationality and Morality" in *Review of Metaphysics* 46, 1993.

"Emotional Intelligence and Wisdom" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 36, 1998.

#### 4. Robert Merrihew Adams

"Motive Utilitarianism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 73, 1976

*Finite and Infinite Goods: A Framework for Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

#### 5. H. D. Aiken

"Emotive Meaning and Ethical Terms" in *Journal of Philosophy* 61, 1944

"Definitions of Value and the Moral Ideal" in *Journal of Philosophy* 42, 1945.

"Evaluation and Obligation: Two Functions of Judgments in the Language of Conduct" in *Journal of Philosophy* 47, 1950

"A Pluralistic Analysis of the Ethical 'Ought'" In *Journal of Philosophy* 48, 1951.

"The Authority of Moral Judgments" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12, 1952.

"Definitions, Factual Premises and Ethical Conclusions" in *Philosophical Review* 61, 1952.

"The Levels of Moral Discourse" in *Ethics* 62, 1952.

"The Role of Conventions in Ethics" in *Journal of Philosophy* 49, 1952.

"Moral Reasoning" in *Ethics* 64, 1953.

"The Spectrum of Value Predications" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 14, 1953.

*Reason and Conduct: New Bearings in Moral Philosophy* (New York: Knopf, 1962)

"The Concept of Moral Objectivity" in Neri-Castaneda and Nakhnikian, *Morality and the Language of Conduct*

"The Problem of Evaluative Objectivity" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 4, 1966

"Contra - The Moral Point of View" in *Philosophical Exchange* 3, 1980

#### 6. Carlos E. Alchourron

"Logic of Norms and Logic of Normative Propositions" in *Logique et Analyse* 12, 1969.

"Prescripciones y Normas: La Theoria de Castaneda" in *Critica* 13, 1981.

"Para una Logica de las Razones Prima Facie" in *Analisis Filosofico* 16, 1996.

#### 7. Carlos E. Alchourron and Eugenio Bulygin

"The Expressive Conception of Norms" in Hilpinen, *New Studies in Deontic Logic*

"Normative Knowledge and Truth" in Gracia, *Philosophical Analysis in Latin America*

#### 8. Carlos E. Alchourron and Antonio A. Martino

"Logic Without Truth" in *Ratio Juris* 3, 1990

A & M urge that *Jorgensen's dilemma* - given that norms lack truth-values either the notion of inference is inapplicable to them or it can be characterized without reference to truth - be resolved in favour of the latter horn. (various alternatives are characterized and rejected.) For philosophical motivation they appeal to Wittgenstein's doctrine of meaning as use. They propose taking an abstract notion of consequence, which they characterize, as primitive. They then propose that the rules for the standard connectives be given, Gentzen-style, with reference to their introduction and elimination rules. For deontic logic the following basic rule is proposed:

$A1, \dots, A_n \vdash B$

$OA1, \dots, OA_n \vdash OB$

A & M then show that the more standard axioms of deontic logic are derivable in terms of this rule and vice versa.

#### 9. Henry Allison

"Morality and Freedom: Kant's Reciprocity Thesis" in *Philosophical Review* 95, 1986

*Kant's Theory of Freedom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990)

"On a Presumed Gap in the Derivation of the Categorical Imperative" in *Philosophical Topics* 19, 1991

#### 10. David Alm

"Moral Conditionals, Noncognitivism, and Meaning" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, 2000

"On the Reasonableness of Moral Judgments" in *Social Theory and Practice* 26, 2000

"Atomism about Value" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 82, 2004, pp. 312-331.

#### 11. J. E. J. Altham

"Evaluation and Speech" in Casey, *Morality and Moral Reasoning*

"The Legacy of Emotivism" in MacDonald and Wright, *Fact, Science and Morality*.

"Reflection and Confidence" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*

A suggestive and intelligent critique of Williams' metaethical views. Williams has suggested that reflection on our thick concepts can destroy the ethical knowledge they embody but confidence in their practical deployment may remain possible even then. But when ethical reflection leads us to just drop some thick concept, we simply drop it and there is no residual role for confidence. If, on the other hand, the reflection takes the form of a metaethical critique it is hard to see how the damage can be limited only to *some* thick concepts. If reflection can destroy ethical knowledge it will, Altham suggests, destroy *all* of it. If the destruction is limited, we should deny that what has been destroyed was ever knowledge.

#### 12. J. E. J. Altham and Ross Harrison

(ed.) *World, Mind and Ethics* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1995)

#### 13. William Alston

"Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgements" in *Nous* 2, 1968

#### 14. Alan Ross Anderson

"The Logic of Norms" in *Logique et Analyse* 1, 1958

"A Reduction of Deontic Logic to Alethic Modal Logic" in *Mind* 67, 1958.

"On the Logic of 'Commitment'" in *Philosophical Studies* 10, 1959.

"Some Nasty Problems in the Formal Logic of Ethics" in *Nous* 1 1967

Anderson maintains that  $\text{.It is obligatory that } p \text{.}$  is equivalent to  $\text{.If } Op \text{ then } V \text{.}$  where  $V$  is some bad state of affairs obtaining. But what kind of conditional is signaled here by  $\text{.if.}$ ? Not material implication certainly as we could then infer  $O(p)$  from  $p$ . Strict implication is also an unsatisfactory reading as it is not being proposed that  $V$  is a logical consequence of  $Op$  and we in any case do not want to be able to infer  $O(p)$  from "Necessarily  $p$ ". Anderson suggests that the most satisfactory reading is in terms of a notion of relevant implication he goes on to define and explore.

#### 15. Elizabeth Anderson

*Value in Ethics and Economics* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1993)

"Reasons, Attitudes, and Values: Replies to Sturgeon and Piper," in *Ethics* 106, 1996

"Practical Reason and Incommensurable Goods" in Chang (ed.), *Incommensurability, Incomparability and Practical Reason*

#### 16. Julia Annas

"Moral Knowledge as Practical Knowledge" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

#### 17. G. E. M. Anscombe

*Intention* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1957)

"On Brute Facts" in *Analysis* 18, 1958

"Modern Moral Philosophy" in *Philosophy* 33, 1958

#### 18. Louise M. Antony

"Nature and Norms" in *Ethics* 111, 2001.

A clear and rich discussion of Nussbaum's attempt to defend a grounding role in ethical theory for a form of Aristotelian essentialism from Williams' critique of any such idea. The basic problem is that accounts of human nature are either *external*, confining themselves to scientific fact, in which case they seem to have limited potential to yield ethical conclusions, or *internal*, explicitly normative articulations of our self-conceptions, which yield substantive ethical conclusions only because they are heavy with normative presuppositions and do not speak to those who do not share these presuppositions. In her exegesis Williams, Nussbaum makes out this external/external distinction in terms of a descriptive/normative distinction. But in her critique external accounts are assimilated to the kind of external realism she follows Putnam in rejecting. But this is to confuse independence from human values with independence from all forms of human conceptualization and to misdiagnose opposition to essentialism as opposition to metaphysical realism. The real but

limited truth in essentialism is that external accounts of what humans are like point to commonalities that offer us the normative common ground we need in order successfully to address one another's internal moral self-understandings.

19. **Lennart Aqvist**  
*Introduction to Deontic Logic and the Theory of Normative Systems* (Naples: Bibliopolis, 1987)
20. **Steven Arkonovich**  
"Defending Desire: Scanlon's Anti-Humeanism" in *Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research* 63, 2001
21. **Horacio Arlo Coasta, John Collins and Isaac Levi**  
"Desire-As-Belief Implies Opinionation or Indifference" in *Analysis* 55, 1995, pp. 2-5.
22. **Leslie Armour**  
"The Origin of Values" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*
23. **Richard Arneson**  
"Human Flourishing versus Desire Satisfaction" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 61, 1999, pp. 113-142.
24. **Hilliard Aronovitch**  
"Reflective Equilibrium or Evolving Tradition?", *Inquiry* 39, 1996.
25. **Nomy Arpaly**  
"On Acting Rationally Against One's Best Judgement" in *Ethics* 110, 2002, pp. 488-513.  
*Unprincipled Virtue: An Inquiry into Moral Agency* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
26. **Robert Arrington**  
*Rationality, Realism and Relativism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989)
27. **R. F. Atkinson**  
"Consistency in Ethics" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 39, 1965.
28. **Robert Audi**  
"The Concept of Wanting" in *Philosophical Studies* 24, 1973.  
"Axiological Foundationalism" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12, 1982.  
"A Theory of Practical Reasoning" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 19, 1982.  
"Acting for Reasons" in *Philosophical Review* 95, 1986.  
"Intending, Intentional Action and Desire" in Marks, *The Ways of Desire*  
"The Architecture of Reason" in P. A.P.A. 62, Supp. 1, 1988.  
"Internalism and Externalism in Moral Epistemology" in *Logos* 10, 1989.  
*Practical Reasoning* (London: R.K.P., 1989)  
"Moral Epistemology and the Supervenience of Ethical Concepts" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 29, 1990, Spindel Supplement.  
"Ethical Reflectionism" in *The Monist* 76, 1993.  
"Naturalism and the Explanatory Power of Moral Concepts" in Wagner, *Naturalism: A Critical Appraisal*  
"Acting From Virtue" in *Mind* 1995.  
"Intuitionism, Pluralism and the Foundations of Ethics" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge*  
"Intrinsic Value and Moral Obligation" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 35, 1997  
"Moral Judgement and Reasons for Action" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*  
*Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997)  
"The Axiology of Moral Experience" in *The Journal of Ethics* 2, 1998.  
"Moderate Intuitionism and the Epistemology of Moral Judgment" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 1, 1998, pp. 15-44.  
"Prospects for a Naturalization of Practical Reason: Humean Internalism and the Normative Authority of Desire" in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 10, 2002.  
"Intrinsic Value and Reasons for Action" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 79-106.
29. **Bruce Aune**  
"Castaneda's Theory of Morality" in Tomberlin, *Hector-Neri Castaneda*
30. **A. J. Ayer**  
*Language, Truth and Logic* (New York: Dover, 1952), especially chapter 6.
31. **Carla Bagnoli**  
"Value in the Guise of Regret" in *Philosophical Explorations*, 2000.  
"Rawls on the Objectivity of Practical Reason" in *Croatian Journal of Philosophy* 3, 2001.  
"Moral Constructivism: a Phenomenological Argument" in *Topoi*, 21, 2002.
32. **Annette Baier**  
*Postures of the Mind* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985)  
"Extending the Limits of Moral Theory" in *Journal of Philosophy* 83, 1986  
*Moral Prejudices* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1994)
33. **Kurt Baier**  
"Objectivity in Ethics" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 26, 1948  
"S. Hampshire: Fallacies in Moral Philosophy: a Note" in *Mind* 59, 1950  
"Decisions and Descriptions" in *Mind* 60, 1951  
"Doing My Duty" in *Philosophy* 26, 1951  
"Good Reasons" in *Philosophical Studies* 4, 1953.  
"Proving A Moral Judgment" in *Philosophical Studies* 4, 1953

- "The Point of View of Morality" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 32 1954  
*The Meaning of Life* (Canberra: Commonwealth Government Printer, 1957)  
*The Moral Point of View* (Ithaca: Cornell U. P. 1958).  
 "Reasons for Doing Something" in *Journal of Philosophy* 61, 1964  
 "Acting and Producing" in *Journal of Philosophy* 62, 1965  
 "Action and Agent" in *The Monist* 49, 1965.  
 "Moral Obligation" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 3 1966.  
 "The Concept of Value" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 1, 1967.  
 "Fact, Value and Norm in Stevenson's Ethics" in *Nous* 1, 1967  
 "Ethical Egoism and Interpersonal Comparability" in *Philosophical Studies* 24, 1973  
 "Reason and Experience" in *Nous* 7, 1973.

Baier objects to prescriptivism's understanding of practical discourse as imperative. His central argument is that it can make perfect sense to say both "I know that you ought to do X but please don't" and "I know I ought to X but I won't".

- "Rationality and Morality" in *Erkenntnis* 1977  
 "Moral Reasons" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978.  
 "Moral Reasons and Reasons to be Moral" in Goldman and Kim, *Values and Morals*.  
 "The Social Source of Reason" in *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association.*, 51, 1978.  
 "The Conceptual Link Between Morality and Rationality" in *Nous* 16, 1982.  
 "Rationality, Reason and the Good" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*.  
 "Justification in Ethics" in *Nomos* 27, 1986.  
 "Radical Virtue Ethics" in *Midwest Studies* 13, 1988.  
 "Preference and the Good of Man" in Schilpp and Hahn, *The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright*  
*The Rational and the Moral Order* (La Salle: Ill: Open Court, 1995).  
 "Comments" in Schneewind, *Reason, Ethics and Society*

34. **Kurt Baier and Stephen Toulmin**

"On Describing" in *Mind* 61, 1952.

35. **Thomas Baldwin**

"Ethical Non-Naturalism" in Hacking, *Essays in Analysis*

36. **Stephen W. Ball**

"Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore's Open Question Argument" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 25, 1988.

Ball argues that the OQA is not successfully rebutted by such critics as Harman and Putnam. The objection that it is invalid as parallel reasoning might undermine such identities as that water is H<sub>2</sub>O is met by noting, firstly, that the OQA is supposed to apply primarily against analytic identities between moral and natural properties. Secondly, Ball suggests the OQA can be effective even against such property identities more generally for it offers strong evidence for the thought that we cannot establish such identities on linguistic grounds and we may appeal to supplementary arguments familiar from elsewhere in metaethics to question whether there are, in this case, the sort of extra-linguistic reasons to claim such identities as we find in science. The objection that OQA is circular can also, Ball suggests, be sidestepped if we see it as appealing not, question-beggingly, to the conceptual fact that X has property P but is not good is not self-contradictory but to the psychological fact that such a possibility seems open to ordinary users of moral concepts. Such an appeal to linguistic intuitions is not logically compelling but has the status of a strong piece of evidence against analytic naturalism.

"Evolution, Explanation and the Fact-Value Distinction" in *Biology and Philosophy* 3, 1988.

"Facts, Values and Normative Supervenience" in *Philosophical Studies* 55, 1989.

"Linguistic Intuitions and Varieties of Ethical Naturalism" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1991.

"Gibbard's Evolutionary Theory of Rationality and its Ethical Implications" in *Biology and Philosophy* 10, 1995.

37. **Renford Bambrough**

*Moral Scepticism and Moral Knowledge* (Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1979)

"The Roots of Moral Reason" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*

38. **Stephen J. Barker**

"Is Value Content a Component of Conventional Implicature?" in *Analysis* 60, 2000

"Truth and the Expressing in Expressivism" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 299-317.

39. **W. H. F. Barnes**

"A Suggestion About Values" in *Analysis* 1934.

40. **Marcia Baron**

"Varieties of Ethics of Virtue," in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 22, 1985

41. **Jonathan Barrett**

"Really Taking Darwin and the Naturalistic Fallacy Seriously: An Objection to Rottshaefer and Martinsen" in *Biology and Philosophy* 6, 1991.

42. **Christine Battersby**

"Morality and the Ik" in *Philosophy* 53 (1978)

43. **Bernard H. Baumrin**

"Is There a Naturalistic Fallacy?" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 5, 1968.

"Moral Blindness" in *Metaphilosophy* 17, 1986.

44. **Michael Bayles**

- "Intuitions in Ethics" in *Dialogue* 23, 1984
- "Mid-Level Principles and Justification" in Pennock and Chapman, *Justification*
45. **R. W. Beardsmore**  
*Moral Reasoning* (London: Routledge, 1969)
46. **Lawrence Becker**  
*On Justifying Moral Judgments* (London: R. K. P., 1973)
47. **Roger Beehler**  
*Moral Life* (New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield, 1978)
48. **Ruth Benedict**  
"A Defense of Moral Relativism" in *The Journal of General Psychology*, Vol. 10, 1934 and in Sommers and Sommers, *Virtue and Vice in Everyday Life*.
49. **Stanley Benn and R. S. Peters**  
*Social Principles and the Democratic State* (London: George Allen, 1959)
50. **Jonathan Bennett**  
"The Necessity of Moral Judgements in *Ethics* 103, 1993, pp. 458-472.
51. **Fred R. Berger**  
"Stevenson, Meaning and Metaethics" in *Methodos* 14, 1962.
52. **Frithjof Bergmann**  
"The Experience of Values," *Inquiry*, Vol. 16, 1973.
53. **Luther J. Binkley**  
*Contemporary Ethical Theories*(New York: Citadel, 1961)
54. **Robert Binkley**  
"The Ultimate Justification of Moral Rules" in Welsh, *Fact, Value and Perception*
55. **Rudiger Bittner**  
*What Reason Demands* (Cambridge: C. U. P, 1989)
56. **Gunnar Björnsson**  
"Why Emotivists Love Inconsistency" in *Philosophical Studies* 104, 2001  
Björnsson takes emotivism as an empirical hypothesis identifying moral opinions with a certain kind of desire or optation. He then seeks to address the Frege-Geach problem by offering a rough general characterization of negative, conditional etc thoughts in terms of their functional role in reasoning and seeking to show what purposes can be served by optation-involving thoughts that play these functional roles.  
"How Emotivism Survives Immoralists, Amoralists, Irrationality, and Depression" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 40, 2002.
57. **Max Black**  
"Some Questions About Emotive Meaning" in *Philosophical Review* 57, 1948.  
"The Gap Between "is" and "Should"" in *Philosophy* 41, 1966.  
*The Labyrinth of Language* (Britannica Perspectives Series, London: Pall Mall, 1968) (esp. chap. 5 on emotivism)
58. **Robert Black**  
"Moral Scepticism and Inductive Scepticism" in P.A.S. 30, 1989-90.
59. **Simon Blackburn**  
"Moral Realism" in Casey, *Morality and Moral Reasoning* and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, pp. 111-129.  
"Truth, Realism and the Regulation of Theory" in *Midwest Studies* 5, 1980  
"Rule-Following and Moral Realism" in Holzman and Leich, *Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule*, pp. 163-187.,  
*Spreading the Word* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984).
- This is a textbook in the philosophy of language. However the discussion of realism in chapters 5-7 is largely focused on the case of ethics and became the classic presentation of ethical irrealism in the 1980s. Blackburn sees evaluative properties as projections of sentiments and sets out to describe the quasi-realist project of explaining the realist character of the way we speak on the assumption that this projectivism is true. Central aspects of his sketch in chapter 6 of how this can be done include his influential treatment of the Frege-Geach problem, construing evaluative conditionals as expressive of second-order attitudes, and his ingenious attempt to make good projectivist sense of the matter of moral mind-independence. He also attempts to construct a notion of truth applicable to evaluations. The question, of how, if this quasi-realist project can give legitimate application to such realist language, the contrast with more robust realism should be made out, is addressed in chapter 7 in terms of the relevance of the subject matter of an area of discourse to the causal explanation of our beliefs in that area. Chapter 5 contains brief but interesting remarks on thick concepts, reductionism and the "speech act fallacy".
- "Errors and the Phenomenology of Value" in Honderich, , *Morality and Moral Reasoning* and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, pp. 149-165.

Considering Mackie's error theory, SB imagines that the error theorist might seek to engage in a form of practical thinking freed of metaphysical error - in *shmoralizing*. The error theory is undermined, however, if, as the quasi-realist expects, *shmoralizing* turns out to be *just like* moralizing. Hence the quasi-realist seek to accommodate the phenomenological aspects of value that the realist is apt to emphasize such as mind-independence. This is consistent with quasi-realism, however, as we can read the counterfactuals that state it as expressing first order moral commitments rather than as espousing metaethical realism. The analogy, pressed by McDowell, between values and secondary qualities, is questioned and, in the final section, SB suggests an affinity between projectivism and consequentialism.

"Supervenience Revisited" in Hacking, *Essays in Analysis* and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*.

"Making Ends Meet" in *Philosophical Books* 1986.

"Morals and Modals" in MacDonald and Wright, *Fact, Science and Morality* and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, pp. 52-74.

"How to be an Ethical Anti-Realist" in *Midwest Studies* 12, 1987 and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, pp. 166-181.

"Attitudes and Contents" in *Ethics* 98, 1988, pp. 501-517 and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*, pp. 182-197.

SB here revisits the Frege-Geach problem and seeks to improve on his STW approach. The general desideratum of any logic of attitudes is, he suggests, that our goals should be consistent. Taking *adeontically perfect* world to be one where every proposition we "hurrah!" is true and taking "H!p" where p is some proposition to express commitment to some goal to be realized in *every* deontically perfect world, "B!p" to rule p out of any such world, and "T!p" admit p to at least *some* deontically perfect worlds, we can understand the consistency of a set of attitude sentences in terms of whether they together commit us to a goal that can be consistently realized in some deontically perfect world. If this is not true we will say that the set of sentences is *unsatisfiable*. Negated attitudes can, SB suggests, be systematically read as attitudes to negated propositions, e.g. not-H!p = T!not-p. He understands conditionals and other basic embedded contexts in terms of what we are *committed to* when we accept something, adopting the method of semantic tableaux or trees to capture this notion. The commitment I express by e.g. "(H!p  $\vee$  H!q)" is one that involves *tying myself to a tree*. I tie myself, commit myself, to either accepting H!p or accepting H!q. The validity of an argument then consists in the joint unsatisfiability of the sentences we commit ourselves to in accepting the premises and denying the conclusion.

"Just Causes" in *Philosophical Studies* 61, 1991, pp. 39-42 and in *Essays in Quasi-Realism*.

"Reply to Sturgeon" in *Philosophical Studies* 61, 1991, pp. 39-42.

"Through Thick and Thin" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supp. Vol. 96, 1992.

Blackburn sets out to debunk thick concepts arguing that the moral attitudes expressed in their use is typically carried by non-lexical features like tone, a matter of passing rather than priori theory. He stresses the flexibility of our language with respect to the evaluations we convey by it and our failure to talk past each other - at least as much as "thickies" should predict - when we bring contrasting sensibilities to the way we use our words.

"Wise Feeling, Apt Reading" in *Ethics* 102, 1992

*Essays in Quasi-Realism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993)

"Gibbard on Normative Logic" in *Philosophical Issues* 4, 1993, pp. 60-66.

"The Land of Lost Content" in Frey and Morris, *Value, Welfare and Morality*

"Realism- Quasi or Queasy?" in Haldane and Wright, *Reality, Representation and Projection*, pp. 365-383.

"The Flight to Reality" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, *Virtues and Reasons*.

"Justification, Scepticism and Nihilism" in *Utilitas* 7, 1995.

"Practical Tortoise Raising" in *Mind*, 1995

"Dilemmas, Dithering, Plumping and Grief" in Mason, *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory*

Review of Dworkin's "Objectivity and Truth", BEARS, 1996.

"Securing the Nots: Moral Epistemology for the Quasi-Realist" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge*

"Has Kant Refuted Parfit?" in Dancy, *Reading Parfit*

"Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 58, 1998

*Ruling Passions: A Theory of Practical Reasoning* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)

"Trust, Cooperation and Human Psychology" in Levi and Braithwaite, *Trust and Governance*, pp. 28-45.

"Wittgenstein, Wright, Rorty and Minimalism" in *Mind* 107, 1998, pp. 157-181.

Objects to Wright's version of minimalism that there may be normative regimes for the acceptance/rejection of sentences that are nothing much to do with truth conditions. The proper moral to draw, SV argues, from the relevant work of Ramsey is that we need not a 'sorted notion of truth' but a sorted notion of *truth-aptitude*, one that recognizes functional differences. We can anyway rule out such distinctions in advance only if, unlike Wright but like Rorty we are accepting of an indefensibly quietist 'blanket minimalism'. The second half of the paper is a critique of Wright and Boghossian's anxieties about the supposedly (and only supposedly, thinks SB) contagious character of irrealism about semantics.

"Is Objective Moral Justification Possible on a Quasi-Realist Foundation?" in *Inquiry* 42, 1999, pp. 213-228.

The quasi-realist is not greatly threatened by the freshman relativist.. The existence of alien and different moral views like those of the Taliban do not threaten it, do not deprive us of the conceptual resources to say, and say rightly, that such people are simply wrong (while granting to the freshman that there are other, very different viewpoints which we should be more tolerant of or from which we can even learn). It is rather quasi-realism's rivals that are at risk from such a worry, given the likelihood of plural modes of human flourishing, plural ways in which people might constitute their practical identities and plural ways in which (à la McDowell/Cavell) our organisms might conceivably whirl. As for objectivity, it is a virtue, being sensitive to the right aspects of the situation, and in the right way and its opposite is bias, a vice the Taliban amply exemplify.

"Relativism" in LaFollette, *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*, pp. 38-52.

"Normativity a la Mode" in *The Journal of Ethics* 5, 2001.

"How Emotional is the Virtuous Person?" in Goldie, *Understanding Emotions*

"Anti-Realist Expressivism and Quasi-Realism" in Copp, *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, pp. 146-162.

"Must We Weep for Sentimentalism?" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, pp. 144-159.

60. **William T. Blackstone**

"Objective Emotivism in Aesthetics" in *Methodos* 10, 1958.

"Hutcheson's Moral Sense Theory and its Significance for Emotivism in Contemporary Metaethics" in *Methodos* 11, 1959.

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"Are Metaethical Theories Normatively Neutral?" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 39, 1961.

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"Thomism and Metaethics" in *Thomist* 28, 1964.

61. **Brand Blanshard**

*Reason and Goodness* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961)

62. **Paul Bloomfield**

"Of Goodness and Healthiness: A Viable Moral Ontology" in *Philosophical Studies* 87, 1997

"Prescriptions are Assertions: An Essay in Moral Syntax" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 87, 1997.

*Moral Reality* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001).

"Is There Moral High Ground" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 41, 2003, pp. 511-526.

"Opening Questions, Following Rules" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 169-189

63. **Lawrence Blum**

*Moral Perception and Particularity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994)

64. **Paul Boghossian**

"The Rule-Following Considerations" in *Mind* 98, 1989.

"The Status of Content" in *Philosophical Review* 99, 1990

65. **Paul Boghossian and David J. Velleman**

"Colour as a Secondary Quality" in *Mind* 98, 1989

66. **Sissela Bok**

"What Basis for Morality: A Minimalist Approach" in *The Monist* 76, 1993.

67. **E. J. Bond**

*Reason and Value* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

"The Justification of Moral Judgements" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*

68. **E. J. Borowski**

"Moral Autonomy Fights Back" in *Philosophy* 55, 1980.

69. **Luc Bovens and Dalia Drai**

"Supervenience and Moral Realism" in *Philosophia* 27, 1999.

70. **Norman E. Bowie**

(ed.) *Ethical Theory* (Hackett: Indianapolis, 1983)

71. **Dwight R. Boyd**

"An Interpretation of Principled Morality" in *Journal of Moral Education* 8, 1979.

"The Return of Stage 6: Its Principle and Moral Point of View" in Wren, *The Moral Domain*

"The Study of Moral Development: A Bridge over the Is-Ought Gap" in Wren, *The Moral Domain*

72. **Richard Boyd**

"How to be a Moral Realist" in Sayre-McCord, *Essays on Moral Realism*, pp. 181-228.

This marvellous *tour de force* is the core paper of so-called *Cornell Realism*. Suppose we are *homeostatic consequentialists*. Suppose, that is, we identify goodness with a cluster of properties, conducive to the satisfaction of human needs, tending to occur together and with a tendency to promote each other (or to be promoted by the same sorts of things). If this theory is right, goodness is a natural property and as amenable to observation as any other. The role of heavily theory-laden intuition and culturally transmitted presuppositions need not debunk, just as in science it need not debunk. Indeed, in science, such things can be seen as *favouring* realism - we can argue that heavily theory-dependent revisions of scientific knowledge can only contribute to scientific progress if the theories in question are approximately true enough not to lead us astray. Analogously, if there is grounds to believe moral reasoning starts out approximately true, we can legitimately view the presupposition-heavy method of reflective equilibrium as one of discovery and not merely construction. And there is, argues RB, such ground: human needs are accessible to empirical study; indeed, he suggests, much moral progress has arisen from experiments of a political or social kind. And indeed our capacity to cognize our needs is highly apt for evolutionary explanation. As a natural kind term, "good" stands, on this view, in no need of any reductive, analytic definition. And as a term picking out a homeostatic cluster property we can predict failures of bivalence that can be explanatory of the intractability of moral "hard cases". What it would take to determine that this is what "good" meant would be grounds to believe this was the property that causally regulated our use of the word and Boyd thinks there may be such reasons - when for example we reflect on our we identify moral terms in foreign languages. Moreover externalism is true - we can, in principle, be well-informed about the moral facts and left indifferent to them. But the dual role of sympathy, as a cognitive aid to appreciating the needs of others and as a source of motivation makes this tend not to be the case. RB does not directly argue that homeostatic consequentialism is true. His aim is rather to use it for the illustrative purpose of characterizing how moral realism very plausibly might be defended.

"Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part I" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66, 2003.

"Finite Beings, Finite Goods: The Semantics, Metaphysics and Ethics of Naturalist Consequentialism, Part II" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 67, 2003.

73. **Joseph Boyle**

"Natural Law and the Ethics of Traditions" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

74. **Michael Bradie**

- "Rationality and the Objectivity of Values" in *The Monist* 67, 1984.
75. **M. S. Brady**  
"How to Understand Internalism", *Philosophical Quarterly* 50, 2000
76. **Robert Brandom**  
"Action, Norms and Practical Reasoning" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 12 1998
77. **R. B. Brandt**  
"An Emotional Theory of the Judgment of Moral Worth" in *Ethics* 52, 1941  
"The Significance of Differences of Ethical Opinion for Ethical Relativism" in *PPR* 4 1944.  
"Moral Valuation" in *Ethics* 56 1946.  
"The Emotive Theory of Ethics" in *Philosophical Review* 59, 1950.  
"Stevenson's Defense of the Emotive Theory" in *Philosophical Review* 59, 1950  
"The Status of Empirical Assertion Theories in Ethics" in *Mind* 61, 1952.  
"The Definition of an Ideal Observer theory in Ethics" in *PPR* 15, 1954.  
"Some Puzzles for Attitude Theories of Value" in Lepley, *The Language of Value*.  
"Blameworthiness and Obligation" in Melden, *Essays in Moral Philosophy*.  
*Ethical Theory* (Prentice-Hall, 1959).  
"Moral Philosophy and the Analysis of Language" (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1963).  
"Rational Desires" in PAPA, 1970.  
*A Theory of the Good and the Right* (Oxford: Clarendon Press 1979).  
"Relativism Refuted?" in *The Monist* 67, 1985, pp. 279-307.  
"The Explanation of Moral Language" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*.  
"Act Utilitarianism and Metaethics" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*.  
"The Science of Man and Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in *Ethics* 100, 1990.  
"Foundationalism for Moral Theory" in Couture and Nielsen, *On the Relevance of Metaethics*.  
"Science as a Basis for Moral Theory" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge*.
78. **Jan Bransen**  
"On the Incompleteness of McDowell's Moral Realism" in *Topoi* 21, pp. 187-198. 2002.
79. **Jan Bransen and Marc Slors**  
(ed.) *The Problematic Reality of Values* (Van Gorcum: Assen, 1996)
80. **Michael Bratman**  
"Intention and Evaluation" in *Midwest Studies* 10, 1986  
*Intention, Plans and Practical Reason* (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1987)  
"Cognitivism about Practical Reason" in *Ethics* 102, 1991, pp. 117-128 and in *Faces of Intention*.  
"Practical Reason and Acceptance in a Context. in *Mind* 101, 1992, pp. 1-14 and in *Faces of Intention*.  
"Identification, Decision and Treating as a Reason" in *Philosophical Topics* 24, 1996, pp. 1-18 and in *Faces of Intention*.  
"The Sources of Normativity" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, 1998 and in *Faces of Intention*.  
*Faces of Intention: Selected Essays on Intention and Agency* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).  
"Reflection, Planning and Temporally Extended Agency" in *Philosophical Review* 109, 2000, pp. 35-61.  
"Valuing and the Will" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 14, 2000, pp. 249-265.  
"Hierarchy, Circularity and Double Reduction". in Buss and Overton, *Contours of Agency*, pp. 65-85.  
"A Desire of One's Own" in *Journal of Philosophy* 100, 2003, pp. 221-242.
81. **J. M. Brennan**  
*The Open Texture of Moral Concepts*(New York: Harper and Row, 1977)
82. **J. Bricke**  
(ed.) *Freedom and Morality* (University of Kansas, 1976)
83. **M. H. Brighthouse**  
"Blackburn's Projectivism: An Objection" in *Philosophical Studies* 59, 1990, pp. 225-233.
84. **David O. Brink**  
"Moral Realism and the Sceptical Arguments from Disagreement and Queerness" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 62 1984.  
"Externalist Moral Realism" in Gillespie, *Moral Realism*, pp. 23-42.  
"Rawlsian Constructivism in Moral Theory" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*. 17, 1987.  
"Sidgwick's Dualism of Practical Reason" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 66, 1988.  
"Moral Realism Defended" in Pojman, *Ethical Theory*  
*Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics* (Cambridge:C.U.P., 1989).

This is the only book-length exposition of what has come to be known as Cornell Realism. Brink thinks the anti-realist has the burden of proof in debate given the realist surface syntax of moral language, the realism he takes to be implicit in common sense morality and the fact that realism promises a "straight solution" to moral scepticism. He defends motivational externalism - the view that moral judgements motivate only contingently - by appealing to the possibility of the amoralist who views the moral facts with indifference. Moreover the coherence of the amoralist's sceptical challenge - that we give him a reason to care about morality - undermine, he urges, the distinct form of internalism whereby wherever there is a moral requirement there is a reason. So arguments such as Harman's against moral realism which depend on such internalism about reasons fail. Realism can make better sense than its rivals not only of the amoralist but also of moral disagreement, moral expertise and the possibility of an esoteric moral truth that, on moral grounds, it would be wrong for us to know. Brink



defends a coherentist account of moral epistemology. He urges that we may, consistently with naturalism, agree with the claim of the 'Is'-'Ought' Thesis that there are no entailments between nonmoral statements and (nonvacuous) moral statements by rejecting what Brink calls the *Semantic Test for Properties* whereby terms designate the same property only if they are synonymous. This is false as familiar examples of synthetic property identities make clear. Given concerns about multiple realizability, moral naturalism is to be understood as a claim that moral properties are constituted by natural properties, not that they are identical to them. But there is nothing queer about constitution and because natural facts constitute the moral facts the latter are neither queer nor explanatorily impotent. Indeed Brink argues that moral facts do explanatory work in their own right not reducible to any lower-order explanations at the subvenient level. In a long final chapter Brink defends a version of objective utilitarianism. There are also several appendices of which the most interesting is a quite substantial discussion of Rawls' constructivism.

"A Puzzle About the Authority of Morality" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, 1992.

"Common Sense and First Principles in Sidgwick's *Methods*" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Social Philosophy and Policy* 11, 1994.

"Moral Conflict and Its Structure", *Philosophical Review*, 103, 1994.

"A Reasonable Morality" in *Ethics* 104, 1994

"Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority and Supremacy" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

"Moral Motivation" in *Ethics* 108, 1997, pp. 4-32.

"Legal Interpretation, Objectivity and Morality" in Leiter, *Objectivity in Law and Morals*

"Objectivity and Dialectical Methods in Ethics" in *Inquiry* 42, 1999

"Realism, Naturalism and Moral Semantics" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

85. **C. D. Broad**

"On the Function of False Hypotheses in Ethics" in *Ethics* 1915.

*Five Types of Ethical Theory* (London: Kegan Paul, 1930)

"Is 'Goodness' a Name of a Simple Non-Natural Quality?" in P.A.S.S., 1933-4.

"Some Reflections on Moral Sense Theories in Ethics" in P.A.S. 45, 1945

*Ethics and the History of Philosophy* (New York: Humanities Press, 1952)

"Certain Features in Moore's Ethical Doctrines" in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*

86. **Dan Brock**

"The Justification of Morality" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 14, 1979.

87. **Baruch Brody**

"Intuitions and Objective Moral Knowledge" in *The Monist* 62, 1979

88. **John Broome**

"Rational Choice and Value in Economics" in *Oxford Economic Papers* 30, 1978

"Desire, Belief and Expectation" in *Mind* 100, 1991, pp. 265-267.

"'Utility'" in *Economics and Philosophy*, 7 1991

"Rationality and the sure-thing principle", in Meeks, *Thoughtful Economic Man*

*Weighing Goods: Equality, Uncertainty and Time*, Blackwell, 1991. Paperback 1995.

"Can a Humean be moderate?", in Frey and Morris, *Value, Welfare and Morality*

An important paper on practical reason. The *extreme Humean* claims there can be no rational constraints on preferences. The *moderate Humean* holds they are constrained only by coherence as modelled in the axioms of decision theory. However it is always possible to make any pattern of choice conform to these by fine-tuning the individuation of its objects, so, unless something constrains such fine-tuning, moderate Humeanism collapses into extreme Humeanism. This constraint, Broome argues, is provided by *rational principles of indifference* but to admit these is to leave Humeanism behind. The argument is backed up by remarks on the epistemology of preferences which is claimed essentially to involve judgements of the relative goodness of their objects.

"Is incommensurability vagueness?" in Chang, *Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason*, edited by Ruth Chang, Harvard University Press, 1997.

"Reason and Motivation" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* 71, 1997, pp. 131-146.

Instrumentalism is false as it implies, absurdly, that if I want something I ought to want it. Rejecting instrumentalism, Broome suggests that reason can get us to conclusions about what we ought to do, to belief in normative propositions. But can it explain, and explain, *in the right way*, our coming to act on these propositions? Here Broome proposes we simply invoke a *natural disposition* to do what we believe we ought to do. Some might find this unsatisfying, objecting it does not explain our motivation in the right way, that it implies that "motivation is external to reason". But perhaps, Broome suggests, we should nonetheless accept this. At least unless some better account of practical reason - perhaps a noncognitivist account - can be found.

"Extended preferences", in Fehige and Wessels, *Preferences*

"Normative Requirements" in *Ratio* 12, 1999, pp. 398-421.

Sometimes in virtue of some fact  $p$  one ought to do something, a strict relation we could write as:  $p$  oughts  $q$ . Sometimes a fact gives one a reason to do something, a slack relation:  $p$  reasons  $q$ . And sometimes a fact normatively requires one to do something:  $p$  requires  $q$ , another strict relation. If  $p$  and  $p$  oughts  $q$  then you ought to see to it that  $q$ . If  $p$  and  $p$  reasons  $q$  then you have a reason to  $q$ . But if  $p$  and  $p$  requires  $q$  it does not follow that you either ought or have a reason to see to it that  $q$ . Indeed normative requirements do not allow the detachment of a normative conclusion. Examples: believing that  $p$  normatively requires that I believe anything  $p$  entails; believing you ought to do something normatively requires doing it; and having an intention and a belief about the necessary means to realize it normatively requires intending

the means. Instrumental reasoning then does not provide one with a reason to take the means the means to one's ends but merely requires it. So the argument of Korsgaard's "Normativity of Instrumental Reasons" fails.

"Normative Practical Reasoning" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 75, 2001

89. **Bruce Brower**

"Virtue Concepts and Ethical Realism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 85, 1988.

"Dispositional Ethical Realism" in *Ethics*, 103, 1993

90. **Erik Brown**

"Sympathy and Moral Objectivity" in *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 23, 1986

91. **S. C. Brown**

(ed.) *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

92. **A. Buchanan**

"Revisability and Rational Choice" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 5, 1985.

93. **E. Bulygin, G. L. Gardies and I. Niiniluonto**

(eds.) *Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985)

94. **John A. Burgess**

"Error Theories and Values" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76, 1998, pp. 534-552.

95. **Stephen L. Burton**

"Thick Concepts Revised" in *Analysis* 57, 1992

"Reply to Garrard and McNaughton" in *Analysis* 58, 1993

96. **Sarah Buss and Lee Overton**

(Eds.) *Contours of Agency: Essays on themes from Harry Frankfurt* (Cambridge, Ma.: 2002)

97. **Panayot Butchvarov**

"Realism in Ethics" in *Midwest Studies* 12, 1988

*Skepticism in Ethics* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989)

"Ethics Dehumanized" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 367-389.

98. **Alex Byrne and Alan Hajek**

"David Hume, David Lewis and Decision Theory" in *Mind* 106, 1997

99. **C. A. Campbell**

"Moral and Non-Moral Values" in *Mind* 44, 1935

100. **Jay Campbell**

"Quine on Cognitive Meaning and Normative Ethics" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 34, 1996.

101. **Richmond Campbell**

"Can Inconsistency be Reasonable" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 11, 1981

"Sociobiology and the Possibility of Ethical Naturalism" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*

"Socially Generated Moral Justifications" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*

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102. **Claudia Card**

(Ed.): *Feminist Ethics* (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1991)

103. **George R. Carlson**

"Moral Realism and Wanton Cruelty" in *Philosophia* 24, 1994.

104. **Thomas L. Carson**

"Gibbard's Conceptual Scheme for Moral Philosophy", in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52, 1992

*Value and the Good Life* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2000)

105. **Thomas L. Carlson and Paul K. Moser**

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106. **Roberto Casati and Christine Tappolet**

*Response-Dependence, European Review of Philosophy*. volume 3 (Stanford: CSLI Publications, 1998)

107. **John Casey**

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108. **Hector-Neri Castaneda**

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Imperatives, Oughts and Moral Oughts" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 44, 1966

"Actions, Imperatives and Obligations" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 68, 1968.

"On the Conceptual Autonomy of Morality" in *Nous* 7, 1973.

"'Ought' and 'Better'" in *Analysis* 34, 1973.

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109. **Hector-Neri Castaneda and George Nakhnikian**

(eds.) *Morality and the Language of Conduct* (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1963)

110. **Robert Cavalier, James Gouinlock and James Sterba**

- Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy* (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1989).
111. **Robert W. Chandler**  
"A Revised Conception of Ethical Analysis" in *Journal of Philosophy* 16, 1954.
112. **Ruth Chang**  
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113. **T. D. J. Chappell**  
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114. **David Charles and Kathleen Lennon**  
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116. **Paul M. Churchland**  
"Towards a Cognitive Neurobiology of the Moral Virtues" in *Topoi* 17, 1998.
117. **Stephen R. L. Clark**  
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118. **Stanley G. Clarke**  
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119. **Stanley G. Clarke and Evan Simpson**  
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120. **Robert Coburn**  
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121. **L. Jonathan Cohen**  
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122. **Rachel Cohon**  
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123. **Mark Colby**  
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124. **John Collins**  
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125. **Sarah Conly**  
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126. **David E. Cooper**  
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127. **Neil Cooper**  
*The Diversity of Moral Thinking* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981)  
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"Contractualism and Moral Scepticism" in Vallentyne, *Contractualism and Rational Choice*  
"Explanation and Justification in Ethics" in *Ethics* 100, 1990, pp.237-258.  
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129. **D. Copp and D. Zimmerman**  
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130. **Jocelyne Couture and Kai Nielsen**  
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131. **H. H. Cox**  
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132. **Roger Crisp**  
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133. **Roger Crisp and Brad Hooker**  
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134. **Garrett Cullity**  
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135. **Garrett Cullity and Berys Gaut**  
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136. **Terence Cuneo**  
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137. **Jonathan Dancy**  
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"Nonnaturalism" in Copp, *Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*, pp. 121-144.  
"What Reasons Do" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 39-59.
138. **Jonathan Dancy, J. Moravcsik and C. C. W. Taylor**  
(Eds.) *Human Agency: Language, Duty, Value* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1985)
139. **Norman Daniels**  
(Ed.) *Reading Rawls* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975)  
"Moral Theory and the Plasticity of Persons" in *The Monist* 62, 1979.  
"Wide Reflective Equilibrium and Theory Acceptance in *Ethics* in JP 76, 1979.  
"Reflective Equilibrium and Archimedean Points" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 10, 1980.  
Some Methods of Ethics and Linguistics" in *Philosophical Studies* 37, 1980  
"Can Cognitive Psychotherapy Reconcile Reason and Desire?" in *Ethics* 93 1983  
"Two Approaches to Theory Acceptance in Ethics" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*
140. **Justin D'Arms and Daniel Jacobson**  
"Expressivism, Morality and the Emotions" in *Ethics* 104 1994.  
"The Moralistic Fallacy: On the "Appropriateness" of Emotions" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61, 2000, pp. 65-89.  
"Sentiment and Value" in *Ethics* 110, 2000, pp. 722-748.  
"The Significance of Recalcitrant Emotions (or, Anti-Quasijudgementalism)" in Hatzimoysis, *Philosophy and the Emotions*.  
"Two Arguments for Sentimentalism" in *Philosophical Issues* 15, 2005, pp. 1-25.  
"Anthropocentric Constraints on Human Value" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 99-126.  
Sensibility Theory and Projection" in Copp, *The Oxford Handbook of Ethical Theory*

141. **Stephen Darwall**

"Harman and Moral Relativism," in *The Personalist* 58, 1977.

"Practical Skepticism and the Reasons for Actions" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 8, 1978  
*Impartial Reason* (London: Cornell U.P., 1983)

In this rich and interesting exploration of a Kantian approach to practical reason in general and moral reasons in particular, Darwall sets out first of all to loosen the supposed links between reasons and desires. Desires as such do not furnish us with reasons. Reasons must be capable of motivating us all right but what can be a reason for me depends not on my present desires but on my motivational capacities in a broad sense. Reasons, Darwall maintains, are facts reflective awareness of which would move us to action. Where preferences conflict we face a problem of integration, one that demands we adopt a standpoint distinct from that internal to any individual preference, a reflective standpoint whence we may dispassionately adjudicate among preferences. The unity of agency we can thereby attain is made possible by our taking preferences to be criticizable in the light of reasons. Some of our reasons comprise *objective* considerations, considerations that make no reference to the agent as such. A preference is *impersonally basable* if it can be motivated by objective considerations. Reasons are *intersubjective* when they involve considerations that might ground impersonally basable preference for *all* members of some community. It is a fact about us - and not a mysterious nonnatural one - that we prefer our preferences to be impersonal basable, that we value intersubjectivity in our values. Our capacity for self-respect is bound up with notions of intersubjective respect-worthiness. Intersubjective value also informs our understanding of our welfare as something that matters and should matter to ourselves and others and of our lives as meaningful. Crucially it also informs the practice of *rational appraisal* which makes reference to norms taken as applicable to all agents. *An internally self-identified subject of a system of rational norms* is proximally motivated by the desire to act on the rational principles he recognizes but this desire in turn is motivated (and justified) by judgements about intersubjectively valid normative principles. We may think of such principles as those that would be chosen from behind a thick veil of ignorance. The book contains useful discussions of, *inter alia*, Nagel, Gauthier and Baier.

"Kantian Practical Reason Defended" in *Ethics* 96, 1985.

"Agent-Centered Restrictions from the Inside Out" in *Philosophical Studies* 50, 1986

"Rational Agent, Rational Act" in *Philosophical Topics* 14, 1986

"Abolishing Morality" in *Synthese* 72, 1987.

"How Nowhere Can You Get (and Do Ethics)?" in *Ethics* 98, 1987

"Moore to Stevenson", in Cavalier, Gouinlock and Sterba, *Ethics in the History of Western Philosophy*.

"Autonomist Internalism and the Justification of Morals" in *Nous* 24, 1990.

"Internalism and Agency" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, 1992.

*The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought'* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995)

"Reasons, Motives and the Demands of Morality" in Darwall, Gibbard and Railton, *Moral Discourse and Practice*

"Reason, Norm and Value" in Schneewind, *Reason, Ethics and Society*

"Expressivist Relativism" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 58, 1998.

*Philosophical Ethics* (Boulder: Westview, 1998)

"Because I Want It" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

"Ethical Intuitionism and the Motivation Problem" in Stratton-Lake, *Ethical Intuitionism*.

"Moore, Normativity and Intrinsic Value" in *Ethics* 113, 2003, pp. 468-489.

"How Should Ethics Relate to (the Rest of) Philosophy: Moore's Legacy" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 17- 37.

142. **Stephen Darwall, Alan Gibbard and Peter Railton**

"Towards Fin de Siecle Ethics: Some Trends" in *Philosophical Review* 101, 1992, pp. 115-189.

143. **Donald Davidson**

"How is Weakness of the Will Possible?". in Feinberg (ed.): *Moral Concepts*.

Reflection on the structure of moral conflict and weakness show that we should not treat moral principles as universally quantified conditionals since the instantiation of the antecedent does not permit the detachment of the consequent. Rather we should construe such principles as denoting a relation between propositions along the lines of .x is F prima facie makes x right/good. (.pf(x is right/good, x is F).). That (a is right/wrong, e) where e is all the considerations known to the agent is never logically entailed by any more particular prima facie principle instantiated by a. Nor does it entail the unconditional judgement .x is good/right.. Weakness of will is what occurs when I judge that pf(x is better than y, e) but I am led irrationally by some subset of e to the unconditional judgement (y is better than x) which issues in clear-eyed akratic action.

*Expressing Evaluations* The Lindley Lecture (monograph), University of Kansas, 1984.

"The Objectivity of Values" in Gutiérrez (ed): *El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente* (Reprinted in English and Serbo-Croatian translation in: *Belgrade Circle* 1-2, 1995).

"Objectivity and Practical Reasoning" in Ullmann-Margalit (ed.): *Reasoning Practically*

144. **Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone**

"Two Notions of Necessity" in *Philosophical Studies* 38, 1980

145. **William H. Davis**

"The Authority of the Moral Sense" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 13, 1979.

"The Morally Obvious" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 19, 1985.

146. **Judith Wagner DeCew**

"Moral Conflicts and Ethical Relativism" in *Ethics* 101, 1990.

147. **Michael De Paul**

"Reflective Equilibrium and Foundationalism" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 23, 1986.

"Supervenience and Moral Dependence" in *Philosophical Studies* 23, 1987.

"Two Conceptions of Coherence Methods in Ethics" in *Mind* 96, 1987.

"Argument and Perception: The Role of Literature in Moral Inquiry" in *Journal of Philosophy* 85, 1988.

"The Problem of the Criterion and Coherence Methods in Ethics" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 18, 1988.

"The Highest Moral Knowledge and the Truth Behind Internalism" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Spindel Supplement, 199, pp. 137-165.

*Balance and Refinement: Beyond Coherence Methods of Moral Inquiry* (London: Routledge, 1993)

148. **Elliot Deutsch**

(ed.) *Culture and Modernity: The Authority of the Past* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1989)

149. **John Dewey**

*Human Nature and Conduct* (New York: Henry Holt, 1922)

"The Ambiguity of 'Intrinsic Good'" in *Journal of Philosophy* 39, 1942.

"Valuation Judgments and Immediate Quality" in *Journal of Philosophy* 40, 1943.

"Further as to Valuation as Judgment" in *Journal of Philosophy* 40, 1943.

"Some Questions about Value" in *Journal of Philosophy* 41, 1944.

"Ethical Subject-Matter and Language" in *Journal of Philosophy* 42, 1945

150. **John Divers and Alexander Miller**

"Why Expressivists About Value Should Not Love Minimalism About Truth" in *Analysis* 54, 1994.

There is, as Michael Smith claims, an analytic link between truth and belief. But, as his account of the distinct functional roles of belief and desire is not *platitudinous* and is disputed by anti-Humeans, minimalists need not accept it. So Smith cannot argue from moral beliefs not being even minimally beliefs to their not being minimally true for he is not entitled to that premise. Nor from their not being robustly beliefs to their not being minimally true for the analytic link supports no valid such argument. If his claim is that moral language is only minimally true but not robustly true that may be consistent with Wright's minimalism which is pluralistic about truth. Perhaps Smith is objecting to the claim that moral language is *assertoric* but then he needs to supply an argument against the claim that being minimally truth-apt suffices for being assertoric.

151. **Julian Dodd and Suzanne Stern-Gillet**

"The Is/Ought Gap, the Fact/Value Distinction and the Naturalistic Fallacy" in *Dialogue* 34, 1995

152. **Marinus C. Doeser**

"Can the Dichotomy of Fact and Value be Maintained?" in Doeser and Kraay, *Facts and Values*

153. **Marinus C. Doeser and John N. Kraay**

(Eds.) *Facts and Values: Philosophical Reflections from Western and Non-Western Perspectives* (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1986)

154. **Alan Donagan**

*The Theory of Morality* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977)

"Moral Rationalism and Variable Social Institutions" in *Midwest Studies* 7, 1982

155. **Cian Dorr**

"Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking" in *Nous* 36, 2002, pp. 558-572.

This paper considers arguments of the form: 1. P 2. If P then Q Therefore: 3. Q where P is an evaluative sentence and Q a straightforwardly factual sentence. Suppose someone who accepts 2 comes to accept 1. This, we naturally think, can make it rationally appropriate to come to accept 3. But to do so, if 1 is given a noncognitivist interpretation, would be a case of wishful thinking: revising one's beliefs about the world in the interest of making them cohere with our desires and feelings. And that is never rationally appropriate. So a charitable approach to what we are naturally disposed to think demands that we reject noncognitivism.

156. **Dale Dorsey**

"A Coherence Theory of Truth in Ethics" in *Philosophical Studies* 127, 2006, pp. 493-523.

157. **R. S. Downie**

"The Hypothetical Imperative" in *Mind* 93, 1984

158. **James Dreier**

"Internalism and Speaker Relativism" in *Ethics* 101, 1990, pp. 6-26.

This important paper defends a form of relativism where "x is good" is taken to mean "x is approved by some standard M" where this standard is determined contextually. Foot-type constraints on what can count as a moral standard are one determining factor here but more central are the motivational/affective dispositions of the speaker so that *normally*, there is a conceptual linkage between one's moral beliefs and such dispositions. Dreier defends this *modest internalism* - "the principle that *in normal contexts* a person has some motivation to promote what he believes to be good". When stated in this modest way, he urges, internalism retains its plausibility but evades the sorts of counterexamples suggested by e.g. Stocker. Speaker relativism is defended as furnishing the best explanation of modest externalism (the main rivals here being Michael Smith's moral sense theory which has problems when the speaker's moral beliefs are false and noncognitivism which remains plagued by the embedding problem).

"The Supervenience Argument against Moral Realism", *Southern J Phil* 30.

Dreier argues that, while Blackburn is right in supposing that for the moral dualist (nonnaturalist realist) the supervenience of the moral on the natural is left mysterious, his supervenience argument against realism is question begging against reductive naturalism (for reductive naturalists accept strong supervenience) and is unsuccessful against nonreductive

naturalists who have no trouble accepting weak and rejecting strong supervenience. At least they will reject strong supervenience when the latter is read as claiming that whenever a thing is M (where M is some moral predicate) it is analytically necessary that anything N is M (where N is some natural predicate). (If it were a case of metaphysical necessity rather than analytic necessity nonreductive naturalists would hold strong supervenience true and so, Dreier claims, they should.) However, Dreier goes on to argue, his own favoured indexical account of moral concepts, whereby these are understood as expressing properties relative to contexts of utterance, makes excellent sense of moral supervenience which operates in strikingly similar ways to the supervenience relations between indexical and non-indexical predicates.

"Structures of Normative Theories", *Monist* 76, 1993.

"Perspectives on the Normativity of Ethics", *Nous* 28(1994) 514-525.

"Accepting Agent-Centered Norms: A Problem for Non-Cognitivists and a Suggestion for Solving It" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74, 1996.

"Expressivist Embeddings and Minimalist Truth" *Philosophical Studies*, 83, 1996

Horwich and Stoljar have argued that truth-minimalism puts us in the way of a quick and dirty solution to the Frege-Geach problem. JD isn't having it, urging that expressivists must, as Blackburn puts it, *earn* the right to talk of even minimal truth by explaining how the various embedded contexts make sense on an expressivist reading of the embedded expressions. If we adopt a minimalist take on truth-conditions, knowing the truth conditions of moral claims doesn't suffice for this. JD's illustration: Stipulate that "Bob is hiyo"  $\circ$  "Hiyo [i.e. Hi!], Bob!". This gives us embeddability and hence minimal truth. But we are still no distance towards making sense of "If a dingo is near, then Bob is hiyo." And merely to appeal here to the inference rule for the conditional is not much help.

"Rational Preference: Decision theory as a Theory of Practical Rationality" *Theory and Decision*, 40, 199, 249-276.

"Humean Doubts about the Practical Justification of Morality" in Gaut and Cullity, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

It is false that there are no categorical imperative. The means-end rule: M/E -If you desire to F and believe that by doing you will F, then you ought to G is one. Someone who failed to follow this rule would be irrational and what they are missing cannot be a desire: a desire to comply with M/E would only be any help if they were already disposed to do so. Dreier calls this *the Tortoise argument* given the analogy with Carroll's famous argument: we can't get someone who doesn't accept the validity of an instance of *modus ponens* to do so by getting them to accept more conditionals. Means/end rationality then has a special status: nothing could even count as a reason for someone who did not buy into it. But this special status is significant since instrumental reasons do seem always to be dependent on our contingent desires and the Tortoise argument gives us grounds to suppose that instrumental reasons are fundamental.

"Transforming Expressivism" in *Nous* 33, 1999.

Dreier first proposes a way of representing Gibbard's semantics from *Wise Choices* that treats content of a statement S as a function from systems of norms to sets of worlds specified as follows:

$$\{ \langle n, W \rangle : S_n \text{ holds at } w \ll w \in W \}$$

where  $S_n$  is the descriptive correlate, Gibbard-style, of S (obtained by replacing every normative predicate in S with its n-corresponding predicate, *forbidden/permitted/required according to n*). This is a function from systems of norms to propositions construed as per possible worlds semantics. But it can be generalized to view the content of a statement as a function from systems of norms to propositions *construed in other ways*. This way of formulating Gibbard's semantics makes it tractable for relatively fine-grained ways of individuating propositions and casts light on what is meant by calling a normative statement "true". However, JD goes on to suggest, this sort of expressivism, is starting to look very close to a form of cognitivism, one where normative statements are seen as having definite propositional *content*, where this is determined by the *meaning* of the statement (again a function from norms to propositions) and whichever norms are salient in its conversational content.

"Dispositions and Fetishes: Externalist Models of Moral Motivation" *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 60,

2000

Michael Smith says that if externalism is true we must conceive of good people either as motivated by a *de re* desire to do the right thing or a *de dicto* desire to do the right thing. The first would fail the tracking condition: such a desire would not be properly responsive to changes in moral beliefs. The second would be "fetishistic". Dreier argues this dilemma does not exhaust the possibilities. First, an agent might just be *suggestible*: changes in moral belief might just cause appropriate changes in *de re* desires. The suggestible agent however might still be morally defective for her motivation would not meet a variant of the tracking condition: her response to moral uncertainty might be defective, involving a reluctance to investigate moral arguments that might lead her to change her mind. Second an agent might have an effective second-order desire to come to desire noninstrumentally and *de re* to do the right thing. The resultant first order desire would be *contingent* on the second order desire in that the former would owe its existence to the latter. But the first order desire need not be *conditioned* on the second order desire in the sense that would make it instrumental. So Smith's argument by dilemma against externalism fails.

"The Expressivist Circle: Invoking Norms in the Explanation of Normative Judgment" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, 2002.

The expressivist analysis of normative judgements invokes ascriptions of beliefs and desires. But it is widely held that belief and desire are themselves normative concepts. If someone fears dogs they ought to flee them. If someone believes that P & Q they ought to believe that Q & P. This renders expressivism circular insofar as it seeks to explain normativity. Blackburn tries to 'de-fang' the worry by suggesting that in ascribing beliefs and desires we express "expectations" but without regarding these expectations as normative. This understates the problem as (1) the "ought" in talk of what we ought to believe seem paradigmatically normative; (2) the normative aspects of belief and desire seem to belong to them constitutively. JD's proposed solution is to exploit the way we can stand back from norms, speaking e.g. of 'so-called

virtues'. What he proposes the expressivist should say is that: "Saying what people ought to do expresses a so-called desire that such things be done."

"Meta-Ethics and Normative Commitment" in *Philosophical Issues* 12, pp. 241-263.

"Troubling Developments in Metaethics" (Critical Study of Timmons, *Morality without Foundations: A Defense of Moral Contextualism* in *Nous* 36, 2002

"Metaethics and the Problem of Creeping Minimalism" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 18, 2004, pp. 23-44.

(ed.): *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006)

"Negation for Expressivists: A Collection of Problems with a Suggestion for Their Solution" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 217-233.

"Was Moore a Moorean?" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 191-217.

159. **Elmer H. Duncan**

"Has Anyone Committed the Naturalistic Fallacy?" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 8, 1970.

160. **A. E. Duncan-Jones**

"Good Things and Good Thieves" in *Analysis* 17, 1966.

161. **Michael Durrant and Robin Attfield**

"Prescriptivity and Justification" in *Philosophical Papers* 10, 1980.

162. **R. G. Durrant**

"Moral Neutrality and the Analysis of Morality" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*: 36 1958.

"Identity of Property and the Definition of Good" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 48, 1970.

163. **Gerald Dworkin**

"Contractualism and the Normativity of Principles" in *Ethics* 112, 2002, pp. 471-482.

An excellent short paper on Scanlon which argues that Scanlon's invocation of considerations of justifiability to others need not leave all the work to be done by independent considerations which explain them. There might indeed be such independent considerations but for a Scanlonian contractualism, what would remain distinctive about considerations of justifiability of others would be their providing moral principles with their normative authority. They hypothetical character of the justification to which contractualism appeals does not undermine this authority so long as we share the ideal of human relationship to which the theory appeals. However Dworkin raises a different set of sceptical worry addressed to Scanlon's claim that moral reasons somehow apply even to those (the disaffected) who do not share this ideal.

164. **Gerald Dworkin and Judith Jarvis Thomson**

*Ethics* (New York: Harper and Row, 1968)

165. **Ronald Dworkin**

"Objectivity and Truth: You'd Better Believe It" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 25, 1996, pp. 87-139.

166. **Susan Dwyer**

"Moral Competence" in Murasugi and Stainton (eds.): *Philosophy and Linguistics*

167. **Roy Edgley**

*Reason in Theory and Practice* (London: Hutchinson, 1969)

168. **Jon Elster and J. E. Roemer**

(eds.) *Interpersonal Comparisons of Well Being* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

169. **David Enoch**

"Noncognitivism, Normativity and Belief: A Reply to Jackson" in *Ratio* 14, 2001

FJ claims that if someone believes that p and that if p then q then he ought to believe that q. The noncognitivist will accept this normative claim but may deny that, as a matter of conceptual truth, being subject to such a norm is a constitutive condition for being a belief. He may instead offer a nonnormative characterization of beliefs in terms of certain dispositions. In this way a noncognitivist can sidestep Jackson's argument (in the latter's "Noncognitivism, Normativity, Belief").

"Why Idealize?" in *Ethics* 155, 2005, pp. 759-787.

"Agency, Shmagency: Why Normativity Won't Come From What is Constitutive of Action" in *Philosophical Review* 115, 2006, pp. 169-198

A sharp and forceful paper urging against Rosati, Velleman and Korsgaard that the fact that some aim is constitutive of action does nothing by itself to endow it with normative significance for the agent.

"AN Outline of An ARgument for Robust Metanormative Realism in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 2, pp. 21-50.

170. **A. C. Ewing**

"Subjectivism and Naturalism in Ethics" in *Mind* 53, 1944.

"The Possibility of an Agreed Ethics" in *Philosophy* 21, 1946.

*The Definition of Good* (New York: MacMillan, 1947).

"Hare and the Universalisation Principle" in *Philosophy* 39, 1964.

"The Autonomy of Ethics" in Ramsey, *The Prospect of Metaphysics*.

171. **W. D. Falk:**

"Ought" and Motivation" in P.A.S. 48, 1947-8 and *Ought, Reasons and Morality*

"Moral Perplexity" in *Ethics* 66, 1956

"Action-Guiding Reasons" in *Journal of Philosophy* 60, 1963

"Morality, Self and Others in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, *Morality and the Language of Conduct*

"Hume on Practical Reason" in *Philosophical Studies* 27, 1975



"Hume on "Is" and "Ought" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 6, 1976  
*Ought, Reasons and Morality* (Cornell, Cornell University Press, 1990).

172. **Jeremy Fantl**  
 "Is Metaethics Morally Neutral?" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 87, 2006, pp. 24-44.
173. **Christoph Fehige**  
 (ed.) *Zum moralischer Denken* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1995)
174. **Christoph Fehige and Ulla Wessels**  
 (eds.) *Preferences* (de Gruyter, 1998)
175. **Joel Feinberg**  
 (ed.): *Moral Concepts* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969)
176. **Hartry Field**  
 "Disquotational Truth and Factually Defective Discourse" in *Philosophical Review* 103, 1994.
177. **J. N. Findlay**  
*Values and Intentions* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961)
178. **Kit Fine**  
 "The Question of Realism" in *Philosophers' Imprint* 1, 2001.
179. **Stephen Finlay**  
 "The Conversational Practicality of Value Judgement" in *Journal of Ethics* 8, 2004, pp. 205-223.  
 "Value and Implicature" in *Philosophers' Imprint* 5, 2005.  
 "The Reasons that Matter" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 84, 2006 pp. 1-20.  
 "Responding to Normativity" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 2, pp. 220-239.
180. **Roderick Firth**  
 "Ethical Absolutism and the Ideal Observer" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12, 1952, pp. 317-345.
181. **Mark Fisher**  
 "On the Logical Status of Metaethical Theories" in *Theoria* 28, 1962.
182. **William J. Fitzpatrick**  
 "The Practical Turn In Ethical Theory: Korsgaard's Constructivism, Realism, and the Nature of Normativity" in *Ethics* 115, 2005, pp. 651-691.
183. **Owen Flanagan**  
 "Moral Structures?" in *Philosophy of the Social Sciences* 12, 1982.  
 "Virtue, Sex and Gender: Philosophical Reflections on the Moral Psychology Debate" in *Ethics* 92, 1982.  
 "A Reply to Lawrence Kohlberg's Puka-Goodpaster Exchange" in *Ethics* 92, 1982.  
 "Quinean Ethics" in *Ethics* 93, 1982, pp. 56-74.  
 "Pragmatism, Ethics and Correspondence Truth: Response to Gibson and Quine" in *Ethics* 98, 1988.  
 "Identity and Strong and Weak Evaluation" in Flanagan and Rorty, *Identity, Character and Morality. Varieties of Moral Personality: Ethics and Psychological Realism* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1991).  
*Self-Expressions: Mind, Morals and the Meaning of Life* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).
184. **Owen Flanagan and Amelie O. Rorty**  
 (Eds.) *Identity, Character and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology* (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1990).
185. **Philippa Foot**  
 "Moral Beliefs" in P.A.S. 59, 1958 and *Virtues and Vices*

Two assumptions typically inform the rejection of naturalism: (1) "some individual may, without logical error, base his beliefs about matters of value entirely on premises which no one else would recognize as giving any evidence at all." and (2) "given the kind of statement which other people regard as evidence for an evaluative conclusion, he may refuse to draw the conclusion because this does not count as evidence for *him*." Both (1) and (2) are false, Foot argues, for there is an internal relation between evaluations and their objects. Similar points apply to an attitude like pride or a judgement like the judgement that something is dangerous. You can't be proud of just anything (of the sky, say) or think dangerous something quite unconnected with injury (and similarly not just anything can count as an injury). To say some action is good, in a moral context, is to bring it under the head of some duty or virtue and some actions (like clasping ones hands three times in an hour) have no such connection - at least absent some special background. Nothing can be counted a virtue if not connected with human good or harm. Judgements about moral goodness have an action-guiding character because of the sorts of things that are good. Thus we have a reason to pursue courage and temperance because of the sorts of things they are, because they speak to human needs. Having the virtues benefits the possessor. It is hard, Foot concedes, to show that justice is a benefit to its possessor but only if this can be done (and she thinks it can) can we count justice a virtue at all.

"Moral Arguments" in *Mind* 67, 1958 and *Virtues and Vices*.

Foot denies the view that moral arguments are liable to breakdown where the disputants simply take opposing attitudes such that no appeal to evidence can gain purchase on the position of either. "Anyone who uses moral terms at all... must abide by the rules for their use, including rules about what shall count as evidence for or against the moral judgement concerned." She begins with a consideration of "rude". Something is rude is it "causes offence by indicating lack of respect". It may be used to condemn but can be used only when certain descriptive conditions apply. Someone couldn't just decide it was rude to act conventionally or approach a front door slowly. Likewise notions like goodness, obligation, virtue are conceptually tied to notions of harms, benefit, advantage: "a man cannot make his own personal decision about the considerations which are to count as evidence in morals." And the concept of "morality" itself is tied down to certain aspects of our practice. This is not to support a "verbal decision in favour of our own moral code". For we can accept with Foot that

moral concepts have descriptive anchorings while at the same time being open to the possibility that conventional morality may be subverted by argument. Such openness to argument is consistent with a recognition that there are constraints on what are to count as arguments.

"Goodness and Choice" in P. A. S. S. 35, 1961 and *Virtues and Vices* (ed.) *Theories of Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967)

"Morality and Art" in *Proceedings of the British Academy*, 56, 1970.

"Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives" in *Philosophical Review* 81, 1972 and *Virtues and Vices*. *Virtues and Vices* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1978)

"Moral Relativism" (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1979)

"Moral Realism and Moral Dilemma" in *Journal of Philosophy* 80, 1983.

"Utilitarianism and the Virtues" in *Mind* 94, 1985.

"Does Moral Subjectivism Rest on a Mistake?" in *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies* 15, 1995

Subjectivists hold that there is some special essentially practical way of using language that characterizes moral language. Given this there is necessarily always a gap between the descriptive grounds of a moral judgement and the judgement itself. This supposition is the mistake Foot's title refers to. What makes it plausible is Hume's practicality requirement, that morality is essentially practical. Foot accepts this requirement but thinks its demand is best met simply by taking morality to be part of practical reasons. That is an unattractive view if practical rationality is conceived as grounded in an agent's desires; but she claims, following Quinn, that it should not be so conceived. Rather practical rationality concerns the goodness of human beings with respect to action where this is conceived as depending on essential features of human life. Given these facts of human life (what, following Anscombe, Foot calls *Aristotelian necessities*) considerations of e.g. the honouring of promises can be connected to action, as Hume's requirement demands, by acquiring the status of practical reasons. These are reasons every individual has though there is no requirement that every individual should recognize them.

"Rationality and Virtue" in Pauer-Studer (ed): *Norms, Values, and Society*

The rationality of moral action should not be understood in terms of some independently conceived notion of rationality in terms of self-interest or desire. Rather, something, justice say, being a virtue just is for it to consist in sensitivity to a certain range of reasons. The central question here will then be whether some candidate virtue really is a virtue and we answer it by inquiring whether actions that accord with it are good human actions. And this, Foot argues, is something we ascertain by consideration of the way of life of our species and our characteristic needs if we are to flourish.

## 186. Eckart Forster

(Ed.): *Kant's Transcendental Deductions: The "Three Critiques" and the "Opus Postumum"* (Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1989)

## 187. Bas C. van Fraassen

"Values and the Heart's Command" in *Journal of Philosophy* 70, 1973.

## 188. W. Frankena

"The Naturalistic Fallacy" in *Mind* 48, 1939.

This is not the supposed fallacy of inferring 'ought's from 'is's but that of thinking 'good' can be defined. For Moore, naturalists commit what WF calls the *definist fallacy* of defining one property by another. But if this were *generally* fallacy *all* definition would be impossible. It is a fallacy only where the properties in question are indeed distinct. It is precisely this that is at issue between naturalists and intuitionists so the latter cannot appeal to the supposed fallacy from the outset as a weapon in controversy but only after the issue is settled. And if the intuitionist proves right, the mistake of which naturalists stand convicted is that of confusing two properties, or perhaps of blindness to one of them. These are both mistakes, certainly, but not logical fallacies, properly speaking.

"Ewing's Case Against Naturalistic Theories of Value" in *Philosophical Review* 57, 1948.

"Arguments for Non-Naturalism about Intrinsic Value" in *Philosophical Studies* 1, 1950.

"Moral Philosophy at Mid-Century" in *Philosophical Review* 60, 1951

"Sellars' Theory of Valuation" in *PPR* 15, 1954

"Ethical Naturalism Renovated" in *Review of Metaphysics* 10 1957

"Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy" in A. I. Melden, *Essays in Moral Philosophy*, pp. 40-81.

"Broad's Analysis of Ethical Terms" in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad*.

*Ethics* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963)

"Recent Conceptions of Morality" in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, *Morality and the Language of Conduct*

"On Saying the Ethical Thing" in P. A. P. A. 39 1966.

*Perspectives on Morality: Essays of William K. Frankena* (ed. Kenneth Goodpaster)(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1976)

"Is Morality a Purely Personal Matter?" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978

"Is Morality a System of Ordinary Oughts?" in *The Monist* 63, 1980

"Has Morality an Independent Bottom?" in *The Monist* 63, 1980

"Concepts of Rational Actions in the History of Ethics" in *Social theory and Practice* 9, 1983

"Moral-Point-of-View Theories" in Bowie, *Ethical Theory*

"Hare on the Levels of Moral Thinking" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*

"Hare on Moral Weakness and the Definition of Morality" in *Ethics* 98, 1988.

"Kantian Ethics Today" in *Journal of Philosophical Research* 15, 1990

## 189. Samuel Freeman

- (Ed.): *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003)
190. **R. G. Frey and C. W. Morris**  
(Ed.) *Value, Welfare and Morality* (Cambridge, C. U. P. 1993)
191. **Richard Fumerton**  
*Reason and Morality* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990)
192. **W. B. Gallie**  
"Essentially Contested Concepts" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 56, 1956  
"Essentially Contested Concepts" in *Inquiry* 14, 1994
193. **Eric H. Gampel**  
"A Defense of the Autonomy of Ethics: Why Value Is Not Like Water" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26, 1996.  
A very nice critique of naturalism. It's often thought the Open Question Argument is evaded by forms of naturalism that propose a synthetic *a posteriori* identity between goodness and some natural property, much as we find with natural kind terms. But natural kind terms are rather special. With them, speakers intend to refer to whatever is actually causally responsible for whatever phenomena 'fix the reference'. So this question is *not* open: "X has a high M[ean] K[inetic] E[nergy] and having such an MKE is what explains all the causal roles of high temperature in the actual world..., but is X hot?" In ethics however speakers do not have such intentions. So this question *is* open: "A is N and being N is what explains the causal role of right acts in the actual world..., but is A right?" If the naturalist says he is offering reforming definitions we should plausibly reject these on ethical grounds. These questions *should* remain open. Causal explanatory role is not what we should appeal to in determining the answers to ethical questions  
"Ethics, Reference and Natural Kinds" in *Philosophical Papers* 26 1997
194. **J. L. A. Garcia**  
"On 'Justifying' Morality" in *Metaphilosophy* 17, 1986  
"Relativism and Moral Divergence" in *Metaphilosophy* 19, 1988  
"On the Irreducibility of the Will" in *Synthese* 1991  
"Are 'Is' to 'Ought' Deductions Fallacious: On a Humean Formal Argument" in *Argumentation* 9, 1995
195. **Richard T. Garner**  
"On the Genuine Queerness of Moral Properties and Facts" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 68, 1990, pp. 137-146.  
*Beyond Morality* Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1994)
196. **Eve Garrard and David McNaughton**  
"Thick Concepts Revisited: A Reply to Nurton" in *Analysis* 53, 1993  
"Mapping Moral Motivation" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 1, 1998, pp. 267-291.
197. **Jon Garthoff**  
"The Embodiment Thesis" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 7, 2004, pp. 15-29.
198. **Gerald Gaus**  
*Value and Justification: The Foundations of Liberal Theory* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) *Justificatory Liberalism: An Essay On Epistemology and Political Theory* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
199. **Berys Gaut**  
"The Structure of Practical Reason" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*
200. **David Gauthier**  
*Practical Reasoning* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962)  
"Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 4, 1967.  
"The Unity of Reason: A Subversive Reinterpretation of Kant" in *Ethics* 96, 1985.  
*Morals by Agreement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)  
"Reason to be Moral?" in *Synthese* 72, 1987.  
"Moral Artifice" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 18, 1988.  
"Morality, Social Choice and Semantic Representation: A Reply to My Critics" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 5, 1988.  
*Moral Dealing: Contract, Ethics and Reason* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1990).  
"The Roots and Roles of Normative Governance" in *Synthese* 91, 1992.  
"Value, Reasons and the Sense of Justice" in Frey and Morris, *Value, Welfare and Morality*.  
"Assure and Threaten" in *Ethics* 104, 1994  
"Individual Reason" in Schneewind, *Reason, Ethics and Society*. "Rationality and the Rational Aim" in Dancy, *Reading Parfit*  
"Subjective Obligation: A Reply to Wiggins" in Fehige, *Preferences*.
201. **R. Gay**  
"Bernard Williams on Practical Necessity" in *Mind* 98, 1984
202. **Peter Geach**  
"Good and Evil" in *Analysis* 17, 1956  
"Good" is always attributive never predicative. I.e "is a good A" does not decompose logically into "is an A" and "is good". Failure to see this leads to error. Thus "Objectivists", seeing the difficulty in understanding "good" as a descriptive predicative adjective, imagine it might somehow help to see it as a descriptive predicative adjective standing for non-natural property. And "Oxford Moralists" see it as not descriptive at all but commendatory. It is a fallacy to think that this makes "good" ambiguous. There is a connection, and not an empirical one, between goodness and choice but it is one that holds *normally* and *other things being equal*. Normally and other things being equal someone who wants an A will choose a good A -this is part of the "ratio" of "want". The case of good action is special because this is something at which everyone aims. Without contextual clue as to what substantive is intended talk of "good things" or "good events" is just unintelligible.

"Imperative and Deontic Logic" in *Analysis* 18, 1957-8 and in *Logic Matters*  
 "Ascriptivism" in *Philosophical Review* 69, 1960 and in *Logic Matters*

Ascriptivism is the view that calling an action voluntary is not to describe it at all but to ascribe it to some person, holding that person responsible for it. Geach thinks this representative of a fashion for reading apparently descriptive uses of language as nothing of the kind, another such being prescriptivism. Such non-descriptive theories offer accounts of what it is to call something P, but collapse when we consider cases where we predicate P of something without calling it P as we do in embedded contexts such as "If gambling is bad, inviting people to gamble is bad." A quite separate story might be told about what "bad", "voluntary" or whatever mean in such contexts but then modus ponens arguments in which such conditionals feature would be convicted of equivocation. And so the "Frege-Geach" argument against expressivism is born.

"Imperative Inference" in *Analysis* 23, Supplement, 1963 and in *Logic Matters*

"Assertion" in *Philosophical Review* 74, 1965, pp. 449-465 and in *Logic Matters*

"Kenny on Practical Reasoning" in *Analysis* 26, 1966

*Logic Matters* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972 & Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980)

*The Virtues* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977)

(ed.) *Logic and Ethics* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1991)

"Whatever Happened to Deontic Logic?" in *Logic and Ethics*

203. **George R. Geiger**

"Can We Choose Between Values?" in *Journal of Philosophy* 41, 1944.

"A Note on the Naturalistic Fallacy" in *Philosophy of Science* 16, 1949.

204. **Harry J. Gensler**

"The Prescriptivism Incompleteness Theorem", in *Mind*, 1976

"Prescriptivism and Incompleteness", in *Mind*, 1981

"How Incomplete Is Prescriptivism?", in *Mind* 93, 1984

*Formal Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1996)

205. **Joshua Gert**

"Practical Rationality, Morality and Purely Justificatory Reasons" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 37, 2000

"Skepticism about Practical Reasons Internalism" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 39, 2001

"Avoiding the Conditional Fallacy" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 52, 2002

"Expressivism and Language Learning" in *Ethics* 102, 2002

Gert proposes a constraint that expressivist semantic theories must meet and urges that this may be difficult. Suppose an expressivist semantics is true of our language in generation N. Then it has to be supposed to remain true for generation N+1 given our best understanding of how children learn normative language. But it is hard to see how this should be. A child is liable to learn to associate terms like "morally wrong" with the extension determined by his parents' attitudes. He is liable to be corrected when using "morally wrong" to express his own attitudes except in cases where his parents' attitudes concur. He is thus apt to grow up using "morally wrong" as a descriptive term picking out that extension (Some small variation between his parents will render his use of the term vague but not problematically so). Dreier-style speaker relativism, Gert also argues, faces much the same difficulty.

"Cognitivism, Expressivism and Agreement in Response" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, I > 2, pp. 77-110.

206. **Alan Gewirth**

"Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics" in *Mind* 69, 1960.

"Positive 'Ethics' and Normative 'Science'" in *Philosophical Review* 69, 1960.

"Meaning and Criteria in Ethics" in *Philosophy* 38, 1963.

"The Generalization Principle" in *Philosophical Review* 73, 1964.

"Categorical Consistency in Ethics" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 17, 1967.

"Metaethics and Moral Neutrality" in *Ethics* 78, 1968.

"The Non-Trivializability of Universalizability" in *The Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 47, 1969.

"Must One Play the Moral Language Game? In *American Philosophical Quarterly* 7, 1970.

"Some Comments on Categorical Consistency" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 20, 1970.

"The Normative Structure of Action" in *Review of Metaphysics* 25, 1971.

"The 'Is'-'Ought' Problem Resolved" in *Proceedings and Addresses of the A. P. A.* 47, 1974.

*Reason and Morality* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1978)

"On Deriving a Morally Significant 'Ought' in *Philosophy* 54, 1979.

"Limitations of the Moral Point of View" in *The Monist* 63, 1980.

"The Future of Ethics: The Moral Powers of Reason" in *Nous* 15, 1981.

*Human Rights* (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1982)

"The Rationality of Reasonableness" in *Synthese* 57, 1983

"The Epistemology of Human Rights" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 1, 1984.

"Can Any Final Ends be Rational?" in *Ethics* 102, 1991.

"The Constitutive Metaphysics of Ethics" in *Revue de Metaphysique et Morale* 98, 1993.

"Is Cultural Pluralism Relevant to Moral Knowledge" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*

"The Immoral Sense" in *Criminal Justice Ethics* 13, 1994.

"'Ought' and Reason for Action" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 35, 1997.

"The Agent Prescriber's 'Ought'" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 35, 1998.

207. **Allan Gibbard**

- "Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice" in *Midwest Studies* VII, 1982  
 "A Non-Cognitivist Analysis of Rationality in Action" in *Social Theory and Practice* 9, 1983, pp. 199 - 221  
 "Moral Judgement and the Acceptance of Norms" in *Ethics* 96, 1985  
 "Normative Objectivity" in *Nous* 19, 1985  
 "Reply to Sturgeon" in *Ethics* 96, 1985  
 "An Expressivistic Theory of Normative Discourse" in *Ethics* 6, 1986  
 "Hare's Analysis of "Ought" and its Implications" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*  
 "Communities of Judgment" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 7, 1989.  
 "Norm, Discussion and Ritual: Evolutionary Puzzles" in *Ethics* 100, 1990.  
*Wise Choices, Apt Feelings* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard U. P., 1990)

*Normative governance* is the process of influence on norms we accept by conversations . *normative discussion* . about absent circumstances. When such discussion promotes consensus, this impacts on our feelings and actions, it can help to coordinate our actions and feelings and this coordinating role casts light on the likely evolutionary rationale for normative thought and language. Such thought and language .is part of nature, but it does not describe nature.. Thus Gibbard rejects any purely descriptive analysis of .rational. as failing to do justice to the element of endorsement in normative language. We should prefer his .norm-expressivistic analysis. of normative language. On such an analysis we understand what it is to be rational only indirectly through an understanding of what it is to judge something rational. To judge something rational is to accept a system of norms that permit it (where *accepting a norm* is a state manifested in a complex pattern of avowing that norm and acting in accordance with it.) Calling something *rational* is just expressing such an acceptance. (Analogously, to call R a *reason* for doing X is to express acceptance of a system of norms that treat R as weighing in favour of X). The norms one accepts are seen as making a contribution to the content of what one says independent of that made by one's beliefs. The content of a judgement can be understood in terms of the set of .factual-normative worlds. (ordered pairs  $\langle w, n \rangle$  where  $w$  is a possible world and a comprehensive system of norms) where that judgement holds (or, as Gibbard ultimately prefers to say, the set of such worlds it rules out). A sentence  $S$  holds in world  $\langle w, n \rangle$  if a sentence  $S_n$  is true in  $w$  that is got from  $S$  by replacing normative terms like .required., .permitted. etc with  $n$ -corresponding descriptive terms like .required by  $n$ ., .permitted by  $n$ ., etc. If  $S_1$  holds in a subset of factual-normative worlds where  $S_2$  holds (or if the worlds  $S_2$  rules out are a subset of those  $S_1$  rules out), we may say  $S_1$  entails  $S_2$ . If  $S_2$  holds in none of the factual-normative worlds where  $S_1$  holds (or if, between them, they rule out everything) they are inconsistent. We can understand normative judgements without supposing there to be any normative states of affairs that they represent. Our ordinary beliefs about our immediate surroundings are cases of *natural representation*, cases where a part of the world, here our cognitive natures, has evolved to correspond in some way to another part of it. More scientific beliefs are cases of designed, *artificial representation*. But we can best explain how we came by our normative beliefs without supposing there to be any normative facts. The fact-norm distinction can be defended as a claim about the in principle adequacy for interpreting the judgements we need to make in both living and understanding human lives of a hypothetical *normative-Galilean* language, free of thick concepts. Specifically moral norms are best understood, Gibbard suggests, as norms governing guilt and anger.

Some of the norms we accept are higher-order norms governing the acceptance of norms. If I accept a norm along with some higher order norm demanding its acceptance, that apply to all and leave no slack, I treat it as a requirement of rationality. *Existential commitments* are weaker than this but stronger than matters of mere taste: here the commitment is merely to one's own continued acceptance of the norm. Indeed I might accept a norm along with higher order norms that, while requiring me to accept it, requires others to accept other incompatible norms, a case of standpoint-dependent validity. In telling you that something is rational, however, I make a *conversational demand* on you, that you accept what I say. This makes particular sense if my judgements enjoy *contextual authority* being based on norms we both share. Or I may earn myself *Socratic authority* by bringing you to work out for yourself that norms you accept will lead you to agreement. Gibbard also thinks some sense can be made of what he calls *fundamental authority*, involving a form of raw (necessarily mutual and limited) trust in the judgements others make. For he argues not to be willing to accord such fundamental authority would undermine one's trust even in one's own normative judgements in ways that would threaten one with a paralysing hyper-scepticism. Higher order norms may determine both .standards of conversational legitimacy. and the shape taken by the justifications those standards demand that we offer each other for conversational demands. To treat demands as objective is to take them to apply universally and do so openly and sincerely. But we may well not do this. In some cases this would be mere browbeating relative to any standards of conversational legitimacy that serve the central consensus-promoting function of normative discussion. Faced with outsiders holding exotic views we have four options: (a) parochialism (Greeks deny that Scythians any normative competence but have no story to tell about why); (b) relativism (the Greeks have a principled (and ultimately non-relative story to tell about why Scythian norms are right for Scythians, Greek norms for Greeks); (c) tell some epistemic story about why the outsiders get it wrong; (d) work towards constituting a single inclusive community of judgement. Among higher-order norms we need to distinguish *norms of rationale* which give some deep rationale the norms we accept should share and epistemic *norms of warrant*. That these can come apart is a further dimension in which we can make sense of the idea of normative objectivity: we can make sense of the thought that a members of a community might apply correct norms of warrant and come up with mistaken results. A direct pragmatism which took normative judgements to be warranted with reference simply to the costs and benefits of holding them would likely be self-defeating but a limited role for pragmatic considerations is apt to lead to normative scepticism given the role of pragmatic factors in shaping our dispositions to accept and reject norms. To avoid this we should allow pragmatic considerations at least a limited and indirect authority, accepting a .pragmatism of legitimate influence. that seeks to arrive at an account of which kinds of pragmatic influence promote good judgement and then accords authority to those subject to such influences. When normative consensus breaks down *repression* (coercion deemed illegitimate by those coerced) is sometimes justified though its costs are high. To avoid these costs where we can we may seek to form limited communities of judgement based on norms of toleration or accommodation.

Morality is concerned with norms for anger and guilt but a broader range of emotions, sentiments in particular of benevolence, fairness and respect inform reflection on what the content of such norms should be. Normative inquiry into what our feelings should be has tentative beginnings in views which are a mixture of substantive (it makes sense to be sad when someone dies); formal (if it makes sense for me to be sad at something, it makes sense for you to be sad at similar things) and epistemological (views of what makes sense that result from careful thought carry some authority). Adam Smith was right to appeal to the gains from coordination in our feelings though coordination is often best served when our feeling mesh rather than simply matching up. Such pragmatic considerations favour in particular that our norms for guilt and anger should mesh and that we should conform our actions to them. Consistency in normative thought is not demanded of us, as cognitivists would suppose, as a condition for truth; but normative thought and discussion would lose much of its point without a tendency on our part to be governed by the norms we avow and to be consistent in our normative avowals. Normative inquiry, directed at the real good of consistency and objectivity, is driven both by philosophical refinement of our norms and the search for some pragmatic rationale for them. We thus seek to arrive at moral understandings that secure both conviction and consensus.

Highly demanding and hugely rewarding, this is surely the most important work on metaethics since at least *The Language of Morals*.

"Constructing Justice" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 1991.

"Moral Concepts: Substance and Sentiment" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, 1992, pp. 199-221.

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"Preference and Preferability" in Fehige and Wessels, *Preferences*

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"REasons Thick and Thin" in *Journal of Philosophy* 100, 2003, pp. 288-304.

*Thinking how to Live* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 2003).

"Moral Feelings and Moral Concepts" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 195-215.

"Normative Properties" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 319-337.

208. **Roger F. Gibson**

"Flanagan on Quinean Ethics" in *Ethics* 98, 1988, pp. 534-540.

209. **Margaret Gilbert**

"Vices and Self-Knowledge" in *Journal of Philosophy* 68, 1971

*On Social Facts* (London: Routledge, 1989).

210. **Michael B. Gill**

"Relativity and the Concept of Morality" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 33, 1999.

211. **Norman Gillespie**

(ed.) *Moral Realism* Southern Journal of Philosophy XXIV, Spindel Conference 1985 (1986)

212. **Lou Goble**

"The Logic of Obligation, 'Better' and 'Worse'" in *Philosophical Studies* 70, 1993, pp. 133-163

213. **Peter Goldie**

(ed.): *Understanding Emotions: Mind and Morals* (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2002)

214. **Alan Goldman**

"Red and Right" in *The Journal of Philosophy* 84, 1987

"Global Moral Commitment" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 25 1988

*Moral Knowledge* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1988)

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215. **A. I. Goldman and Jaegwon Kim**

(ed.) *Values and Morals* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1978)

216. **D. Goldstick**

"The Causal Argument Against Ethical Objectivity" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*

217. **Robert M. Gordon**

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218. **Luke Gormally**

(ed.) *Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe* (Four Courts Press,

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219. **J. C. B. Gosling**

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220. **Jorge Gracia**

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221. **Selwyn A. Grave**

- "Are the Analyses of Moral Concepts Morally Neutral?" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 55, 1958
- "Too Good a Reason to be a Reason" in *Analysis* 20, 1959
- "Moral Distinctions in a State of Nature" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 38, 1960
222. **Patricia S. Greenspan**  
"Conditional Oughts and Hypothetical Imperatives" in *Journal of Philosophy* 72, 1975.
- "Guilt and Virtue" in *Journal of Philosophy* 91, 1994.
- Practical Guilt, Moral Dilemmas, Emotions and Social Norms* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994).
- "Moral Responses and Moral Theory: Socially Based Externalist Ethics" in *Journal of Ethics* 2, 1998.
223. **G. R. Grice**  
*The Grounds of Moral Judgement* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)
224. **James Griffin**  
"Are There Incommensurable Values?" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 7, 1977
- "Well-Being and Interpersonal Comparability" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*
- "Values: Reduction, Supervenience and Explanation by Ascent" in Charles and Lennon, *Reduction, Explanation and Realism*
- "How We Do Ethics Now" in Griffiths, *Ethics*
- Value Judgement: Improving our Ethical Beliefs* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996)
225. **A. Phillips Griffiths**  
(ed.) *Ethics* (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1993).
226. **Carlos Gutiérrez**  
(d.) *El Trabajo Filosófico de Hoy en el Continente* (Bogotá: Editorial ABC, 1995)
227. **W. Haas**  
"Value Judgments" in *Mind* 62, 1953.
228. **Ian Hacking**  
(ed.) *Essays in Analysis* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1985)
229. **Mane Hajdin**  
"External and Now-for-Then Preferences in Hare's Theory" in *Dialogue* 29, 1990.
- "External Reasons and the Foundations of Morality: Mother Theresa versus Thrasymachus" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 26, 1992.
- "Sanctions and the Notion of Morality" in *Dialogue* 32, 1993.
- The Boundaries of Moral Discourse* (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1994).
230. **Alan Hajek and Philip Pettit**  
"Desire Beyond Belief" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 82, 2004, pp. 77-92
231. **John Haldane and Crispin Wright**  
(ed.) *Reality, Representation and Projection* (New York, O.U.P., 1993)
232. **Bob Hale**  
"The Compleat Projectivist" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 36, 1986, pp. 65-84.
- "Can There be a Logic of Attitudes?" in Haldane and Wright, *Reality, Representation and Projection* pp. 337-363.
- Confronted with the Frege-Geach problem, quasi-realists face a dilemma. Either they read evaluative conditionals as involving a dominant conditional operator, in which case it is hard to sustain an expressive construal of their components. Or they view them as involving a dominant attitude operator, in which case it is hard to do justice to our intuitions about validity. Blackburn's STW account falls foul of horn 2 as it misdiagnoses a moral failing (holding a combination of attitudes of which I disapprove) as a logical one. His AC account, on the other hand, falls foul of horn 2. Blackburn understands 'If p then H!q' in terms of the tableau rule for the conditional as committing us to either denying p or insisting on q. But he does not see the commitment as distributing across the disjunction. But something must so distribute if the tableau rule is to make sense. And what if not truth? If, on the other hand, we try to understand conditionals as expressing higher-order attitudes but stick with the AC logic, we are threatened by the unacceptable consequence that cases of modus ponens involving mixed conditionals (If Fred stole the money he should be punished, and such like) come out invalid.
- "Postscript" in Haldane and Wright, *ibid.*
- "Can Arboreal Knotwork Help Blackburn Out of Frege's Abyss?" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, pp. 144-149.
233. **Everett Hall**  
*What is Value: An Essay in Philosophical Analysis* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1952)
234. **Richard J. Hall**  
"Are Pains necessarily Unpleasant?" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 49, 1989, pp. 643-659.
235. **Stuart Hampshire**  
"Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" in *Mind* 58, 1949.
- "Fallacies in Moral Philosophy: A Reply to Mr Baier" in *Mind* 59, 1950.
- Morality and Pessimism* (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972)
- "Morality and Convention" in Sen and Williams, *Utilitarianism and Beyond*
- A fine paper on relativism. Do our moral responses spring from nature or convention - nomos or physis - like standards of dress or standards of health? Both, says Hampshire, and these two sources of moral norms are related in complex ways. It is natural to human beings to value love and friendship but the norms that sustain these values may differ in different social contexts. There are some norms that we take seriously in ways that survive critical reflection. But these may be local norms and we need not insist on understanding them as universally binding. The latter insistence is most appropriate in the domain of justice where the need for convergence is most pressing. Here Rawls applies a form of "stripping down"

argument, stripping away particular cultural factors to reveal a core of shared rationality. But it is inappropriate, Hampshire urges, to apply such procedures in ethical thinking across the board.

*Morality and Conflict* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1983)

236. **Jean Hampton**

"Can We Agree on Morals?" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 18, 1988.

"Should Political Philosophy be Done without Metaphysics?" in *Ethics* 99, 1989

"Rethinking Reason" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 29, 1992

"The Failure of Expected-Utility Theory as a Theory of Reason" in *Economics and Philosophy* 10, 1994

"Does Hume Have an Instrumental Conception of Practical Reason?" in *Hume Studies* 21, 1995

*The Authority of Reason* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

237. **Roger Hancock**

"The Refutation of Naturalism in Moore and Hare" in *Journal of Philosophy* 57, 1960.

Argues that Moore and Hare's arguments fail. Moore claims for any non-ethical F we can significantly ask "Are F's good?" But what does "significantly ask" mean here? If the point is that "F's are not good" is never self-contradictory the question again naturalism is begged. If it is that "F" and "good" designate two distinct properties, Moore must at least say more to defend what he claims. Hare's version assumes that all ethical sentences are used to guide choices in ways non-ethical sentences are not and that equivalent action-guiding significance is a necessary condition for synonymy and both assumptions are deniable by the naturalist.

"A Note on Hare's 'The Language of Morals'" in *Philosophical Quarterly*. 13, 1963.

"A Note on Naturalism" in *Ethics* 77, 1966.

238. **Rollo Handy**

"Naturalistic Definitions in Ethics and 'Common Usage'" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 16, 1956.

"The Naturalistic 'Reduction' of Ethics to Science" in *Journal of Philosophy* 53, 1956.

"The Genetic Fallacy and Naturalistic Ethics" in *Inquiry* 2, 1959.

"Doubts about Ordinary Language in Ethics" in *Inquiry* 3, 1960.

"Ethics, Human Needs and Individual Responsibility" in *Humanist* 27, 1967

*Value Theory and the Behavioural Sciences* (Springfield, 1969)

*The Measurement of Value: Behavioural Science and Philosophical Approaches* (Louis-Green, 1970)

239. **Marsha Hanen**

"Justification, Coherence and Feminism" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*

240. **Edward Harcourt**

"Quasi-Realism and Ethical Appearances" in *Mind* 114, 2005, pp. 249-275.

241. **R. M. Hare**

*The Language of Morals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952)

Evaluative language, like imperative language, is primarily used not descriptively, to say what is the case but prescriptively, to guide action. Like imperatives, value judgements cannot be deduced from factual, descriptive premises alone (exceptions being hypothetical imperatives and certain very unassuming judgements in which function words like 'auger' feature). Nonetheless value judgements are responsive to the character of the things valued. A word such as 'good' or 'ought' is a *supervenient* epithet. If two things differ in goodness or rightness, they must differ also in some other respect. For in applying a value term to something a speaker expresses his acceptance of a certain standard for things of that kind and a failure of supervenience would signal that the standard was an inconsistent one. This standard will vary from one comparison class to another: it provides, in the context of any such class, the *criteria of application* of a value term but, being thus variable, does not constitute its *meaning*. At the heart of Hare's analysis is his claim that "Value terms have a special function in language, that of commending; and so they plainly cannot be defined in terms of any other words which themselves do not perform this function; for if this is done, we are deprived of a means of performing this function." (p. 91) Value words have a further element of *descriptive* meaning but, with the more general value words, their *evaluative* meaning is primary as it is constant across all comparison classes and because it may drive changes in descriptive meaning. Value judgements, insofar as they have such evaluative meaning, entail imperatives governing choice and action and applicable across all relevantly similar cases. This is not true of ordinary language imperatives, which are not properly universal. But if we live with a certain artificiality in the construction of imperatives such as:

All P's being Q, please.

we could treat the latter as equivalent to the evaluative element in the meaning of:

All P's ought to be Q.

And we could then reconstruct (near enough) ordinary evaluative language on that basis. Only by treating evaluative meaning as primary can we understand why different people (the missionary and the cannibals with their contrasting moral standards) can communicate about and disagree over evaluative matters. There is a way of using value words without commendatory force but only in an "inverted commas" sense where we make no value judgement but merely allude to the value judgements of others. This commendatory use of moral language must again be seen as primary given that the inverted commas use is parasitical on the genuinely evaluative use - we must appeal to the latter in order to explain the content of the former. Moral judgements implicate principles: they are to be justified by reference to the speaker's standards as they apply to the facts of the case. When justification is sought of a complete set of standards determining fully a way of living no further justification can be given and it is a matter simply of our willingness to live in such a way. But this ultimate unjustifiability does not make our judgements arbitrary. It is too easy to forget just how good this ground-breaking book is.



"Broad's Approach to Moral Philosophy" in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad. Freedom and Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1963)

Hare here develops further the universal prescriptivism argued for in *The Language of Morals* which the opening chapters briefly recapitulate. "Ought", he then argues, implies "can" albeit not strictly logical sense, but rather much as, on Strawson's account, "The king of France is bald" implies "There is a king of France" - a case of certain judgements *presupposing* that certain questions *arise*. Prescriptive questions, questions about what one ought to do only arise when the corresponding practical questions, questions about what to do, arise. And the latter only arise with respect to actions within our control. "Within our control" here can be understood in a compatibilistic manner for practical questions will arise whether or not determinism is true. Given his prescriptivism, Hare denies that we can sincerely accept a moral judgement that we are able to act in accordance with and yet act contrary to it, seeking to explain cases of weakness of will either in terms of psychological impossibility or of subtle failures to mean what we profess to in a fully prescriptive way. In the light of universal prescriptivism, ethical theorizing is to be understood as the search for principles that we are able to commit ourselves to where that commitment is a universal one. We need to be able to accept the consequences of our moral judgements and we need to be able to accept them whichever roles we occupy in the circumstances to which they apply. Our inclinations determine what moral judgements we can accept on these terms by constraining which universal prescriptions we can assent sincerely to. This role is not played by *hypothetical* inclinations but by our *actual* inclinations albeit to a large extent with reference to hypothetical cases. Thinking in this way often calls on us to balance the interests of many people and universalizability demands that the interests of all should receive equal consideration. For we can only give special treatment to certain people on the basis of some ground that we are willing to universalize. For most of us, Hare suggests, thinking in this way will issue in acceptance of a utilitarian ethic that seeks maximally to advance the satisfaction of desires. Nonmoral *ideals* -such as aesthetic ideals - may be pursued without this concern for balancing competing interests in cases where the interests of others are not at stake. But, where the interests of others are involved, moral considerations *override* considerations of other kinds. This thought can be avoided. It is avoidable in particular by the *fanatic*, by someone who is willing to prescribe that some people's interests, including in certain hypothetical circumstances his own, be subordinated to some ideal or other. But people who are willing clear-headedly to do this are, Hare suggests, extremely rare. This possibility of clear-headed fanaticism means that Hare's route from universalizability to utilitarianism is not a logically compulsory route. But it is a route, he urges, almost all of us will in fact, if we think clearly and rationally, freely elect to follow.

"Descriptivism" in *Proc. Brit. Ac.* 49, 1963.

"The Promising Game" in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 1964

"Geach, Good and Evil" in *Analysis* 17, 1967.

Geach thinks 'good' can be given a common descriptive meaning such that the descriptive characteristics it specifies are determined in each case by the meaning of the word or phrase it qualifies. This has some truth but only when we restrict our consideration to functional words and 'good' is often, and especially in moral contexts, applied other than to functional words. In such cases the standard being applied cannot at all be read off from the meaning of the word or phrase qualified. Perhaps Geach could insist on a functional interpretation for expressions like 'man' and 'human action' but then he could not insist, as in effect he does, that 'human action' is a comparison class within which we have always no option but to choose. Understanding 'human action' functionally one might perfectly well have simply no interest in performing good human actions.

"Meaning and Speech Acts" in *Philosophical Review* 79, 1970, pp. 3-24.

"The Argument from Received Opinion" in *Essays in Philosophical Method*

*Essays on Philosophical Method* (London: Macmillan, 1971)

*Practical Inferences* (London: MacMillan, 1971)

"Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism" in H. D. Lewis, *Contemporary British Philosophy*

"Some Confusions about Subjectivity" in J. Bricke, *Freedom and Morality*

"Prediction and Moral Appraisal" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978.

"Relevance" in Goldman and Kim, *Values and Morals*.

*Moral Thinking* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

Hare recommends that we distinguish two levels of moral thinking: the intuitive level where we follow a set of simple *prima facie* principles and the critical level that makes no appeal to intuition and which should guide us both in the selection of intuitive principles and in resolving conflicts between them. In elaborating an account of how critical thinking works, Hare again seeks to build a case for utilitarianism from the requirements of universalizability and prescriptivity. The version of utilitarianism that results is less accommodating to the possibility of fanaticism than that of *Freedom and Reason*. There Hare allowed that someone, the fanatic, might universally prescribe the subordination of all, even his own, interests, to some ideal. However universalizability is now understood to work in a way that rules this out. A crucial role is played by the following claim about preferences: for me to know that, were I in your shoes I would have preference set S - which is just a matter of knowing that you have preference set S - is necessarily myself actually to have preference set S with the respect to the eventuality that I am circumstanced as you are. Universalizability then demands that when I make a decision that bears on your preferences I give the latter equal weight, as I am required to prescribe whatever I prescribe no less for the circumstance where I am in my actual situation than for the circumstances where I am in yours. Therefore, in deciding what should be done when preferences conflict, I must represent fully to myself the preference sets of all the people concerned and thereby acquire motivations corresponding in strength to all these, relative to all the various hypothetical circumstances universalizability requires me to keep in view, i.e. to those circumstances where I occupy the positions of each one of those

concerned. This disallows any privileging of my own preferences vis-à-vis my actual circumstances, including my own moral convictions. So the only kind of 'fanatic' now allowed as possible is the very unlikely one whose moral convictions are so extremely strong as to outweigh any preferences that oppose them. (This picture of how moral thinking works has the advantage of reducing problems over the interpersonal comparisons of utility to a problem merely about intrapersonal comparisons: for it renders moral thinking not a matter of comparing my preferences to yours but one of comparing my preferences relative to my circumstances with those I have for the hypothetical case where I am circumstanced just as you are.) The consistent amoralist who refuses to make any moral judgements at all remains conceivable and this, Hare urges, saves his view from collapsing into a form of naturalism. There are strong objections to a consistent amoralism: for, taking the world as it is, an informed concern for the welfare of one's children would speak strongly against inculcating it. But these objections are prudential, not logical.

"Supervenience" in *P.A.S.S.*, 58, 1984.

"Ontology in Ethics" in Honderich, *Morality and Objectivity*

"Comments" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*

"Universal Prescriptivism" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*

"Objective Prescriptions" in Griffiths, *Ethics*.

Replies (in German) to Birnbacher, Corradini, Fehige, Hinsch, Hoche, Kusser, Kutschera, Leist, Lampe, Lenzen, Lumer, Millgram, Moscher, Nida-Rumelin, Roh, Schaber, Schöne, Siefert, Stranzinger, Trapp, Vogler and Wolf in Fehige, *Zum moralischer Denken*.

"Foundationalism and Coherentism in Ethics" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge*.

"Off on the Wrong Foot" in Couture and Nielsen, *On the Relevance of Metaethics*.

#### 242. **Gilbert Harman**

"Moral Relativism Defended" in *Philosophical Review* 84, 1975, pp. 3-22.

*The Nature of Morality* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977)

This book is rather like Mackie's *Ethics*: everybody has read the massively influential first chapter but the rest is a bit neglected. Harman's title hints at the naturalism that sets his agenda: Either moral facts are a part of nature ("naturalism") or there are no such facts ("nihilism"). Moore's open question argument, though often thought to refute naturalism fails, Harman urges, to do so - parallel reasoning would show that water was not H<sub>2</sub>O. Emotivism is characterized as a form of "moderate nihilism" that seeks to understand moral language as serving some non-fact-stating role (while "extreme nihilism" simply rejects morality.) But Harman is dissatisfied with emotivism, reading it as a view that identifies moral judgements with attitudes of some special kind but fails to specify what kind that is in any adequate and nontrivial way. A similar problem bedevils the ideal observer theory, a theory some form of which emotivists are under some pressure to adopt in order to make sense of the possibility of moral error. Moral facts, Harman famously argues in chapter 1, play no role in explaining our observations. A scientist's observations are explained (on a good day) by the facts of scientific theory; but moral facts are irrelevant to explaining our moral "observations" and moral judgements. Harman's metaethics is not however anti-realist so much as reductionist: the central kind of moral facts expressed by moral "ought" statements can be analysed as relational facts about reasons. To say P ought to do D is to say that P has good reasons, relative to certain conventional principles P and myself both endorse, to do D. Unlike moral facts, facts about reasons do play a role in explaining observations, in particular psychological observations. Accordingly their status is not problematic (Harman sketches an account of reasons in terms of good reasoning and of good reasoning in terms of how an ideally functioning reasoner would reason.). So while there are no absolute facts about right and wrong, there are relative facts about right and wrong, the relativity kicking in with respect to particular conventions. So a form of relativism is true: moral principles apply to us in virtue of conventions in force in our society. This does not make moral criticism of our conventional morality impossible as certain of our principles may be open to objection in the light of certain others. The conventionalism is given a psychoanalytic twist in Harman's suggestion that members of each generation internalises the moral standards of their parents in the form of the superego which operates as a key source of moral motivation. Harman also anticipates Williams in his defence of a strong form of internalism about moral reasons: our conventions simply do not apply to outsiders who fail to satisfy them.

"Relativistic Ethics: Morality as Politics" in *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 3, 1978

"What Is Moral Relativism?" in Goldman and Kim, *Values and Morals*

"Metaphysical Realism and Moral Relativism: Reflections on Hilary Putnam's *Reason, Truth and History*" in *Journal of Philosophy* 79, 1982.

"Justice and Moral Bargaining" in *Soc. Phil. and Pol.* 1, 1983.

"Human Flourishing, Ethics and Liberty" in *PPA* 12, 1983.

"Is There A Single True Morality?" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*, pp. 27-48.

*Moral Agent and Impartial Spectator* (Kansas: The Lindley Lecture, 1986).

"Moral Explanations of Natural Facts: Can Moral Claims Be Tested Against Moral Reality?" in Gillespie, *Moral Realism*, pp. 57-68.

Rationality in Agreement: A Commentary on Gauthier's *Morals by Agreement*" in *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 5, 1988.

"Moral Diversity as an Argument for Moral Relativism" in Odegard and Stewart, *Perspectives on Moral Relativism*.

"Desired Desires" in Frey and Morris, *Value, Welfare and Morality*.

"Explaining Value" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge* and *Soc. Phil. Pol.* 11 1994.

"Responses to Critics" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 58, 1998, pp. 207-213.

#### 243. **Gilbert Harman and Judith Jarvis Thomson**

*Moral Relativism and Moral Objectivity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1996)

244. **J. Harrison**  
 "The Importance of Being Important" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978  
 "Deontic Logic and Imperative Logic", in Geach, *Logic and Ethics*
245. **John C. Harsanyi**  
 "Does Reason Tell Us What Moral Code To Follow And, Indeed, To Follow Any Moral Code At All?" in *Ethics* 96, 1985.
246. **Begum Hasna**  
 "Moore on Goodness and the Naturalistic Fallacy" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 57, 1979.
247. **Helen Haste**  
 "Moral Responsibility and Moral Commitment: The Integration of Affect and Cognition" in Wren, *The Moral Domain*  
 "Communitarianism and the Social Construction of Morality" in *Journal of Moral Education* 25, 1996.
248. **Anthony Hatzimoyisis**  
 "Analytical Descriptivism Revisited" in *Ratio* 15, 2002  
 (Ed.) *Philosophy and the Emotions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
249. **S. Hauerwas and A. MacIntyre**  
 (eds.) *Revisions: Changing Perspectives in Moral Philosophy* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1983).
250. **William H. Hay**  
 "C. L. Stevenson and Ethical Analysis" in *Philosophical Review* 56, 1947.  
 "Frederick L. Will on Morality" in Westphal, *Pragmatism, Reason and Norms*
251. **Joseph Heath**  
 "Foundationalism and Practical Reason" in *Mind* 106, 1997
252. **John Heil**  
 (ed.) *Rationality, Morality and Self Interest: Essays Honoring Mark Carl Overvold* (New York: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993).
253. **Bennett Helm**  
 "Freedom of the Heart" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 77, 1996.  
 "Emotional Reason: How to Deliberate about Value" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 37, 2000.  
*Emotional Reason: Deliberation, Motivation and the Nature of Value* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)  
 "Emotions and Practical Reason: Rethinking Evaluation and Motivation" in *Nous* 35, 2001
254. **Ulrike Heuer**  
 "Reasons for Actions and Desires" in *Philosophical Studies* 121, 2004, pp. 43-63.  
 "Raz on Values and Reasons" in Pettit, Scheffler, Smith and Wallace, *Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz*, pp. 129-152.  
 "Explaining Reasons: Where Does the Buck Stop?" in *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 1, 2006.
255. **John Hill**  
*The Ethics of G. E. Moore: A New Interpretation* (Assen: van Gorcum, 1976)  
 "Moral Cognitivism: More Unlikely Analogues" in *Ethics* 86, 1976.  
 "Can We Talk About Ethics Anymore?" in *Journal of Business Ethics* 14, 1995.
256. **Thomas E. Hill Jr.**  
 "Kant's Argument for the Rationality of Moral Conduct" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 66, 1985, pp. 3-23.  
 "Kantian Constructivism in Ethics" in *Ethics* 99, 1989  
 "Gibbard on Morality and Sentiment" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 52, 1992  
 "Reasonable Self-Interest" in *Philosophy and Social Policy* 14, 1997, pp. 52-85.  
 "Hypothetical Consent in Kantian Constructivism" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001
257. **Risto Hilpinen**  
 (ed.) *New Studies in Deontic Logic* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1981)
258. **Wilfred Hodges**  
 "Logic, Truth and Moral Judgements" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*
259. **Richard Holton**  
 "Minimalism and Truth-Value Gaps" in *Philosophical Studies* 97, 2000
260. **S. Holzman and C. Leich**  
 (ed.) *Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule* (London Routledge: 1981)
261. **Ted Honderich**  
 (ed.) *Morality and Objectivity* (London: Routledge, 1985)
262. **Brad Hooker**  
 "Williams' Argument Against External Reasons" in *Analysis* 44, 1987  
 "Theories of Welfare, Theories of Good Reasons for Action, and Ontological Naturalism" in *Philosophical Papers* 20, 1991  
 (ed.) *Truth in Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell 1996)  
 'Reflective Equilibrium and Rule Consequentialism?' in Hooker, Mason and Miller, *Morality, Rules and Consequences*, pp. 222-238.  
 "Moral Particularism: Wrong and Bad" in Hooker and Little, *Moral Particularism*, pp. 1-22.
263. **Brad Hooker and Margaret Olivia Little**  
 (Eds.) *Moral Particularism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000)
264. **Brad Hooker, Elinor Mason and Dale E. Miller**  
 (eds.) *Morality, Rules and Consequences: A Critical Reader* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2000.)

265. **Christopher Hookway**  
 "Two Conceptions of Moral Realism in P. A. S. S. 60, 1986, pp. 189-206.  
 "Fallibilism and Objectivity: Science and Ethics" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*, pp. 46-67
266. **Terence Horgan**  
 From Supervenience to Superdupervenience: Meeting the Demands of a Material World" in *Mind* 92, 1993.
267. **Terence Horgan and Mark Timmons**  
 "New Wave Moral Realism Meets Moral Twin Earth" in *Journal of Philosophical Research* 16, 1991, pp. 447-465 and in Heil, *Rationality, Morality and Self-Interest*.  
 "Troubles on Moral Twin-Earth: Moral Queerness Revived" in *Synthese* 92, 1992, pp. 224-260.  
 "Troubles for New Wave Moral Semantics: The Open Question Argument Revived" in *Philosophical Papers* 21, 1992, pp. 153-176.  
 "From Moral Realism to Moral relativism in One Easy Step" in *Critica* 28, 1996, pp. 3-39.  
 "Troubles for Michael Smith's Metaethical Rationalism" in *Philosophical Papers* 25, 1996, pp. 203-231.  
 "Copping Out on Moral Twin Earth" in *Synthese* 124, 2000, pp. 139-152.  
 "Non-Descriptivist Cognitivism: Outline of a New Metaethic" in *Philosophical Papers* 29, 2000, pp. 121-153.  
 "Cognitivist Expressivism" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 255-298.  
 "Expressivism, Yes! Relativism, No!" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 73-98.  
 (Eds.): *Metaethics After Moore* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006)  
 "Morality Without Moral Facts" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, pp. 220-238.
268. **Christoph Horn and Dieter Schönecker**  
 (eds.): *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals: New Interpretations* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 2005)
269. **Paul Horwich**  
*Truth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990)  
 "Gibbard's Theory of Norms" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22, 1993.  
 Gibbard, in denying there are normative facts, is really just denying there are *naturalistic* normative facts. In a weaker sense of *facts* where *It is a fact that p* is equivalent to *p*, it is just harmless to say there are normative facts. A better understanding of expressivism is as combining an implicit definition of *rational* in terms of *believes that x is rational* and a denial that normative facts explain anything. The word *rational* gets to express a property and to help formulate truths because it shares an inferential role with other predicates. The expressivist does not have to explain *why* the term has this role but just to defend the assumption that this supposition is consistent with expressivism. For this, it's enough that the word's application is constrained by the speaker's state of mind and a fair degree of intersubjective agreement may be expected. Given this predicative inferential role, the Frege-Geach problem is no problem.  
 "The Essence of Expressivism" in *Analysis* 54, 1994, pp. 19-20.  
 Evaluative utterances, according to Michael Smith's understanding of expressivism, are expressions of desires and cannot be true. Horwich is prepared to accept the first conjunct but denies the second. He accepts there is a connection between belief and truth but denies that beliefs should be identified by a causal role distinct from that of desire. The essence of expressivism is just the claim that *X is right* (a) expresses a desire and (b) functions logically as a predicate. A question remains whether (a) and (b) account for our practice but we need not explain (b) on the basis of (a) and their mutual consistency is unproblematic.
270. **Donald C. Hubin**  
 "Prudential Reasons" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 10, 1980  
 "Irrational Desires" in *Philosophical Studies* 62, 1991, pp. 23-44.  
 "Hypothetical Motivation" in *Nous* 30, 1996, pp. 31-54.  
 "What's Special About Humeanism?" in *Nous* 33, 1999, pp. 30-45.  
 "The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality" in *Journal of Philosophy* 98, 2001, pp. 445-468.  
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271. **Donald C. Hubin and David Drebusenko**  
 "Quicksand in the Contract Ground" in *Philosophical Studies* 44, 1983, pp. 115-120.
272. **Donald C. Hubin and Michael Perkins**  
 "Self-Subverting Principles of Choice" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 16, 1986, pp. 1-10.
273. **W. D. Hudson**  
 "Moral Arguments" in *Mind* 68, 1959.  
 "On the Alleged Objectivity of Moral Judgments" in *Mind* 71, 1962.  
 "Hume on 'Is' and 'Ought'" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 14, 1964.  
 "The 'Is'-'Ought' Controversy" in *Analysis* 25, 1965.  
*Ethical Intuitionism* (London: MacMillan, 1967)  
 "Fact and Moral Value" in *Religious Studies* 5, 1969.  
*Modern Moral Philosophy* (London MacMillan, 1970) (second Edition, 1983).  
 "The 'Is-Ought' Problem Resolved" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*  
 "The Development of Hare's Moral Philosophy" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*.
274. **Michael Huemer**  
 "Naturalism and the Problem of Moral Knowledge" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, 2000  
*Ethical Intuitionism* (London: Palgrave MacMillan, 2005)
275. **Douglas Huff and Omar Prewett**

- (eds.) *The Nature of the Physical Universe* (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1979)
276. **I. L. Humberstone**  
 "First Steps in Philosophical Taxonomy" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12, 1982  
 "Direction of Fit" in *Mind*, 101, 199, pp. 59-83.  
 "A Study in Philosophical Taxonomy" in *Philosophical Studies* 83, 1996  
 "Two Types of Circularity" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57, 1997, pp. 249-280.
277. **Ivor Hunt**  
 "Value Concepts and Conceptual Truth" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 63, 1963.
278. **Thomas Hurka**  
 "The Speech Act Fallacy Fallacy" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12, 1982  
 "Two Kinds of Organic Unity" in *The Journal of Ethics* 2, 1998.
279. **Paul Hurley**  
 "Where Traditional Accounts of Practical Reason Go Wrong" in *Logos* 10, 1989  
 A Kantian Rationale for Desire-Based Justification" in *Philosophers' Imprint* 1, 2001
280. **Susan Hurley**  
*Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989)  
 "Reason and Motivation: The Wrong Distinction?" in *Analysis* 61, 2001
281. **Rosalind Hursthouse**  
 "Arational Actions" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1991  
*On Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) (especially chapters 9-11)
282. **Rosalind Hursthouse, Gavin Lawrence and Warren Quinn**  
 (ed.) *Virtues and Reasons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)
283. **Nadeem Hussain**  
 "The Return of Moral Fictionalism" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 18, 2004, pp. 149-187.
284. **Nadeem Hussein and Nishi Shah**  
 "Misunderstanding Metaethics: Korsgaard's Rejection of Realism" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 265-294.
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#### 285. Terence Irwin

"Practical Reason Divided: Aquinas and his Critics" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

#### 286. [Frank Jackson](#)

"Defining the Autonomy of Ethics" in *Philosophical Review* 83, 1974.  
 "Internal Conflicts in Desire and Morals" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 22, 1985.  
 "Critical Notice of Susan Hurley's *Natural Reasons: Personality and Polity*" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 70, 1992.  
*From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defence of Conceptual Analysis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998)  
 "Non-Cognitivism, Normativity, Belief" in *Ratio* 12, 1999.

Someone who believes that p and that if p then q ought to believe that q. This is a normative constraint on whether something counts as a belief and there are others. But if noncognitivism about normativity is correct there can be no such thing as satisfying a normative constraint and hence no such thing as a belief. This is a reductio of noncognitivism about normativity. As noncognitivism about ethics and about rationality plausibly stand or fall together, being supported by effectively the same strategies of argument, this is bad news too for noncognitivism about morality.

"Non-Cognitivism, Validity and Conditionals" in Jamieson, *Singer and his Critics*

An ingenious and attractively simply attempt to address the Frege-Geach problem. Suppose non-cognitivism is right: ethical sentences express non-cognitive attitudes and so are never true. But say that they are *q-true* if the things said to be e.g. good or right have in fact the properties at which the correlative attitudes are directed. Then say a sentence is *\*true* if it is true or q-true. Now say that an argument is *\*valid* if its conclusion's *\*truth* follows from that of its premises. *\*Validity* is the extension of the notion of validity the non-cognitivist needs; it makes good sense, has an intimate connection to meaning, confers validity on what, intuitively, we want it to, and, given our interest in ethical consistency, is something there is a clear point to our being interested in.

"Cognitivism, A Priori Deduction and Moore" in *Ethics* 113, 2003, pp. 557-575.

**287. Frank Jackson, Graham Oppy and Michael Smith**

"Minimal Realism and Truth-Aptness" in *Mind* 1994.

Truth-aptness, argue J, O and S, is not minimal in the way Crispin Wright supposes because of the platitudinous link between truth and *belief*, where beliefs are states with a certain functional role that contrasts with that of desire. A truth-apt sentence is one that can give the content of a belief and it is just this condition which, according to non-cognitivists, moral sentences do not satisfy.

**288. Frank Jackson and Philip Pettit**

"Moral Functionalism and Moral Motivation" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 45, 1995, pp. 20-40.

"Moral Functionalism, Suervenience and Reductionism" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 46, 1996

"A Problem for Expressivism" in *Analysis* 58, 1998, pp. 239-251.

Expressivists deny that ethical sentences report beliefs. Rather they express attitudes. But for ethical language, so characterised, to be possible these must be attitudes that we are able to recognize and we must be prepared sincerely to utter a moral sentence only when we believe we have the corresponding attitude. But that is just to say that moral sentences serve to report just these beliefs and are true when and only when these beliefs are true. And that is what expressivism denies.

"Locke, Expressivism, Conditionals" in *Analysis* 63, 2003, pp. 86-92.

**289. Rockney Jacobsen**

"Semantic Character and Expressive Content" in *Philosophical Papers* 26, 1997

**290. Dale Jacquette**

"Wittgenstein on the Transcendence of Ethics" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 75, 1997

**291. Dale Jamieson**

"Method and Moral Theory" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*  
(ed.): *Singer and his Critics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1999)

**292. Nicholas Jardine**

"Science, Ethics and Objectivity" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*

**293. Christopher Johnson**

"Commending and Choosing" in *Mind* 66, 1957.

**294. Oliver A. Johnson**

"Ethical Intuitionism: A Restatement" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 7, 1957.

"On Moral Disagreements" in *Mind* 68, 1959

*Moral Knowledge* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1966)

"Aesthetic Objectivity and the Analogy with Ethics" in Vesey, *Philosophy and the Arts*

"Blanshard's Critique of Ethical Subjectivism" in *Idealistic Studies* 1990.

"'Is' and 'Ought': A Different Connection" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 1991.

**295. Robert Johnson**

"Reasons and Advice for the Practically Rational" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 57, 1997

"Minding One's Manners: Revisiting Moral Explanations", *Philosophical Studies* 90, 1998

"Internal Reasons and the Conditional Fallacy" in *The Philosophical Quarterly* 49, 1999, pp. 53-71.

**296. Mark Johnston**

"Dispositional Theories of Value" in P.A.S.S. 1989, pp. 139-174.

"Objectivity Refigured" in Haldane and Wright, *Reality, Representation and Projection*

"The Authority of Affect" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63, 2002

A defence of realism about "sensory values", values Johnston takes to be immediately disclosed to us in experience. We should, argues Johnston, be *detectivists* and not *projectivists* about these because the *detectivist* can explain the "authority" of effect and the *projectivist* cannot. Action motivated by affectless desire is more or less unintelligible to us. Adopting a dispositional, response-dependence account of sensory value doesn't lessen these worries about projectivism as the only forms which even pretend to do so turn out to be incoherent in various ways. Accepting projectivism shifts our attention away from the affective authority of other people and things in the world, focusing instead simply on their agreeableness to us. As such it sustains a deep evaluative egocentricity and is nothing less than "the ideology of the pornographic attitude." Etc., etc.

"Is Affect Always Mere Effect?" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 63, 2002.

**297. J. Jorgensen**

"Imperatives and Logic" in *Erkenntnis* 7, 1938

**298. Richard Joyce**

*The Myth of Morality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001)

"Moral Realism and Teleosemantics" in *Biology and Philosophy* 16, 2001, pp 725-734.

"Expressivism and Motivational Internalism" in *Analysis* 62, 2002.

Expressivism . the view that moral judgements function to express certain pro attitudes - does not imply the motivational internalist claim that necessarily if x judges that y is right x is motivated in favour of performing y. Compare apologies. Apologies, inter alia, function to express regret. But I can apologize while not feeling regret at that time. (I can even sincerely apologize while not feeling regret at the time.) Nor does the reverse entailment hold. For just because some sort of expression is necessarily linked to some sort of mental state does not imply that the former functions to express the latter.

"Moral Fictionalism" in Kalderon, *Fictionalism in Metaphysics*, pp.287-313.

**299. Shelly Kagan**

"The Additive Fallacy" in *Ethics* 99, 1988, pp. 5-31.

*The Limits of Morality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989)

"Rethinking Intrinsic Value" in *The Journal of Ethics* 2, 1998.

"Thinking about Cases" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

**300. Mark Eli Kalderon**

"Open Questions and the Manifest Image" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 68, 2004, pp. 251-289.  
(ed.): *Fictionalism in Metaphysics* (Oxford University Press: 2005)

**301. Abraham Kaplan**

"Are Moral Judgements Assertions?" in *Philosophical Review* 51, 1942

"Logical Empiricism and Value Judgements" in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap*

**302. Abraham Kaplan and Benbow Ritchie**

"A Framework for an Empirical Ethics" in *Philosophy of Science* 40, 1970.

**303. Toomas Karmo**

"Some Valid (but no Sound) Arguments Trivially Span the "Is"- "Ought" Gap" in *Mind* 97, 1988

**304. Gregory Kavka**

"the Reconciliation Project" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*

**305. Jason Kawall**

"Moral Realism and Arbitrariness" in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 43, pp. 109-129.

**306. John Kekes**

"Pluralism and the Value of Life" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*  
 "The Emergence of Morality in Personal Relationships" in Wren, *The Moral Domain*

**307. John Kemp**

"Moral Attitudes and Moral Judgements" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 1, 1951.  
 "A Categorical Imperative?" in *Ethics* 65, 1954.  
 "Pain and Evil" in *Philosophy* 29, 1954.  
*Ethical Naturalism: Hobbes and Hume* (London: MacMillan, 1970)

**308. Samuel J. Kerstein**

"Korsgaard's Kantian Arguments for the Value of Humanity" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 31, pp. 23-52.  
 "Reason, Sentiment and Categorical Imperatives" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*

**309. Jaegwon Kim**

"Concepts of Supervenience" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 45, 1984  
 "Moral Kinds and Natural Kinds: What's the Difference - for a Naturalist" in *Philosophical Issues* 8, 1997.

**310. Simon Kirchin**

"Quasi-Realism, Sensibility Theory and Ethical Relativism" in *Inquiry* 43, 2000  
 "Ethical Phenomenology and Metaethics" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6, 2003, pp. 241-264.  
 "Particularism, Generalism and the Counting Argument" in *European Journal of Philosophy* 11, 2003, pp. 54-71.

**311. Philip Kitcher**

"Essence and Perfection" in *Ethics* 110, 2000

**312. J. C. Klagge**

"An Alleged Difficulty Concerning Moral Properties" in *Mind* 93, 1984

**313. Lawrence Kohlberg**

"The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment" in *Journal of Philosophy* 70, 1973.  
 "A Reply to Owen Flanagan's "Virtue, Sex and Gender" and Some Comments on the Puka-Goodpaster Exchange" in *Ethics* 92, 1982.

**314. Max Kölbel**

"Expressivism and the Syntactic Uniformity of Declarative Sentences" in *Critica* 29, 1997.  
*Truth without Objectivity* (London: Routledge 2002).



The scope of this clear and enjoyable short book is wider than simply metaethics but given its concern with what we can best say about truth and objectivity in contexts where objectivity is problematic, among which contexts evaluative contexts feature saliently, it is highly relevant to metaethical concerns. Objectivity is understood as a property a claim has if we cannot disagree about its truth without at least one of us making a mistake. Kölbel rejects an expressivism which denies truth-evaluability to propositions of such problematic sorts on the grounds that the only ways to solve the Frege-Geach problem commit us to a .radical expressivism. that would generalize this denial in implausible ways. He also denies .revisionism. which reinterprets such sentences along the lines of reading .Liquorice is tasty. as .I find liquorice tasty.. Such views solve the problem of disagreement without mistake by reinterpreting such cases, highly implausibly, as involving no real disagreement at all. He denies however that truth requires objectivity. Truth on a deflationary understanding is perfectly compatible with a lack of objectivity. (In the long and fascinating fifth chapter he argues that the widespread supposition that truth in some robust . or indeed in any - sense is a central explanatory concept in the theory of meaning rests on a misunderstanding.) Truth he argues is relative to perspectives. In some areas of discourse, there is objectivity where that is a matter of any proposition that is true in anyone.s perspective necessarily being true in everybody.s perspective. In other areas there is non-objectivity where that is a matter of it being possible that what is true in one person.s perspective is not true in another.s. (Some areas, including perhaps ethics, may be complex insofar as some propositions within them may be objective while others are not.)

### 315. Aurel Kolnai

"Deliberation is of Ends" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 62, 1962, pp. 195-218.  
 "Aesthetic and Moral Experience: The Five Contrasts" in *British Journal of Aesthetics* 11, 1971.  
 "Contrasting the Ethical with the Aesthetical" in *British Journal of Aesthetics* 12, 1972.  
*Ethics, Value and Reality* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1978)  
 "The Ghost of the Naturalistic Fallacy" in *Philosophy* 55, 1980.

### 316. Niko Kolodny

"Why Be Rational?" in *Mind* 114, 2005, pp. 509–63.  
 "State or Process Requirements?" in *Mind* 116, 2007, pp. 371-385.

### 317. Christine Korsgaard

"Two Distinctions in Goodness" in *The Philosophical Review* 91, 1983 and *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*.

Namely: that between instrumental and final and that between intrinsic and extrinsic. CK warns against confusing them by seeing intrinsic and instrumental as correlative. This can lead to a false dichotomy between a subjectivism that sees our making something an end as conferring intrinsic value and an objectivism whereby it is things with intrinsic value that ought to be our ends. For Kant only a good will has intrinsic ("unconditioned") goodness but the goodness of our rationally chosen ends is both extrinsic and final. His theory is good (and better than Moore's theory of organic wholes) at dealing with messy cases of mixed goods - thus a mink coat or a good meal may be valued partly for their own sakes (final) but only under certain conditions of life (extrinsic).

"Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value" in *Ethics* 96, 1986 and *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*.  
 "Scepticism about Practical Reason" in *Journal of Philosophy* 83, 1986, pp. 5-25 and *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*.

Instrumental reason, taking the means to one's ends, is not just a matter of getting the right beliefs about what these means are. One must also, given these beliefs, be motivated to act accordingly. We may be expected to do this only *insofar as we are rational*. This qualification, essential here, may plausibly be understood as generally applicable to Williams' central claim - the *internalism requirement* - that reasons for action must be *capable of motivating us* - True, says CK, but only insofar as we are rational. Once the qualification is in place, the status as principle of rationality of e.g. some principle of prudence depends merely on how we rate it *qua* rational principle. If we take it to constitute such a principle, then, insofar as someone is rational, we will expect him to be motivated accordingly. There is no *further* difficulty for skepticism about the force of reason as a motive to bring to the scene. Williams is right to argue that all reasons are internal reasons if this is read as CK would have it - they must be capable of motivating a *rational* person. But this cuts no ice against the Kantian, as Williams is wrong to take it there is a problem here with universal reasons binding on any rational being as such. There may or may not be but if there are, there is no problem with their satisfying the internalism requirement.

"The Reasons We Can Share: An Attack on the Distinction Between Agent-Relative and Agent-Neutral Values" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 10, 1993 and *Creating the Kingdom of Ends*.

*Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).  
*The Sources of Normativity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996)

What in the world, asks Korsgaard, in this published version of her 1992 Tanner Lectures, could possibly ground the supposition that we are, as we take ourselves to be, *obligated* to do things? She considers four answers to this, *the normative question*. (1) The first is the kind of *voluntarism* typified by Pufendorf and Hobbes. This takes obligation to stem from the commands of some legitimate authority. The "legitimate" is essential as mere power could not robustly obligate us - if we could contrive to evade its sanctions the obligation would evaporate. But, as the notion of legitimacy presupposes normativity, this gets us nowhere. (2) The second is *substantive moral realism*, so called to distinguish it from the sort of Kantian constructivist view (*procedural moral realism*) CK endorses. Substantive moral realism takes there to be a domain of moral facts independent of the procedures by which we seek to reach answers to moral questions, characterizing ethics, erroneously, as a *theoretical* inquiry. As an account of the source of normativity, this is empty, offering no insight into why we should care about these putative moral facts. There is no reason to believe in such facts other than our confidence in the reality of obligation and hence the former belief can offer no sort of ground to the latter confidence. (3) This leads CK to consider a Humean *reflective endorsement* approach that appeals to this very confidence to answer the normative question, one whereby the demand morality make on us meet with approval when we reflect on them from the standpoint of our natural human motivations of sympathy and self-love and this is taken to be all the warrant we can intelligibly demand. This is close to correct, argues CK, but she insists that normativity only gets into the picture when these demands and these motivations are seen, not simply as forces operating on us but as *reasons*. To make this insistence is to move from a Humean picture to (4) a Kantian one that grounds obligation in *autonomy*. In autonomous deliberation, we conceive of ourselves as standing above our various motivations and choosing which of them to act on and this requires that we have some conception of ourselves that our choices express. To be understood as furnishing us with reasons, this conception of ourselves must be a conception in terms of which we value ourselves. An autonomous agent must have some conception of himself in terms of which he values himself and which he sees as expressed in his actions and choices in such a way as to give rise to obligations, demands he makes on himself not to betray this value-laden self-conception: this is Korsgaard's understanding of how *integrity* is fundamental to a proper understanding of obligation. There are many possible such self-conceptions varying from person to person. But there is also the noncontingent conception of oneself as a creature that can be described in these terms, "a reflective animal who needs reasons to act and to live." This conception of ourselves as *human* stands behind all our more contingent and particular identities which we can only take seriously insofar as we take our identities as human seriously by valuing our humanity. This does not get us all the way to the moral law for, even if I must value *my own* humanity, why must I value *yours*? This worry is addressed in the fourth lecture where she argues, following Wittgenstein that reasons are essentially public: to recognize my reasons is to have at least a capacity to recognize yours. I might nonetheless think I can just disregard your reasons, taking as normatively significant the fact that *I am me* but, following Nagel, she argues that I cannot intelligibly do this if I am understand you, if I am to hear your words as speech and not merely as noise. This Kantian picture is, she concludes by arguing, consistent with a broad philosophical naturalism. But it answers Mackie's worry about how, consistently with such naturalism, there could possibly be "intrinsically normative" entities in the world. From the standpoint of practical reason (which is not the standpoint of science), we ourselves are such entities.

"The Normativity of Instrumental Reason" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*, pp. 215-254.

For Hume we do not take the means to the ends we rationally ought to pursue as there are no such ends; and we cannot but take the means to the ends we are going to pursue. So for Hume there can be no such thing as instrumental practical reason. For the dogmatic rationalist there are facts independent of my will about what there is reason to do. But what would these facts have to do with me, why should I care about them? Perhaps they speak to ends I must, if I am rational, have, so I must act as they prescribe as a means to these ends. But that already presupposes an instrumental rationality that is not independent of my will. The dogmatic rationalist thus admits a gap between willing the ends and willing the means that he has then no resources to close. The Humean identifies them and so makes instrumental reason something trivial that we cannot fail to satisfy. The solution is to see willing an end not merely as desiring it but as a commitment to do what it takes to attain it: in willing something I make a law for myself, taking my act of will as normative for me. Only thus does what I do take on the unity required to make these doings agency and their doer a person.

"The General Point of View: Love and Moral Approval in Hume's Ethics" in *Hume Studies* 25, 1999, pp. 3-42.

### 318. Julian Kovesi

*Moral Notions* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1967)  
 "Against the Ritual of "Is" and "Ought"" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978

**319.R. W. Krutzen**

"In Defence of Common Moral Sense" in *Dialogue* 38, 1999.

**320.Chandran Kukathas**

"Explaining moral variety" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Social Philosophy and Policy* 11, 1994

**321.Bruce Kuklick**

"The Analytic-Synthetic and the Descriptive-Evaluative Distinctions" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 3, 1969.

**322.Joel J. Kupperman**

"Value Judgments" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 42, 1982.

"Moral Realism and Metaphysical Antirealism" in *Metaphilosophy* 18, 1987.

"Ethical Fallibility" in *Ratio* 1, 1988.

"Ethics for Extraterrestrials" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 28, 1991

"Axiological Realism" in *Philosophy* 71, 1996.

*Value... And What Follows* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

"How Values Congeal into Facts" in *Ratio* 12, 2000.

**323.J. Ladd**

*The Structure of a Moral Code* (Cambridge, Ma.:Harvard University Press, 1957)

**324.Hugh LaFollette**

"The Truth in Ethical Relativism." *Journal of Social Philosophy*, 1991.

(ed.)*The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000)

**325.W. D. Lamont**

*The Value Judgment* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1955)

**326.Gerald Lang**

"The Rule Following Considerations and Metaethics" in *European journal of Philosophy* 9, 2001, pp. 190-209.

This paper is valuable for its singularly lucid and clear-headed reconstruction of the McDowellian argument from the Wittgensteinian Rule Following Considerations to moral realism. This is followed by a critique the central point of which is that even granting the central morals McDowell draws from the RFC still allows clear distinctions to be drawn between discourses admitting of greater or lesser degrees of objectivity, the RFC as such doing nothing to settle where on this spectrum moral discourse is best positioned.

**327.Marc Lange**

"Salience, Supervenience, and Layer Cakes in Sellars's Scientific Realism, McDowell's Moral Realism, and the Philosophy of Mind" in *Philosophical Studies* 103, 2000.

**328.Charles Larmore**

"Pluralism and reasonable disagreement" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*

**329.Jonathan Lear**

"Ethics, Mathematics and Relativism" in *Mind* 92, 1983.

"Moral Objectivity" in S. C. Brown, *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence*

## 330. J. E. Ledden

- "Mr Rynin on Definitions of "Value" in *Journal of Philosophy* 45, 1948.  
 "Concerning the Positivist View in Value Theory" in *Journal of Philosophy* 46, 1949.  
 "On the Logical Status of Value" in *Philosophical Review* 59, 1950

## 331. Richard Lee

- "Preference and Transitivity" in *Analysis* 44, 1984  
 "Williams, Ought, and Logical Form," *Analysis*, 47, 1987

## 332. Brian Leiter

- (Ed.) *Objectivity in Law and Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)  
 "Objectivity, Morality and Adjudication" in Leiter, *Objectivity in Law and Morals*  
 "Moral Facts and Best Explanations" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001, pp. 79-101.

## 333. James Lenman

- "Belief, Desire and Motivation: An Essay in Quasi-Hydraulics" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33, 1996.

Following Nagel, a number of writers, while conceding that desires must always play a part in the rational motivation of action, insist that these in turn may be motivated simply by beliefs. However, the same teleological considerations that inform the concession are shown to tell equally against this sophisticated anti-Humean strategy. There might certainly be a *causal* process that took us from beliefs, and only beliefs, to desires but this could not be a *rational* process of motivation by reasons. This defence of a Humean position is developed with reference to work by Darwall, Wallace and Smith.

- "The Externalist and the Amoralist" in *Philosophia* 27, 1999.

For an externalist like Brink, someone - an *amoralist* - can be coherently imagined who make moral judgements that leave her indifferent. Internalists such as Hare and Smith deny this, claiming that such a person fails to make genuine, full blooded moral judgements. Here I defend internalism, focusing on the case of a whole society who make moral judgements but take no practical interest in them. This thought experiment, I claim, makes little sense and its absurdity supports the view that the amoralist's moral judgements invite an "inverted commas" reading that sees them as parasitical on the full-blooded moral judgements of others.

- "Michael Smith and the Daleks: Reason, Morality and Contingency" in *Utilitas* 11, 1999.

Smith has defended *the rationalist's conceptual claim* that moral requirements are categorical requirements of reason, arguing that no status short of this would make sense of our taking these requirements as seriously as we do. Against this I argue that Smith has failed to show either that our moral commitments would be undermined by possessing only an internal contextual justification or that they need presuppose any expectation that rational agents must converge on their acceptance.

- "Preferences in their Place" in *Environmental Values* 9, 2000

In at least some of their forms, Cost-Benefit techniques for the evaluation of environmental projects and policies treat the preferences of citizens as the sole determinants of the value of outcomes. There are two salient ways in which this supposition might be defended. The first is metaethical and appeals to considerations about how we must understand talk of environmental and other values. The second is political and appeals to considerations about proper democratic legitimacy and the proper aims of public policy. Metaethical considerations, I argue, are something of a red herring here. Roughly subjectivist understandings of our talk of values may be appealingly metaphysically unassuming, but in their most plausible formulations they do not support a view of preferences as the sole determinants of value. Political considerations, on the other hand, are to be taken very seriously. They offer, however, no straightforward rationale for any crudely preferentialist measure of social value. Findings obtained from the use of cost-benefit techniques might sometimes have a legitimate role as an input into, but not as a substitute for, political deliberation. Questions about the scope and limits of such legitimacy are properly addressed in political and not in metaethical terms.

.Disciplined Syntacticism and Moral Expressivism. in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 66, 2003, pp. 32-57.

Moral Expressivists typically concede that, in some minimal sense, moral sentences are truth-apt but claim that in some more robust sense they are not. The Immodest Disciplined Syntacticist, a species of minimalist about truth, raises a doubt as to whether this contrast can be made out. I address this challenge by motivating and describing a distinction between reducibly and irreducibly truth-apt sentences. In the light of this distinction the Disciplined Syntacticist must either adopt a more modest version of his theory, friendlier to expressivism., or substantially modify it, abandoning one of its central conditions on truth-aptness. One natural and promising such modification, the Pure Discipline View, is described and its implications for an understanding of Expressivism briefly discussed.

"Moral Deviants and Amoral Saints: A Dilemmas for Moral Externalism" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 41, 2003, pp. 223-240.

This paper argues that if the externalist moral realist is a naturalist about moral value, he faces familiar difficulties about making clear sense of moral disagreement. If, on the other hand, he is a nonnaturalist about moral value, a rather less familiar difficulty looms: such a position leaves conceptual space not only for an "amoralist" but for an amoralist whose amoralism is no kind of moral defect and consistent with moral sainthood. This serves to reinforce the suspicion that "morality" as the externalist moral realist understands it has remarkably little to do with morality.

"Noncognitivism and the Dimensions of Evaluative Judgement", Bears, 2003.

Michael Smith has cooked up an argument against noncognitivism urging that noncognitivists cannot capture the way evaluative judgements differ in the contrasting dimensions of certitude, importance and robustness. I show here how they can.

"Noncognitivism and Wishfulness" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 6, 2003, pp. 265-274.

In response to Dorr's "Non-Cognitivism and Wishful Thinking", I argue that noncognitivists can in fact make excellent sense of inferences to factual conclusions from premises at least one of which is moral as involving no irrational wishful thinking.

"How to Live, What to Do: A Critical Study of Allan Gibbard: *Thinking How to Live*" in *Journal of Moral Philosophy* 3, 2006, pp. 359-369.

"Moral Naturalism" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2006.

"The Saucer of Mud, The Kudzu Vine and the Uxorious Cheetah: Against Neo-Aristotelian Naturalism in Metaethics" in *European Journal of Analytic Philosophy* 1, 2005, pp. 37-50.

The early part of this paper criticizes Anscombe and Quinn on the relationship between value and desire. Their influential discussions of strange and unusual desires do not, I argue, show what they are intended to show. The remainder focuses primarily on the views of Foot, discussing her objections to subjectivism and in particular expressivism. The expressivist, she claims, can not make adequate sense of the way we apply evaluative terms to nonsentient living things such as plants. I argue to the contrary and urge that the metaethical significance of such applications is greatly exaggerated by Foot and other neo-Aristotelian naturalists.

### 334. Ray Lepley

"The Verifiability of Different Kinds of Facts and Values" in *Philosophy of Science* 7, 1940.

"The Identity of Fact and Value" in *Philosophy of Science* 10, 1943.

"Three Relations of Facts and Values" in *Philosophical Review* 52, 1943.

"Fact, Value and Meaning" in *Philosophical Review* 54, 1945.

*Verifiability of Value* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944).

(ed.) *Value: A Cooperative Enquiry* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949).

(ed.) *The Language of Value* (New York: Columbia U.P., 1957)

### 335. Isaac Levi

"Perception as Input and as Reason for Action" in Couture and Nielsen, *On the Relevance of Metaethics*

### 336. Margaret Levi and Valerie Braithwaite

*Trust and Governance* (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1998)

**337. Jerrold Levison**

(ed.) *Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

**338. Casimir Lewey**

"Moore on the Naturalistic Fallacy" in *Proc. Brit. Ac.* 50, 1964.

**339. C. I. Lewis**

*An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (LaSalle, Ill., Open Court, 1946)

**340. David Lewis**

"Desire as Belief" in *Mind* 97, 1988, pp. 323-332

"Dispositional Theories of Value" in *P. A. S. S.* 1989, pp. 113-137.

"Desire as Belief II" in *Mind* 105, 1996, pp. 303-313.

**341. H. D. Lewis**

*Contemporary British Philosophy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1976)

**342. Marcel Lieberman**

*Commitment, Value and Moral Realism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

**343. Hallvard Lillehammer**

"Smith on Moral Fetishism" in *Analysis* 57, 1997.

"Analytic Dispositionalism and Practical Reason" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 2, 1999.

"Normative Antirealism" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 37, 1999

"Revisionary Dispositionalism and Practical Reason" in *The Journal of Ethics* 4, 2000.

**344. Margaret Olivia Little**

"Moral Realism I: Naturalism" in *Philosophical Books* 35, 1994

"Moral Realism II: Non-Naturalism" in *Philosophical Books* 35, 1994

"Seeing and Caring: The Role of Affect in Feminist Moral Epistemology" in *Hypatia* 1995

"Virtue as Knowledge: Objections from the Philosophy of Mind" in *Nous* 1997, pp. 59-79.

"Moral Generalities Revisited" in Hooker and Little, *Moral Particularism*, pp. 276-304.

**345. Don Locke**

"The Trivializability of Universalizability" in *Philosophical Review* 78, 1968

"Beliefs, Desires and reasons for Action" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 19, 1982

**346. Robert Lockie**

"What's Wrong With Moral Internalism?" in *Ratio* 11, 1998

**347. Don Loeb**

"Full-Information Theories of Individual Good" in *Social theory and Practice* 21, 1995.

"Generality and Moral Justification" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 56, 1996.

"Must a Moral Irrealist be a Pragmatist" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 33, 1996

"Moral Realism and the Argument from Disagreement" in *Philosophical Studies* 90, 1998

348. **Sabina Lovibond**

*Realism and Imagination in Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983)

"Ethical Upbringing: From Connivance to Cognition" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*

349. **Sabina Lovibond and Stephen Williams**

(eds.) *Identity, Truth and Value: Essays for David Wiggins* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)

350. **J. R. Lucas**

"Ethical Intuitionism II" in *Philosophy* 46, 1971

"Dubious Doubts" in Doeser and Kraay, *Facts and Values*

351. **W. G. Lycan**

"How to Derive 'Ought' from 'May'" in *Ratio* 19, 1977.

"Moral Facts and Moral Knowledge in Gillespie, *Moral Realism*, pp. 79-94.

352. **David Lyons**

"Ethical Relativism and the Problem of Incoherence" in *Ethics* 86, 1976, pp. 107-121.

353. **H. J. McCloskey**

"Towards an Objectivist Ethic" in *Ethics* 73, 1962.

"A Difficulty for Some Non-Objectivist Metaethics" in *Philosophical Studies* 14, 1963.

"Objectivism in Aesthetics" in *Ethics* 74, 1963.

"D-Words, A-Words and G-Words" in *Philosophical Studies* 16, 1965.

*Meta-Ethics and Normative Ethics* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969)

"Intuitionism and Rational Ends: Regan's Account of the Intuitionist's Dilemma" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 9, 1975.

"The Right to Political Power and the Objectivity and Values" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 15, 1977.

"Universalized Prescriptivism and Utilitarianism: Hare's Attempted Forced Marriage" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 13, 1979.

354. **Terrance C. McConnell**

"Moral Dilemmas and Consistency in Ethics" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 8, 1978.

"Metaethical Principles, Meta-Prescriptions and Moral Theories" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 22, 1985.

"On the Nature and Scope of Morality" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54, 1994.

355. **Graham MacDonald and Crispin Wright**

(ed.) *Fact, Science and Morality* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1986)

356. **John McDowell**

"Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" in *P.A.S.S.* 52, 1978, pp. 13-29.

"Virtue and Reason" in *The Monist* 62, 1979, pp. 331-350.

"Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following" in Holzmann and Leich, *Wittgenstein: To Follow A Rule*

"Aesthetic Value, Objectivity and the Fabric of the World" in Schaper, *Pleasure, Preference and Value*

"Values and Secondary Qualities" in Honderich, *Morality and Objectivity*

We need to distinguish two senses of the "objective"/"subjective" distinction. In one some property is objective if "what it is for something to have it can be adequately understood otherwise than in terms of dispositions to give rise to certain subjective states" and otherwise subjective. In the other a property is objective if it is "there to be experienced, as opposed to being a mere figment of the subjective state that purports to be an experience of it" and otherwise subjective. Colours and other secondary qualities exemplify for McDowell the combination of subjectivity in the first sense with objectivity in the second. After a lengthy defence of this realist understanding of secondary qualities, he

suggests that we think of value as analogous in similar terms. There is nonetheless a crucial *disanalogy*. Values are not merely such as to elicit the relevant response from us but such as to merit that response. We make sense of our responses in terms of their being merited by their objects. This is certainly not causal explanation - and McDowell thinks values have no role to play in causal explanation. But it is certainly explanation and explanation which requires us to accept values as objectively (sense 2) there. When we can offer such explanation of our responses, showing that their objects merit such responses and how they do, we vindicate our claims to knowledge of moral properties. Blackburn's projectivism, like Mackie's presupposes a false picture of an external value-free reality onto which value is imposed by our psychological processing mechanism. This is metaphysically objectionable, thinks McDowell. It is also objectionable in terms of ethics as it implies the possibility of a detached external understanding of this mechanism. And that would require us to think of our ethical competence as capturable by some set of principles in a way uncongenial to the particularism McDowell favours.

*Projection and Truth in Ethics* (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1987)

For the realist intuitionist moral attitudes are responses to properties. For the projectivist the properties are projections of the attitudes. McDowell tries here to articulate a middle position. He denies that we can get a conceptual purchase on the attitudes in question without exploiting the concepts of the properties in question. Hence, he thinks, the former cannot be explanatorily prior to the latter. We "earn" truth for ethical claims by locating them in the "space of reasons" rather than by trying to "place" them within a metaphysical perspective external to them. The projectivist wants to deny there are ethical facts and then earn a notion of ethical truth. But the question what to count as facts cannot be viewed as prior to and independent of the question what to count as truths. What we need to place are not just sentiments but pairs of sentiments and features, "an interlocking complex of subjective and objective, of response and feature responded to".

*Mind and World* (Harvard: Harvard University Press, 1996), especially Lecture IV  
 "Might There Be External Reasons" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*  
 "Two Sorts of Naturalism" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, *Virtues and Reasons*

#### 357. D. McFarland and A. Miller

"Response-Dependence Without Reduction?" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76, 1998.

#### 358. James W. McGray

"From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism: A Logical Gap" in *Philosophy Research Archives* 12, 1987.  
 "Universal Prescriptivism and Practical Skepticism" in *Philosophical Papers* 19, 1990.

#### 359. Alastair MacIntyre

"What Morality is Not" in *Philosophy* 32, 1957.  
 "Imperatives, Reasons for Action and Morals" in *Journal of Philosophy* 62, 1965 and in *Against the Self-Images of the Age*.  
*A Short History of Ethics* (London: Routledge, 1967).  
 "The Antecedents of Action" in Williams and Montefiore, *British Analytic Philosophy. Against the Self-Images of the Age* (London: Duckworth, 1971)  
*After Virtue* (London: Duckworth, 1981)(Second Edition, 1984).  
 "How Moral Agents Became Ghosts" in *Synthese* 53, 1982.  
 "Relativism, Power and Philosophy," in *Proceedings and Addresses of The American Philosophical Association* 59, 1985  
 "Practical Rationalities as forms of Social Structure" in *Irish Philosophical Journal* 4, 1987.  
*Whose Justice? Which Rationality?* (London: Duckworth, 1988).  
 "Moral Dilemmas" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50, 1990.  
*Three Rival Versions of Moral Inquiry* (London: Duckworth, 1990).  
 "Pecis of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality?*" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 51, 1991.  
 "Reply to Dahl, Baier and Schneewind" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 51, 1991  
 "Moral Relativism: Truth and Justification" in Gormally, *Truth and Tradition in Ethics*  
 "What Can Moral Philosophers Learn From the Study of the Brain?" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, 1998.

#### 360. J. L. Mackie



"A Refutation of Morals" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 24, 1946  
*Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong* (Harmonsworth, Penguin, 1977)

**361.J. Cameron MacKenzie**

"Prescriptivism and Rational Behaviour" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 18, 1968.  
 "Moral Skepticism and Moral Conduct" in *Philosophy* 59. 1984

**362.Jefferson McMahan**

"Moral Intuition" in LaFollette, *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*

**363.David McNaughton**

*Moral Vision* (Blackwell 1988)  
 "An Unconnected Heap of Duties?" *Philosophical Quarterly* 46, 1996

**364.David McNaughton and Piers Rawling**

"Agent-Relativity and the Doing-Happening Distinction", in *Philosophical Studies*, 1991  
 "Honoring and Promoting Values", *Ethics* 102, 1992  
 "Deontology and Agency", *Monist* 76, 1993  
 "Value and Agent-Relative Reasons", *Utilitas* 1995  
 "Naturalism and Normativity" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume, 2003, pp. 24-45.

**365.J. D. Mabbott**

"True and False in Morals" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 49, 1949.  
 "Reason and Desire" in *Philosophy* 28, 1953

**366.Tibor Machan**

"A Note on Independence" in *Philosophical Studies* 30, 1976  
 "Epistemology and Moral Knowledge" in *Review of Metaphysics* 36, 1982  
 "Why it Appears that Objective Ethical Claims are Subjective" in *Philosophia* 26, 1998.

**367.Tito Magri**

"Freres Ennemis: The Common Root of Expressivism and Constructivism" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

Magri notes that moral expressivism and neo-Kantian constructivism share an insistence that morality can only be made intelligible from a distinctively practical standpoint and a tendency to regard questions of correctness and justification as arising within our moral practice and answerable to criteria internal to it. However both views, Magri suggests, while they give an account of how moral justification is possible within our moral practices fail somehow to explain how it is *possible for there to be practices like that* and in the absence of such an explanation leave open the possibility that the authority we attach to certain moral claims is simply an illusion.

**368.Stephen Maitzen**

"Closing the 'Is'-'Ought' Gap" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12, 1982

**369.Ruth Barcan Marcus**

"Moral Dilemmas and Consistency" in *Journal of Philosophy* 77, 1980.  
 "More about Moral Dilemmas" in Mason, *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory*

**370.Patricia Marino**

"Moral Dilemmas, Collective Responsibility, and Moral Progress" in *Philosophical Studies* 104, 2001, pp. 203-225

**371. Joel Marks**

(ed.) *The Ways of Desire: New Essays in Philosophical Psychology and on the Concept of Wanting* (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1986.)

**372. H. Mason**

"Realistic Interpretations of Moral Questions" in *Midwest Studies* 12, 1988  
(ed.) *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996).

**373. G. M. Matthews**

"Evaluative and Descriptive" in *Mind* 67, 1958.

**374. Wallace I. Matson**

"The Expiration of Morality" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*

**375. Bernard Mayo**

"Mr Hampshire on Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" in *Mind* 59, 1950.  
"Objectivity in Morals" in *Philosophy* 26, 1951.  
"Commitments and Reasons" in *Mind* 64, 1955.

**376. Gay Meeks**

(ed.) *Thoughtful Economic Man* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991)

**377. A. I. Melden**

(ed.) *Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Seattle: 1958)

**378. Alfred R. Mele**

"Intending and the Balance of Motivation" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 66, 1984, pp. 370-376.  
"Are Intentions Self-Referential?" in *Philosophical Studies* 52, 1987, pp. 309-329.  
"Against a Belief-Desire Analysis of Intention" in *Philosophia* 18, 1988, pp. 239-242.  
"Effective Reasons and Intrinsically Motivated Actions" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 48, 1988, pp. 723-731.  
"Motivational Internalism: the Powers and Limits of Practical Reasoning" in *Philosophia* 19, 1989, pp. 417-436.  
*Springs of Action: Understanding Intentional Behaviour* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992)  
"Motivation: Essentially Motivation-Constituting Attitudes" in *Philosophical Review* 104, 1995, pp. 387-423.  
"Internalist Moral Cognitivism and Listlessness" in *Ethics* 106, 1996, pp. 727-753.  
*Motivation and Agency* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003)

**379. Joseph Mendola**

"Normative Realism, or Bernard Williams and Ethics at the Limit," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 67, 1989.  
"Objective Value and Subjective States," in *Philosophical and Phenomenological Research* 50, 1990.

**380. Peter Menzies and Graham Oddie**

"AN Objectivist's Guide to Subjective Value" in *Ethics* 102, 1992, pp. 512-534.

**381. Hugo Meynell**

"The Objectivity of Value Judgments" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 21, 1971.

**382. Alexander Miller**

"An Objection to Smith's Argument for Internalism" in *Analysis* 56, 1996  
 "Emotivism and the Verification Principle" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 98, 1998.

**383. Arthur R. Miller**

"In Defence of a Logic of Imperatives" in *Metaphilosophy* 15, 1984.

**384. R. W. Miller**

"Ways of Moral Learning" in *Philosophical Review* 94, 1985, pp. 502-550.

**385. Elijah Millgram**

"Pleasure in Practical Reasoning" in *The Monist* 76, 1993, pp. 394-415.

"Inhaltsreiche ethische Begriffe und die Unterscheidung zwischen Tatsachen und Werten" in Fehige, *Zum moralischen Denken*, volume 1, pp. 354-388.

Millgram notes the widespread belief that there is an argument from our mastery of thick ethical concepts (TECs) to the failure of the fact-value distinction (FVD) but contends that no such argument has ever really been made. Williams challenges advocates of the FVD to explain how to distinguish the descriptive and evaluative components of thick concepts but offers little by way of convincing argument to persuade us that the challenge cannot be met (Millgram describes a way of meeting it adapted from Hare). McDowell considers the idea of factoring out the meaning of thick concepts in terms of some descriptive concept plus some rule and claims that the rules in question are uncodifiable. But this argument is only effective if we (incorrectly) suppose grasping and applying a TEC fully and unequivocally to determine how one will act in the situation it applies to. Virtue concepts are special for McDowell as their full mastery confers moral infallibility. But if we understand virtue concepts *like that*, there is no reason to suppose anyone has ever mastered one. Putnam's arguments against the FVD make no essential reference to TECs and are based less on the uncontroversial premise that we are masters of such concepts than on his "internal realism". And Murdoch's rejection of the FVD was motivated by considerations about moral psychology, not language. (A neat paper that deserves to be better known: someone should publish an English version.)

"Williams' Argument Against External Reasons" in *Nous* 30, 1996, pp. 197-220.

"Hume on Practical Reasoning" in *Iyyun* 46, 199, pp. 235-265.

*Practical Induction* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1997)

We couldn't just get ourselves to desire things by e.g. taking pills that made do so. For desires with such a poor inferential pedigree would be unstable. The unity of agency, presupposed by practical reasoning's having any point, demands that one's practical and other judgements be structured by a complex array of potential and actual inferential links, in particular "upstream" links that furnish our desires with rational underpinning and the possibility of defeat; such links also furnish these things to those "somewhat general" practical judgements with which we connect and prioritise among our desires. What we find when we follow such links backwards to their most fundamental source is a practical form of observation, more specifically pleasure: "the rock-bottom judgment of desirability of an object of present experience." A key role is also played by the practical judgements of others, and in particular of our friends, judgements to which we accord a status close to our own as inputs into in practical reasoning. This practical learning from experience, generalizing from relatively particular practical observations and testimony to relatively general practical judgements, is what Millgram understands by "practical induction", the capacity for which he argues is indispensable given the complexity of the world and the pervasive novelty we encounter there. In the light of this picture of practical reason we may reject an instrumental understanding of practical reasoning as responsible simply to antecedently given desires. Suggestive, engaging and original.

"Deciding to Desire" in Fehige and Wessels, *Preferences*, pp. 3-25.

Incommensurability and Practical Reasoning In Chang, *Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason*, pp. 151-169.

"Moral Values and Secondary Qualities" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 36, 1999, pp. 253-255.

"Coherence: The Price of the Ticket" in *Journal of Philosophy* 97, 2000, pp. 82-93.

"Mill's Proof of the Principle of Utility" in *Ethics* 110, 2000, pp. 282-310.

An ingenious reconstruction and criticism of Mill's Proof. Millgram seeks to generalize his criticism to all who combine (a) an instrumentalist view of practical reason whereby practical reasoning is exhausted by means-end reasoning with

(b) a privileging of the desires of people who meet a certain standard (the desires of Mill's experienced judges or - on more modern accounts - of fully informed and rational agents). (b) only makes much sense if there is a story to be told about why desires that meet the standard are somehow correct ones to have. But successfully to tell that story would be to engage in a piece of noninstrumental practical reasoning of the sort forbidden by (a).

"Commensurability in Perspective" in *Topoi* 21, 2002, pp. 217-226.

**386. Elijah Millgram and Paul Thagard**

"Deliberative Coherence" in *Synthese*, 108, July 1996, pp. 63-88..

**387. Ronald D. Milo**

"Moral Deadlock" in *Philosophy*, 1986

"Rights and Wrongs" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 23, 1986

"Skepticism and Moral Justification" in *The Monist* 76, 1993

"Contractarian Constructivism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 92, 1995

Recommends the adoption of an ideal hypothetical agreement understanding of ethics as a metaethical position that avoids implausible metaphysical commitment but allows us to make good sense of moral judgements as true and, at least sometimes, as objectively true in a way which may be evidence transcendent but which is also stance-dependent in that moral properties are constituted by an attitude, real or hypothetical, held towards their bearers. IN order to secure for the theory the correct subject matter the idealizing conditions of the contracting parties must be chosen with a view to the principles on which they agree embodying genuine impartiality of some sort and including such paradigmatic moral principles as prohibitions on lying, cheating and stealing. Beyond that these conditions should be maximally normatively neutral. If the upshot is a significant degree of indeterminacy with respect to what such contracting parties can agree that is acceptable: once a core of objective moral truth is secure, Milo is happy to accept a relativistic understanding of other parts of the moral domain.

**388. Joe Mintoff**

"Defending Instrumental Reason" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 36, 1998

**389. Cheryl Misak**

"Pragmatism, Empiricism and Morality" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*

**390. Dorothy Mitchell**

"Are Moral Principles Really Necessary?" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 41, 1963.

"Some Comments on Ethical Distinctions" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 13, 1963.

"Must we Talk about 'Is' and 'Ought'?" in *Mind* 77, 1968.

"Mill's Theory of Value" in *Theoria* 36, 1970.

"Why Should I be Moral?" in *Ratio* 12, 1970.

**391. Michelle M. Moody-Adams**

"On the Alleged Methodological Infirmity of Ethics" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 27, 1990.

"Gender and the Complexity of Moral Voices" in Card, *Feminist Ethics*

*Fieldwork in Familiar Places: Morality, Culture and Philosophy* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1997)

"The Virtues of Nussbaum's Essentialism" in *Metaphilosophy* 29, 1998.

**392. A. W. Moore**

"On There Being Nothing Else to Think, or Want, or Do" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*

**393. G. E. Moore**

*Principia Ethica* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1903)

*Ethics* (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912)

*Philosophical Studies* (London: Paul, Trench and Trubner, 1922), VIII, "The Concept of Intrinsic Value" and X "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"

"A Reply to My Critics" in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*, pp. 535-687.

#### 394. Mary Mothersill

"Moral Philosophy and Meta-Ethics" in *Journal of Philosophy* 49, 1952

"C. I. Lewis: Hedonistic Ethics on a Kantian Model" in *Philosophical Studies* 5, 1954.

"The Use of Normative Language" in *Journal of Philosophy* 52, 1955.

"Moral Knowledge" in *Journal of Philosophy* 56, 1959.

"Agents, Critics and Moral Philosophers" in *Mind* 69, 1960.

"Anscombe's Account of the Practical Syllogism" in *Philosophical Review* 71, 1962.

"The Moral Dilemmas Debate" in Mason, *Moral Dilemmas*

#### 395. John J. Mulhern

"Moral Arguments and Moral Beliefs" in *Logique et Analyse* 17, 1974.

#### 396. Kumiko Murasugi and Robert Stainton

(eds.) *Philosophy and Linguistics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1999)

#### 397. James Bernard Murphy

"Practical Reason and Moral Psychology in Aristotle and Kant" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

#### 398. Robert H. Myers

"On the Explanation, the Justification and the Interpretation of Action" in *Nous* 29, 1995

"The Inescapability of Moral Reasons" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 59, 1999.

#### 399. Thomas Nagel

*The Possibility of Altruism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970)

*The View From Nowhere* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)

"The Foundations of Impartiality" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*

"Universality and the Reflective Self" in Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*

For Nagel the detached character of the view we take of ourselves in reflection is such that in valuing myself I thereby accord authority equally to my own reasons and those of others. Korsgaard's Kantian argument, on the other hand only establishes, in the first instance, egoistic reasons and a second Wittgensteinian step is required to take us further. But the second step does not work and her reliance on it makes her theory unattractively egoistic.

#### 400. George Nakhnikian

"Intrinsic Good and the Ethical 'Ought'" in *Journal of Philosophy* 51, 1954.

"An Examination of Toulmin's Analytical Ethics" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 9, 1959.

"On the Naturalistic Fallacy" in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, *Morality and the Language of Conduct*

"Generalization in Ethics" in *Review of Metaphysics* 17, 1964.

"Kantian Universalizability and the Objectivity of Moral Judgments" in Potter and Timmons, *Morality and Universality*

#### 401. Mark Nelson

"Intuitionism and Conservativism" in *Metaphilosophy* 21, 1990

"Intuitionism and Subjectivism" in *Metaphilosophy* 22, 1991.

"Is it Always Fallacious to Derive Values from Facts?" in *Argumentation*, Vol.9 1995

"Morally Serious Critics of Moral Intuitions" in *Ratio* 12, 1999

**402. Kai Nielsen**

- "The Functions of Moral Discourse" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 7, 1957.  
 "Is 'Why Should I Be Moral?' an Absurdity?" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 36, 1958.  
 "The 'Good Reasons' Approach and 'Ontological Justification' of Morality" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 9, 1959.  
 "On Moral Truth" in Rescher, *Studies in Moral Philosophy*  
 "Anthropology and Moral Theory" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 5, 1971.  
 "On Refusing to Play the Sceptics' Game" in *Dialogue* 11, 1972.  
 "Covert and Overt Synonymity: Brandt and Moore on the 'Naturalistic Fallacy'" in *Philosophical Studies* 25, 1974.  
 "On Considered Judgments" in *Ratio* 19, 1977.  
 "On Deriving an Ought from an Is: A Retrospective Look" in *Review of Metaphysics* 32, 1979.  
 "Considered Judgments Again" in *Human Studies* 5, 1982.  
 "On Needing a Moral Theory: Rationality, Considered Judgments and the Grounding of Morality" in *Metaphilosophy* 13, 1982.  
 "Against Ethical Rationalism" in Regis, Gewirth's *Ethical Rationalism*  
 "Universalisability and the Commitment to Impartiality" in Potter and Timmons, *Morality and Universalizability*  
 "In Defence of Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in Odegard. *Ethics and Justification*.  
 "Reflective Equilibrium and the Transformation of Philosophy" in *Metaphilosophy* 20, 1989.  
*Why Be Moral?* (Buffalo: Prometheus, 1989)  
 "Relativism and Wide Reflective Equilibrium" in *The Monist* 76, 1993

**403. Mordecai Nisan**

- "The Child as Philosopher of Values: The Development of a Distinct Perception of Values in Childhood" in *Journal of Moral Education* 17, 1988.  
 "Moral Balance: A Model of How People Arrive at Moral Decisions" in Wren, *The Moral Balance*  
 "Personal Identity and Education for the Desirable" in *Journal of Moral Education* 25, 1996.

**404. Robert Noggle**

- "The Nature of Motivation (And Why It Matters Less to Ethics than One Might Think)" in *Philosophical Studies* 87, 1997, pp. 87-111.

**405. Daniel Nolan, Greg Restall and Caroline West**

- "Moral Fictionalism versus The Rest" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83, 2005, pp. 307-329.

**406. Richard Norman**

- Reasons for Action* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1971)  
 "Making Sense of Moral Realism" in *Philosophical Investigations* 20, 1987.

**407. Gertrud Nunner-Winkler**

- "Moral Relativism and Strict Universalism" in Wren, *The Moral Domain*

**408. Martha Nussbaum**

- "The Discernment of Perception" in *Proc. Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy* 1, 1985.  
*The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge: C.U.P. 1986)  
 "Finely Aware and Richly Responsible: Philosophy and the Moral Task of Literature" in Cascardi, *Philosophy and the Moral Task of Literature*  
 "Nature, Function and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution" in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy*, Supp Vol 1, 1988.  
 "Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach" in *Midwest Studies*, 1988.  
 "Aristotle, Nature and Ethics" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*.

**409. Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover**

- (eds.) *Women, Culture and Development* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995)

**410. Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen**

"Internal Criticism and the Indian Rationalist Tradition" in Krausz (ed), *Relativism: Interpretation and Confrontation* (ed.) *The Quality of Life* (New York: O.U.P., 1993)

**411. Ken O'Day**

"Normativity and Interpersonal Reasons" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 1, 1998

**412. Graham Oddie**

"Supervenience, Goodness and higher-Order Universals" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 1991.  
 "Harmony, Purity, Truth" in *Mind* 103, 1994, pp.451-472.  
 "Moral Realism, Moral Relativism and Moral Rules: A Compatibility Argument" in *Synthese* 117, 1999.  
 "Axiological Atomism" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 79, 2001, pp. 313-332.  
*Value, Reality and Desire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005)

**413. Douglas Odegard**

*Ethics and Justification* (Edmonton: Academic Printing and Publishing, 1988)

**414. Douglas Odegard and Carole Stewart**

(ed.) *Perspectives on Moral Relativism* (Lilliken: Agathon, 1991)

**415. Harald Ofstad**

"Objectivity of Norms and Value Judgements According to Recent Scandinavian Philosophy" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 12, 1951.  
 "Broad on Ought and Can" in *Theoria* 21, 1955  
 "The Functions of Moral Philosophy" in *Inquiry* 1, 1958.  
 "Frankena on Ought and Can" in *Mind* 68, 1959.  
 "A Note on John Searle's Derivation of 'Ought' from 'Is'" in *Inquiry* 8, 1965

**416. R. G. Olson**

"Emotivism and Moral Skepticism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1959

**417. John O'Leary Hawthorne and Graham Oppy**

"Minimalism and Truth" in *Nous* 31, 1997

**418. John O'Leary-Hawthorne and Huw Price**

"How to Stand up for Non-Cognitivists" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 74, 1996, pp. 275-292.

O'L & P distinguish semantic characterizations of noncognitivism (in terms of truth-aptness) and psycholocial ways (in terms of belief). Both views are threatened by minimalist positions that reject thick or substantial notions of truth and/or belief. Jackson, Oppy and Smith, O'L & P argue stand up for noncognitivists the wrong way, appealing to 'platitudes' about motivation less explicitly embodied in folk practice than is what the noncognitivist is denying. They argue that noncognitivists should explore a 'third-leg' strategy, one that focuses on the diversity of function found in different parts of language but without insisting on a substantial notion of truth.

**419. Derek Parfit**

*Reasons and Persons* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984)  
 "Reasons and Motivation" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* 71, 1997

Parfit seeks to show that Williams' arguments that there could not be external reasons are inconclusive. We should accept that reasons are such that, if we are rational and know the facts, we will be motivated accordingly. But this does not show that reasons must be internal reasons if we reject, as he thinks we should, a Humean theory of motivation; or if we gloss "rational" as having a substantive and not merely procedural sense. He concedes that it is hard to give a clear sense to external reason statements, but urges that, whatever reasons are, they cannot be understood in the reductive way Williams proposes - or in any other reductive way. Normative facts are too radically different from facts of other kinds for any form of reductionist or naturalist account of them to be credible. To see this, he urges, it is important we distinguish certain facts which are normatively significant from the fact that they are normatively significant. Once we deny reductionism, he then claims, internalism about reasons is no more plausible than externalism.

"Normativity" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 325-380.

#### 420. H. J. Paton

*The Good Will* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1927)  
"The Emotive Theory of Ethics" in P.A.S.S., 1948.

#### 421. Herlinde Pauer-Studer

(Ed.): *Norms, Values and Society* (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1994).

#### 422. Ellen Frankel Paul

(eds.) *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1994)

#### 423. Christopher Peacocke

*The Realm of Reason* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), especially chapters 7 and 8.

#### 424. Martin Perlmutter

"Moral Intuitions and Philosophical Method" in Westphal, *Pragmatism, Reason and Norms*

#### 425. R. B. Perry

*General Theory of Value* (New York: Longmans, Green and Co, 1926)

#### 426. Philip Pettit

"Evaluative "Realism" and Interpretation" in Holzmann and Leich, *Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule*  
"Humeans, Anti-Humeans and Motivation" in *Mind* 1987.  
"Virtus Normativa: Rational Choice Perspectives" in *Ethics* 100, 1990  
"Practical Beliefs and Philosophical Theory" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 76, 1998  
"Two Sources of Morality" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

#### 427. Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler, Michael Smith and Jay Wallace

(eds.): *Reason and Value. Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004)

#### 428. Philip Pettit and Michael Smith

"Backgrounding Desire" in *Philosophical Review* 99, 1990.

Among the most important recent contributions to moral psychology. Pettit and Smith argue that we can insist that desire always have a motivational role in human decision-making - figuring in the background of decision - without always appearing in the content of deliberation - figuring in the foreground. (They call this the strict background view of



desire.) Deliberation, they contend, always features some representation of the proposed action or outcome as having some desirable property. It would be implausible to suppose that this property is always just the property of being desired for that would leave us unable to make sense of desires that lack a "desire-related scope", categorical desires not conditional on their own existence. Because desires that figure only in the background need not be phenomenologically salient this understanding of decision-making undermines phenomenological objections to a Humean theory of motivation. Because the fact that an action will satisfy a desire of mine is often nothing to do with my deliberative reason for doing it, we can resist the Harean argument from universalizability to utilitarianism. Because I can take my own desires particularly seriously in deliberation without necessarily taking them seriously qua my desires we can endorse Williams integrity-objection to utilitarianism without integrity seeming just to be "a questionable partiality to self". Because the desires on which we act are not always in the foreground we should not conceive of the autonomous agent as one who always endorses these desires but rather as one whose stable desires for certain kinds of action and outcome are not undermined by pathological- capricious or compulsive - desires. And because we need not foreground the desires on which we act, we can understand the prudent agent as sensitive in deliberation to the facts about what she will desire in a way not mediated by consideration of his now-for-then desires without following Nagel in putting an anti-Humean gloss on such an understanding.

"Embracing Objectivity in Ethics" in Leiter, *Objectivity in Law and Morals*

**429. David Phillips**

"How to Be a Moral Relativist" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 35, 1997

"The Middle Ground in Moral Semantics" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 35, 1998

**430. Paul M. Pietroski**

"Prima Facie Obligations, Ceteris Paribus Laws in Moral Theory" in *Ethics* 103, 1993, pp. 489-515.

**431. Charles R. Pigden**

"Anscombe on 'Ought'" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 38, 1988.

"Logic and the Autonomy of Ethics" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 67, 1989

"Geach on Good" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 40, 1990.

"Ought-Implies-Can: Erasmus, Luther and R. M. Hare" in *Sophia* 29, 1990.

"Naturalism" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*

**432. Christian Piller**

"Doing What is Best" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 50, 2000

"Normative Practical Reasoning" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume* 75, 2001

**433. Adrian Piper**

"Instrumentalism, Objectivity and Moral Justification" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 23, 1986

**434. Mark Platts**

*Ways of Meaning* (London: Routledge, 1979), esp. chapter 10.

"Moral Reality and the End of Desire" in Platts, *Reference, Truth and Reality*, pp. 69-82.

(ed.) *Reference, Truth and Reality* (London: Routledge, 1980)

"Hume and Morality as a Matter of Fact" in *Mind* 97, 1988

*Moral Realities* (London: Routledge, 1992)

**435. Louis P. Pojman**

(ed.) *Ethical Theory* (Belmont: Wadsworth, 1988)

"Gilbert Harman's Internalist Moral Relativism," *The Modern Schoolman*, Vol. 68 (November, 1990)

**436. B. C. Postow**

Moral Relativism Avoided" in *Personalist* 60, 1979

"Werner's Ethical Realism" in *Ethics* 95, 1985

**437. Nelson Potter and Mark Timmons**

(Eds.) *Morality and Universality* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1985)

**438. A. W. Price**

"Varieties of Objectivity and Values" in *P. A. S.* 82, 1983

**439. H. H. Price**

*Belief* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969), esp. Lectures 7 and 8.

**440. Huw Price**

"Semantic Minimalism and the Frege Point" in Tsohatzidis, *Foundations of Speech Act Theory*, pp. 132-155.

**441. H. A. Prichard**

"Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake" in *Mind* 21, 1912

**442. Arthur Prior**

*Logic and the Basis of Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1948)

"The Autonomy of Ethics" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 38, 1960

**443. Hilary Putnam**

"The Place of Facts in a World of Values" in Huff and Prewett, *The Nature of the Physical Universe and Realism with a Human Face*

*Reason, Truth and History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), esp chapters 6-9.

"Beyond the Fact-Value Dichotomy" in *Critica* 14, 1982 and *Realism with a Human Face*

*How Not to Solve Ethical Problems* (Kansas: Lindley Lecture, 1983) reprinted in *Realism with a Human Face*

"The French Revolution and the Holocaust: Can Ethics be Ahistorical?" in Elliot Deutsch, *Culture and Modernity*,

reprinted as "Pragmatism and Relativism: Universal Values and Traditional Ways of Life" in *Words and Life*

*Realism with a Human Face* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1990)

*Renewing Philosophy* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1992), especially chapter 5.

"Objectivity and the Science-Ethics Distinction" in Nussbaum and Sen, *The Quality of Life and Realism with a Human Face*

"Pragmatism and Moral Objectivity" in *Words and Life* and Nussbaum and Glover, *Women, Culture and Development*

*Words and Life* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1994)

"Are Moral and Legal Values Made or Discovered" in *Legal Theory* 1, 1995, pp. 5-19.

**444. Ruth Anna Putnam**

"Creating Facts and Values" in *Philosophy* 60, 1985.

"Weaving Seamless Webs" in *Philosophy* 62, 1987.

Moral values are constructed in our choices but they are not arbitrary. Like other things we construct they answer to our needs. Which lacks are needs is itself a morally loaded question but the mutual entanglement of the factual and the normative is entirely pervasive. Given their place in a web of facts and values, our values can be evaluated in holistic ways and, insofar as our various webs intersect, they can be argued about.

"Understanding Lincoln" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 25, 1988.

"Perceiving Facts and Values" in *Philosophy* 73, 1998.

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**445. W. V. Quine**

"On the Nature of Moral Values" in Goldman and Kim, *Values and Morals*, pp. 37-45 and in Quine, *Theories and Things*, pp. 55-66.

*Theories and Things* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1981).

"Reply to Morton White" in Schlipp and Hahn, *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, pp. 663-665.

#### 446. Philip L. Quinn

"Divine Command Theory" in LaFollette, *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*

#### 447. Warren Quinn

"Moral and Other Realisms: Some Initial Difficulties" in Goldman and Kim, *Values and Morals*

"Truth and Explanation in Ethics" in *Ethics* 96, 1986, pp. 524-544.

"Reflection and the Loss of Moral Knowledge: Williams on Objectivity" in PPA 16, 1987.

*Morality and Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993)

"Putting Rationality in Its Place" in Frey and Morris, *Value, welfare and Morality* and Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, *Virtues and Reasons*

Quinn argues that if we understand desires simply as states of being disposed to act in certain ways, they can carry no normative significance and so the instrumentalist conception of practical reason to which he sees subjectivist (by which he means noncognitivist) views as committed can make no sense. To desire a thing, in this sense, gives us no reason either to pursue it or to pursue the means to it. Desire, however, can rationalize choice but only in virtue of the fact that, when it is conceived in a more adequate way inconsistent with subjectivism, as typically involving an evaluation of the desired object as good. Practical rationality is thinking effectively about how we should obtain what is good. But it is not ethically fundamental in the way the human good is ethically fundamental.

#### 448. Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen

"The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Values in *Ethics* 114, 2004, pp. 391-423.

#### 449. James Rachels

"Wants, Reasons and Justifications" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 18, 1968.

"Reasons for Action" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 1, 1971.

"Evaluating from a Point of View" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 6, 1972.

Can Ethics Provide Answers?" *Hastings Centre Report* 10, 1980

"The Elements of Moral Philosophy" (New York: Random House, 1986)

"Subjectivism" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*

"Naturalism" in LaFollette, *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*

#### 450. Elizabeth Radcliffe

"Hume on Motivating Sentiments: The general Point of View and the Inculcation of Morality" in *Hume Studies* 20, 1994, pp. 37-58.

"Hume on the Generation of Motives: Why Beliefs Alone Never Motivate" in *Hume Studies* 25, 1999, pp. 101-122.

#### 451. Linda Radzik

"A Normative Regress Problem" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 36, 1999

"Incorrigible Norms: Foundationalist Theories of Normative Authority" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 38, 2000

#### 452. Peter Railton

"Facts and Values" in *Philosophical Topics* 14, 1986.

"Moral Realism" in *Philosophical Review* 95, 1986, pp. 163-207.

An extremely influential defence thereof. The fact/value distinction is not well motivated by appeal to an instrumental understanding of reason once it is granted, as PR does, that moral facts are not necessarily reason-providing. I do not always have instrumental reason to be moral but that no more makes morality arbitrary and subjective than analogous considerations make logic arbitrary and subjective. The strategy is to employ the sort

of argument to best explanation that appeals to realists *vis à vis* the external world. For such an argument to be effective, we need reason to suppose the domain of moral facts is independent of what we think about it and yet able to interact causally with us in ways that shape our thought. To this end, PR first characterizes a notion *non-moral goodness* in terms of a person's *objective interests*, the things that, in ideal epistemic circumstances, he would want for his (actual) self. Objective interests may play an explanatory role, in particular in the evolution of desires via the *wants/interests mechanism* whereby we learn about our interests through experience and in other ways, not necessarily conscious or rational. It could be argued that the explanatory work such value does is fundamentally being done just by its supervenience base, but if this consideration undermined realism about goodness it would do the same for, say biology. In the case of *moral* right and wrong we might be sceptics about whether "ought"s can feature in explanation. They can, argues PR, when we are concerned with *crierial*, explanations - explanations that make implicit reference to some contextually fixed goal. *Moral* norms may be supposed to reflect what is rational from the social point of view, what would be rationally approved were everyone's interests counted equally given full information. Such social rationality may play a role in *crierial* explanations: arguably, e.g., departures from it may generate pressures that may serve to lessen the extent of departure. Moral rightness, thus naturalistically understood, does not give categorical reasons and need not always motivate but connects clearly with "what characteristically would motivate individuals who are prepared to submit themselves to relevant sorts of scrutiny."

"Naturalism and Prescriptivity" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 7, 1989, pp. 151-174.

"Nonfactualism about Normative Discourse" in PPR 53, 1992.

"Some Questions About the Justification of Morality" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 6 1992.

"Noncognitivism about Rationality: Benefits, Costs, and an Alternative" in Villanueva, *Naturalism and Normativity*, pp. 36-52.

"What the Non-Cognitivist Helps Us To See The Naturalist Must Help Us To Explain" in Haldane and Wright, *Reality, Representation and Projection*

Of the three features of moral discourse that seem to favour noncognitivism, the supposed oddness of moral facts, the persistence of moral disagreement and the normativity of moral judgement, the trickiest for the naturalist is normativity. The noncognitivist's problem here is capturing what makes some but not all non-hypothetical evaluative attitudes *moral*. If he appeals to their descriptive content, his position loses its distinctness as a wise cognitivist will allow moral language some noncognitive functions. And appeal to a distinction between the meaning and grounds of judgements of goodness works the analytic-synthetic distinction very hard. We often want to say not only the wrongness of an action but the independence of this from my attitudes have their basis in the character of the action itself. Here too a distinction between the content and the characteristic grounds of moral judgement is possible but problematic. The naturalist, by characterizing moral goodness as that which contributes to wellbeing, impartially considered, can explain both the distinctive importance we accord morality and its independence from my attitudes. Morality standards are neither hypothetical nor based on prudence but epistemic standards can be like this too and it doesn't worry us much. The naturalist can characterize and explain a strong tie between moral judgement and motivation but this will be a contingent, empirical matter, not one of conceptual necessity.

"Reply to David Wiggins" in *ibid.*

*Substantive naturalism* is a view which proposes a semantic interpretation of concepts in some area in terms of properties that pull their weight in science. *Analytic naturalism* that did this on a *priori* grounds would be vulnerable to Moore-type Open Question Argument objections. But a substantive naturalist might alternatively claim a *synthetic* identity on a *posteriori* grounds. If continuity with linguistic usage were claimed the OQA might be evidence against such a view but could not refute it. Such an account need not be reductionist though PR's sympathies lie with versions that are - these need not be eliminativist. A naturalistic account is sketched on which moral norms develop in response to real, empirically accessible properties. This goes some way to capturing the normativity of ethics. Discussing Wittgenstein's famous example, PR notes that lying, unlike bad tennis-playing, can impact significantly on human wellbeing. This explains why, for most people, it is motivationally significant. Though not necessarily for *all* people - moral reasons are not categorical. If, like Wiggins, we tie our understanding of morality to the sentiments of a socially situated agent we risk an unwelcome relativism. "Objective vindication" is possible if we can show our moral judgements to track features of the world that contribute to human wellbeing, impartially considered. PR finds it obscure how treating moral concepts as *sui generis* would be helpful in this context.

"Subject-ive and Objective" in *Ratio* 1995, pp. 259-276.

"In Search of Nonsubjective Reasons" in Schneewind, *Reason, Ethics and Society*

"Made in the Shade: Moral Compatibilism and the Aims of Moral Theory" in Couture and Nielsen, *On the Relevance of Metaethics*

"The Diversity of Moral Dilemmas" in Mason, *Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory*

"Moral Realism: Prospects and Problems" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge?*

"On the Hypothetical and Non-Hypothetical in Reasoning about Action" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*, pp. 53-79.

"Aesthetic Value, Moral Value, and the Ambitions of Naturalism" in Levinson, *Aesthetics and Ethics: Essays at the Intersection*

Railton in this interesting and suggestive paper develops an account of aesthetic objectivity via a reconstruction of the argument of Hume's "Of the Standard of Taste". On this Humean picture certain widespread commonalities among humans make possible what Railton calls the *infrastructure* of a suitable *field of value* in virtue of a pervasive conformity relation or *match* between things in the world and our sensibilities. Beauty is constituted by (though not to be analysed or defined in terms of) the properties of things that make for such a match and these beauty-constituting properties are explanatory of our favourable responses. This infrastructure is the basis for a standard of taste as particular sensitivity to such generally appreciated properties is the hallmark of aesthetic expertise and explains why we should and do defer to it. These reflections on aesthetics are then extended into moral value where, Railton suggests, we can view Mill's account of the settled preferences of experienced judges as articulating a standard of desirability analogous to Hume's standard of taste.

"Moral Explanation and Moral Objectivity" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, 1998, pp. 175-182.

"Red, Bitter, Good" in Casati and Tappolet, *Response-Dependence*

Plausibly the extension of colour terms is fixed rigidly by actual perceptual experience but, Railton argues, the same is plausibly not true of values. Consideration of an imaginary variant form of humanity for whom biological kinship relations had no special normative significance does not encourage the thought that such hypothetical humans would be acting and judging inappropriately given the kind of creatures they are. Intrinsic good should be thought of, not as relative but as relational. In this and in the way our classifications by value are plausibly driven by our practical concerns, values do indeed plausibly resemble certain secondary qualities: not those of colour but qualities of taste such as bitter or sweet.

"Normative Force and Normative Freedom: Hume and Kant, But not Hume *versus* Kant" in *Ratio* 12, 1999.

"Moral Factualism" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, pp. 201-219.

"How to Engage Reason: The Problem of Regress" in Wallace, Pettit., Scheffler and Smith, *Reason and Value*

"Normative Guidance" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 3-33.

#### 453. Ian Ramsey

(ed.) *Prospect for Metaphysics: Essays of Metaphysical Exploration* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1961).

#### 454. D. D. Raphael

*The Moral Sense* (London: Oxford University Press, 1947)

*Moral Judgement* (New York: MacMillan, 1995)

"Sidgwick on Intuitionism" in *The Monist* 58, 1974

*Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1981)

#### 455. Stig Alstrup Rasmussen

"Quasi-Realism and Mind-Independence" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 35, 1985.

#### 456. John Rawls

"Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics" in *Philosophical Review* 60 1951

*A Theory of Justice* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971)

"The Independence of Moral Theory" in Proc. A.P.A., 1975

"Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980" in *Journal of Philosophy* 77, 1980.

These are Rawls' rich and very demanding Dewey Lectures. According to KC we view principles of justice (to which Rawls' account is limited) as the outcome of a constructive procedure, in the "original position", whereby agreement on such principles is arrived at by a body of notional persons characterized in terms of a conception of "rational autonomy". That is, they act, in the light of sound principles of rational choice with a view to securing their highest-order interests in being able to advance their moral powers (the capacity for a sense of justice and for some conception of the good) but unconstrained by an prior conception of justice. The

constructive procedure represents an ideal of free persons conceived as "self-originating sources of claims" by not requiring the parties to justify the claims they advance. It represents an ideal of equality by situating the parties symmetrically and it represents the central ideal of fairness by imposing a veil of ignorance on their deliberations that deprives them of knowledge of their position in society and their particular conceptions of the good. In these and other ways the characterization of the original position and the parties to it is intended to model a certain moral ideal, a conception of moral persons as free and equal, that Rawls takes to be implicitly affirmed within democratic societies. Procedures by which principles are selected must thus "be suitably founded on practical reason, or, more exactly, on notions which characterize persons as reasonable and rational and which are incorporated into the way in which, as such persons, they represent to themselves their free and equal moral personality." The aim is that we can so adequately represent this ideal within the original position that we may take the procedure carried out within it as definitive of that conception of justice that best organizes our considered convictions. If this is so, a conception of justice so defined is authoritative for us as being the best workable basis available to us for public justification. An ideal of how moral persons conceived as free and equal should relate to one another as citizens is modelled by the notion of a "well-ordered society", a society effectively regulated by the principles of justice that the parties to an original position, the characterization of which is motivated by a desire adequately to represent such a conception of the person, would choose. Because the citizens of a well-ordered society all effectively affirm a shared conception of justice, their autonomy is "full autonomy". They thus recognize the overriding force of reasons determined by a public conception of justice, reasons whose status as such is determined by the choice of principles by the parties to the original position. Ethical inquiry is not, as rational intuitionists would have it, a matter of our finding out a body of moral facts prior to and independent of that inquiry: on such a view there is no role for any conception of the person richer than a very bare conception of the person as knowing subject. Rather, according to KC, the pursuit of moral justification is a practical and political rather than epistemological or metaphysical problem. We thus need to arrive at a conception precise enough to serve its practical purposes and not so complex as to defeat them. So not all moral questions need be supposed to have answers. We aim to settle the most fundamental issues of justice and other moral conflicts may be simply left as arenas for compromise. The principles of justice recommended by "justice as fairness" are subject to a certain contingency insofar as the constructive procedure is informed by various general facts about people and society, most notably the fact that the circumstances of justice (moderate scarcity and a divergence in conceptions of the good), whose contingency they inherit.

"Themes in Kant's Moral Philosophy" in Forster, *Kant's Transcendental Deductions* and in *Collected Papers*

On Rawls' reading as articulated here, "an essential feature of Kant's constructivism is that first principles of right and justice are seen as specified by a procedure of construction" (the Categorical Imperative Procedure). The procedure is to express the requirements of practical reason as embedded in our conception of ourselves as reasonable, rational responsible moral agents. The CI procedure itself is not constructed but "simply laid out": for Kant in the 2nd Critique, the moral law can have no deduction but rests on the Fact of Reason. This "is the fact that in our common moral consciousness we recognize and acknowledge the moral law as supremely authoritative and immediately directive for us." By giving practical reality to the idea of freedom the moral law obtains all the authentication possible and necessary. Kantian constructivism conceives of objectivity differently from rational intuitionism. For Kant a correct moral judgement is one conforming to the relevant criteria of reasonableness and rationality. Our common practical reason is the source of our agreement in judgements. And because of this commonality the CI procedure will yield the same results whoever applies it. The upshot, according to Rawls, is at once a constructivist conception of practical reason and a coherentist account of its authentication.

*Political Liberalism* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993.)

*Collected Papers* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999)

#### 457. Joseph Raz

"Reasons for Action, Decision and Norms" in *Mind* 84, 1975

*The Morality of Freedom* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986)

"Value Incommensurability" in P. A. S. 86, 1986

*Practical Reason and Norms* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990)

"Mixing Values" in P. A. S. S. 65, 1991

"Moral Change and Social Relativism" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*, also in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 11 (1994)

"The Moral Point of View" in Schneewind, *Reason, Ethics and Society*,

"The Amoralist" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

"Incommensurability and Agency" in Chang, *Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason*

Raz claims that incommensurability is widespread by opposing the "rationalist" conception of human agency which counts an agent's own desires as reasons for action. Desires, he argues, are responsible to but do not themselves constitute reasons. Given that desires do not provide a source of commensurating values and given the lack of other credible candidates for this role, widespread incommensurability is inevitable.

"When We are Ourselves: The Active and The Passive" in P. A. S. S. 91, 1997 and in *Engaging Reason*, pp. 5-21.

"Explaining Normativity: On Rationality and the Justification of Reason" in *Ratio* 12, 1999

"Notes on Value and Objectivity" in Leiter, *Objectivity in Law and Morals*

*Engaging Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999)

"The Truth in Particularism" in Hooker and Little, *Moral Particularism*.

#### 458. Edward Regis Jr.

(ed.): *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984)

#### 459. Donald Regan

Against Evaluator Relativity: A Response to Sen" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, 1983

"The Value of Rational Nature" in *Ethics* 112, 2002, pp. 267-291.

"How to be a Moorean" in *Ethics* 113, 2003, pp. 651-677.

#### 460. Nicholas Rescher

"Reasonableness in Ethics" in *Philosophical Studies* 5, 1954

#### 461. David A. J. Richards

*A Theory of Reasons for Actions* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971)

#### 462. I. A. Richards

*Principles of Literary Criticism* (New York: Harcourt Brace: 1924), esp chapter 7.

"Emotive Meaning Again" in *Philosophical Review* 57, 1948.

#### 463. Robert J. Richards

"A Defence of Evolutionary Ethics" in *Biology and Philosophy* 1, 1986.

"Dutch Objections to Evolutionary Ethics" in *Biology and Philosophy* 4, 1989

#### 464. Michael Ridge

"Humean Intentions" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 35, 1998

.Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity. in *Journal of Political Philosophy* 9, 2001.

For Scanlon an act is wrong if (roughly) it would be unreasonable for anyone to reject it. Scanlon's critics construct a dilemma. If the reasons for which a principle is rejectable are moral reasons then the appeal to reasonable rejection is otiose, a pointless epicycle. A more economical theory would simply ground the ineligibility of the principles in question on these very moral reasons. But if they are non-moral reasons, the theory cannot succeed as an account of moral reasons. In fact it is Scanlon's view that the reasonable rejection he has in mind is based on agent-relative reasons. Such rejection can still ground moral reasons given the constraint that rejection must be (morally) reasonable. This does not make the theory circular, but merely embodies a holism about moral justification. So the pointless epicycle. objection to contractualism fails.

["Moral Non-Naturalism" in \*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy\*, 2003.](#)

"Non-Cognitivist Pragmatics and Stevenson's 'Do so as well!'" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 33, 2003, pp. 563-574.

"How Children Learn the Meanings of Moral Words" in *Ethics* 114, 2004, pp. 301-317.

"Why Must We Treat Humanity With Respect? Evaluating the Regress Argument," in *European Journal of Analytic*

*Philosophy* 1, 2005, pp.57-74.

"Ecumenical Expressivism: Finessing Frege" in *Ethics* 116, 2006, pp. 302-336

"Sincerity and Expressivism" in *Philosophical Studies* 131, 2006, pp. 487-510.

"Saving the Ethical Appearances," *Mind* 115, 2006, pp. 633-650.

"Ecumenical Expressivism: The Best of Both Worlds" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 2, pp. 51-76.

#### 465. Arthur Ripstein

"Explanation and Empathy" in *Review of Metaphysics* 40, 1987

"Foundationalism in Political Theory" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 16, 1987

"Questionable Objectivity" in *Nous* 27, 1993.

#### 466. H. M. Robinson

"Imagination, Desire and Prescription" in *Analysis* 41, 1981.

"Is Hare a Naturalist?" in *Philosophical Review* 91, 1982

#### 467. John Robertson

"Internalism about Moral Reasons" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 67, 1986.

"Hume on Practical Reason" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 1990.

#### 468. Emily Robertson

"Practical Reasons, Authority and Education" in *Philosophy of Education* 39, 1983.

"Moral Education, Subjectively Speaking" in *Philosophy of Education* 44, 1988.

"Moral Judgement" in *Philosophy of Education* 46, 1990.

#### 469. Richard Robinson

"The Emotive Theory of Ethics" in *P.A.S.S.* 22, 1948.

#### 470. Mark van Roojen

"Humean Motivation and Humean Rationality," *Philosophical Studies* 79, 1995.

"Moral Functionalism and Moral Reductionism," *Philosophical Quarterly* 46, 1996

"Expressivism and Irrationality," *Philosophical Review* 105, 1996, pp. 311-335.

Focusing on Blackburn and Gibbard, van Roojen argues that the main attempts at solving the Frege-Geach Problem by expressivists fail to distinguish as they must between strict logical inconsistency and the sort of pragmatic incoherence involved in e.g. accepting both

It is wrong for me to believe that my father is unfaithful to my mother.

and

My father is unfaithful to my mother.

Such accounts thus seem committed to finding inconsistency where there is none. He also worries that

Blackburn's and Gibbard's accounts beg certain question about moral dilemmas in making it a truth of *logic* that what is forbidden can never be required.

"Reflective Moral Equilibrium and Psychological Theory" in *Ethics* 109, 1999.

"Motivational Internalism: A Somewhat Less Idealized Account" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 50, 1999

"Should Motivational Humeans be Humeans about Rationality?" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

"Moral Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism" in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* 2004.

"Expressivism, Supervenience and Logic" in *Ratio* 18, 2005, pp. 190-205.

"Rationalist Realism and Constructivist Accounts of Morality" in *Philosophical Studies* 126, 2005, pp. 285-295.

"Knowing Enough to Disagree: A New Response to the Moral Twin-Earth Argument" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics*, I, pp. 161-193.

#### 471. Connie S. Rosati



- "Naturalism, Normativity and the Open Question Argument" in *Nous* 29, 1995.  
 "Persons, Perspectives and Full Information Accounts of the Good" in *Ethics* 105, 1995.  
 "Internalism and the Good for a Person" in *Ethics* 106, 1996.  
 "Brandt's Notion Of Therapeutic Agency" in *Ethics* 110, 2000  
 "Agency and the Open Question Argument" in *Ethics* 113, 2003, pp. 490-527.  
 "Personal Good" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics after Moore*, pp. 107-131.

**472. Gideon Rosen**

- "Blackburn's *Essays in Quasi-Realism*" in *Nous* 32, pp. 386-405.

**473. Michael Rosen**

- "Must We Return to Moral Realism?" in *Inquiry* 34, 1991.

**474. Adina Roskies**

- "Are Ethical Judgements Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons from Acquired Sociopathy" in *Philosophical Psychology* 16, 2003, pp. 51-66.

**475. Alf Ross**

- "On the Method of Ethics" in *Journal of Philosophy*, 1948

**476. David Ross**

- "The Nature of Morally Good Action" in *P.A.S.* 29, 1928-9  
*The Right and the Good* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1930).  
*The Foundations of Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938)

**477. Jacob Ross**

- "Rejecting Ethical Deflationism" in *Ethics* 116, 2006, pp. 742-768

**478. Peter W. Ross**

- "Explaining Motivated Desires" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

**479. Steven Ross**

- "The Nature and Limits of Moral Objectivism" in *Philosophical Forum* 29, 1998

**480. William A. Rottschaefer**

- "The Limitations of Ethical Theory" in *Zygon* 18, 1983.  
 "Roger Sperry's Science of Values" in *Journal of Mind and Behaviour* 8, 1987.  
 "Evolutionary Naturalistic Justifications of Morality: A Matter of Faith and Works" in *Biology and Philosophy* 6, 1991.  
 "The Insufficiency of Supervenient Explanations of Moral Actions" in *Biology and Philosophy* 6, 1991.  
*The Biology and Psychology of Moral Agency* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998)

**481. William A. Rottschaefer and David L. Martinsen**

- "Really taking Darwin Seriously: An Alternative to Michael Ruse's Darwinian Metaethics" in *Biology and Philosophy* 5, 1990

**482. J. W. Roxbee Cox**

- "Commending and Describing" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 11, 1961.  
 "From Universal Prescriptivism to Utilitarianism" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 36, 1986.

483. **Michael Ruse**

"The Morality of the Gene" in *the Monist* 67, 1984.

484. **Bruce Russell**

"Moral Relativism and Moral Realism" in *The Monist* 67, 1984.

"Two Forms of Ethical Scepticism" in Pojman, *Ethical Theory*

485. **L. J. Russell**

"Ideals and Practice" in *Philosophy* 17, 1942

"Is Anthropology Relevant to Ethics?" in P.A.S.S. 20, 1946.

486. **Eugene E. Ryan**

"Aristotle and a Refutation of Naturalism" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 6, 1972.

487. **D. Rynin**

"The Autonomy of Morals" in *Mind* 1957

488. **R. Sartorius**

*Individual Conduct and Social Norms* (Encino, Ca.: Dickenson, 1975)

489. **Stephen Satris**

*Ethical Emotivism* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987)

490. **Eike V. Savigny**

"A Modest Conception of Moral Sense Perception" in *Erkenntnis* 19, 1983

491. **Geoffrey Sayre-McCord**

"Coherence and Models for Moral Theorizing," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 1985

"Deontic Logic and the Priority of Moral Theory," *Noûs* 1986.

"The Many Moral Realisms," *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Spindel Conference Supplement, 1986  
(ed.) *Essays on Moral Realism* (Ithaca: Cornell U. P., 1988

"Moral Theory and Explanatory Impotence," *Midwest Studies* 12, 1988 pp. 433-57.

Moral hypotheses and properties plausibly require validation by figuring in the best explanations of our observations. It does not suffice, as Sturgeon claims, that they be relevant to explaining our observations. For hypotheses about witches might pass this test if witch-invoking explanations were widespread in our practice and if we accepted a supervenience account of witchhood. The worry is not irrelevance but impotence. What moral hypotheses and properties would lack if the observations we can explain by invoking them could be explained every bit as well without invoking them. But GSM thinks certain moral properties, notably virtue properties, will plausibly pass this test on any plausible interpretation of it as they will feature in certain genuine and general regularities that we cannot identify and explain with invoking them. But that would not close off the possibility that such properties lacked any normative significance. We need to show not only that moral properties have explanatory force but also that they have justificatory force. Reflection on parallels with the normative significance of epistemological hypotheses might, GSM suggests, be a fruitful avenue to explore here.

"Deception and Reasons to be Moral," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, 1989

"Functional Explanations and Reasons as Causes," *Philosophical Perspectives* 1990

"Being a Realist about Relativism," *Philosophical Studies* 1991

"Normative Explanations," *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, 1992, pp. 55-71.

Sayre McCord distinguishes between conventional rules - laws etc. - and trans-conventional rules of morality and morality which at least seem less dependent on social contingencies. The former, he argues, can sometimes play an explanatory role, even one unmediated by beliefs about them (notably sometimes in explaining these beliefs themselves). The latter may also plausibly be thought to do explanatory work. To make this thought good, given some normative theory (of rationality or morality) we need to identify and describe some feedback mechanism whereby actions that violate the rules may carry individual or social costs, those that comply with them benefits, and these costs and benefits have causal impacts. Plausibly, he suggests, just this can be made good in the cases of utilitarian and contractarian understandings of moral rules.

"On Why Hume's General Point of View Isn't Ideal -- and Shouldn't Be," in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Social Philosophy and Policy* 1994

"Coherentist Epistemology and Moral Theory," in *Moral Knowledge?*, ed. by Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons 1996

"Hume and the Baushaus Theory of Ethics," *Midwest Studies* (1996)

"Good' on Twin Earth" in *Philosophical Issues* 8, 1997.

"The Metaethical Problem" in *Ethics* 108, 1997.

"Mill's 'Proof' of the Principle of Utility: A More than Half-Hearted Defense" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

#### 492. T. M. Scanlon

"Preference and Urgency" in *Journal of Philosophy* 72, 1975

"Rawls' Theory of Justice" in Daniels, *Reading Rawls*

"Contractualism and Utilitarianism" in Sen and Williams, *Utilitarianism and Beyond*.

"Levels of Moral Thinking" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*

"The Significance of Choice" in *Tanner Lectures on Human Values* 8, 1988.

"The Aims and Authority of Moral Theory", *Oxford Journal of Legal Studies*, 12, 1992

Objections to both the aims and the methods of moral theory are apt to be based on overstating its ambitions. Moral theory comprises two interrelated activities: Philosophical Enquiry which concerns itself with explaining what sort of things moral principles are, in what sense they can be held to be correct and how we can know that they are. And Moral Enquiry, which looks at the defensibility of particular claims and the reasons we offer for them. The principles Moral Enquiry aims to uncover through the method of Reflective Equilibrium need not be comprehensive in scope, unifying the entire moral domain, nor need they be strict principles from which particular moral conclusions can be derived with no residual need for judgement. It is the aim of neither kind of enquiry to offer some external justification for morality. Rather they seek to depend our understanding of the reasons for accepting morality we are already in possession of. There is only a deep, general and independent sceptical threat to morality to the extent that Philosophical Enquiry underwrites . as Scanlon believes it does not - an e.g. platonistic understanding of the correctness of moral claims that would leave us with worries about how we could ever know them.

"Fear of Relativism" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn, *Virtues and Reasons*

"Self-Anchored Morality" in Schneewind: *Reason, Ethics and Society*

*What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1998), especially chapters 1, 2 and 8.

"Reasons and Passions" in Buss and Overton, *Contours of Agency*.

Those elements of someone's mental life which are attributable to them as a basis for moral appraisal should be identified, Scanlon argues, with all their judgement-sensitive attitudes. Certain kinds of conflicts, conflicts between seemings (it seems to me that something is a reason to do something) and assessments (I judge however that it is not) can only be understood as involving desire at all if, as Scanlon urges we should, we understand desires as seemings in this sense: cases of it appearing to us that we have a reason to do something.

"Rawls on Justification" in Freeman, *The Cambridge Companion to Rawls*.

A magisterial account of three of Rawls' central metaethical ideas: reflective equilibrium, the original position and the idea of public reason. The first is elaborated and defended from the common charges of relativism. Scanlon then explains how the structure of the original position is itself subject to justification in the light of the method of reflective equilibrium and how the idea of public reason originates in Rawls' dissatisfaction with his treatment of stability and congruence in theory as insufficiently alive to the fact of pluralism, a fact which requires that political justification in the sphere of constitutional essentials depend on nothing outside what can be a subject of overlapping consensus among reasonable comprehensive doctrines.

"Thickness and Theory" in *Journal of Philosophy* 100, 2003, pp. 275-287.  
 "Wrongness and Reasons" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 2, pp. 5-20.

493.**E. Schaper**

(ed.) *Pleasure, Preference and Value* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1983)

494.**Samuel Scheffler**

"Moral Skepticism and Ideals of the Person" in *The Monist* 62, 1979  
 "Ethics, Personal Identity and Ideals of the Person" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 12, 1982  
*The Rejection of Consequentialism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982)  
 "Agent-Centered Restrictions, Rationality and the Virtues" in *Mind* 94, 1985

495.**Stephen Schiffer**

"A Paradox of Desire" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 13, 1976  
 "Meaning and Value", in *Journal of Philosophy* 87, 1990

496.**Paul A. Schilpp**

(ed.) *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (La Salle: Open Court, 1942)  
 (ed.) *The Philosophy of C. D. Broad* (La Salle: Open Court, 1959)  
 (ed.) *The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap* (La Salle: Open Court, 1964)

497.**Paul A. Schilpp and Lewis E. Hahn**

(eds.) *The Philosophy of Georg Henrik von Wright* (La Salle: Open Court, 1989)  
 (eds.) *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, 2nd Edition (La Salle: Open Court, 1998).

498.**Moritz Schlick**

*Problems of Ethics* (New York: Dover, 1962)

499.**David Schmidz**

"Rationality Within Reason" in *Journal of Philosophy* 89, 1992  
 "Choosing Ends" in *Ethics* 104, 1994  
*Rational Choice and Moral Agency* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995)

500.**P. F. Schmidt**

"Some Criticisms of Cultural Relativism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1955

501.**J. B. Schneewind**

"Moral Knowledge and Moral Principles" in Hauerwas and MacIntyre, *Revisions*.  
 (ed.) *Reason, Ethics and Society: Themes from Kurt Baier and His Responses* (La Salle: Open Court, 1996)

502.**Dieter Schönecker**

"How is a Categorical Imperative Possible" Kant's Deduction of the Moral Law in *Groundwork III*" in Horn and Schönecker, *Kant's Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals*.

503.**Mark Schroeder**

"The Scope of Instrumental Reason" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 18, 2004, pp. 337-364.  
 "**Realism and Reduction: The Quest for Robustness**" in *The Philosophers' Imprint* 5, 2005.

"The Hypothetical Imperative?" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 83, 2005, pp. 357-372.

"Cudworth and Normative Explanations" in *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 1, 2005.

"Instrumental Mythology" in *Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy* 1, 2005.

"Not So Promising After All: Evaluator-Relative Teleology and Common-Sense Morality" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 87, 2006, pp. 348-356.

"Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and 'Good'" in *Ethics* 117, 2007, pp. 265-295.

"Weighting for a Plausible Humean Theory of Reasons" in *Noûs* 41, 2007, pp. 138-160.

"The Humean Theory of Reasons" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 2, 2007 pp. 195-219.

#### 504. François Schroeter

"Normative Concepts and Motivation" in *Philosophers' Imprint* 5, 2005.

"The Limits of Sentimentalism" in *Ethics* 116, 2006, pp. 337-361.

#### 505. Laura Schroeter and François Schroeter

"A Slim Semantics for Thin Moral Terms" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 81, 2003, pp. 191-207.

#### 506. G. F. Schueler

"Moral Scepticism" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 15, 1978

"Modus Ponens and Moral Realism" in *Ethics* 98 1988, pp. 492-500.

"Pro-Attitudes and Direction of Fit" in *Mind* 100, 1991, pp. 277-281.

"Why Oughts are not Facts (or What the Tortoise and Achilles Taught Mrs. Ganderhoot and Me about Practical Reasoning)" in *Mind*, 1995

*Desire: Its Role in Practical Reason and the Explanation of Action* (Cambridge, MA., M.I.T. Press, 1995)

#### 507. Gerhard Schurz

"How Far Can Hume's Is-Ought Thesis be Generalized?" in *Journal of Philosophical Logic*, 20, 1991.

#### 508. Robert B. Scott Jr.

"Five Types of Ethical Naturalism" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 17, 1980

#### 509. Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion

(ed.) *Hare and Critics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).

#### 510. John Searle

"Meaning and Speech Acts" in *Philosophical Review* 71, 1962

"How to Derive 'Ought' from 'Is'" in *Philosophical Review* 73, 1964.

*Meaning and Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969)

*Speech Acts* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), esp. chapters 6 and 8.

#### 511. Torgny T. Segerstedt

"Imperative Propositions and Judgements of Value" in *Theoria* 11, 1945

#### 512. Roy Wood Sellars

"Can a Reformed Materialism do Justice to Values?" in *Ethics* 55, 1944.

"Valuational Naturalism and Moral Discourse" in *Philosophical Review* 67, 1958.

"In What Sense do Value Judgments and Moral Judgments Have Objective Import?" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 28, 1967.

#### 513. Wilfrid Sellars

"Obligation and Motivation" in *Philosophical Studies* 2, 1951.

"Imperatives, Intentions and the Logic of "Ought"" in Neri-Castañeda and Nakhnikian, *Morality and the Language of Conduct*

"On Reasoning about Values" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 17, 1980.

**514. Amartya K. Sen**

"Hume's Law and Hare's Rule" in *Philosophy* 41, 1966.

"The Nature and Classes of Prescriptive Judgements" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 17, 1967.

"Evaluator Relativity and Consequential Evaluation" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 12, 1983

"Well-being, Freedom and Agency" in *Journal of Philosophy* 82, 1985

"Positional Objectivity" in *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 22, 1993

**515. Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams**

(eds.) *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982)

**516. Stefan Sencerz**

"Moral Intuitions and Justification in Ethics" in *Philosophical Studies* 50, 1986.

**517. Russ Shafer-Landau**

"Ethical Disagreement, Ethical Objectivism and Moral Indeterminacy" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 54, 1994.

"Supervenience and Moral Realism" in *Ratio* 7, 1994.

"Vagueness, Borderline Cases and Moral Realism" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 32, 1995

"Moral Judgment and Normative Reasons" in *Analysis* 59, 1999.

"A Defense of Motivational Externalism" in *Philosophical Studies* 97, 2000, pp. 267-291.

*Moral Realism: A Defence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003)

"Ethics as Philosophy: A Defence of Ethical Nonnaturalism" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 209-232.

(Ed.) *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 1 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006)

(Ed.) *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 2 (OXford: Clarendon Press, 2007)

**518. Yonatan Shemmer**

"Desiring at Will and Humeanism in Practical Reason" in *Philosophical Studies* 119, 2004, pp. 265 - 294.

"Instrumentalism and Desiring at Will" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 35, 2005

**519. George Sher**

"But I Could Be Wrong" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

**520. Roger Shiner**

"Ethical Justification and Case-by-Case Reasoning" in Odegard, *Ethics and Justification*

**521. Robert Shope**

"Rawls, Brandt and the Definition of Rational Desires" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 8, 1978.

**522. David Sidorsky**

"Incomplete Routes to Moral Objectivity: Four Variants of Naturalism" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

**523. Caroline Simon**

"On Defending a Moral Synthetic A Priori" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 26, 1988

"The Intuitionist Argument" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 28, 1990, pp. 91-114.

**524. Evan Simpson**

"Between Internalism and Externalism" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 49, 1999.

Internalists believe (a) there is a conceptual connection between moral belief and motivation whereby (b) such that moral beliefs necessarily motivate. Externalists deny both (a) and (b). Simpson's proposed middle ground is to accept (a) but not (b): the connection is conceptual but defeasible. A psychological motivation for this view is sketched in terms of a relationship of logical dependency whereby someone cannot have a certain sort of belief who is never subject to a certain sort of "concern". For example one could never have the beliefs about dangerousness implicated in fear if one were never afraid. For what I identify as dangerous depends on what I am disposed to fear and so, Simpson reasons, if I fear nothing, I cannot master the concept. Analogous things he suggests, are true of the relation between moral beliefs and the moral emotions such as pity that implicate them.

**525. Neil Sinclair**

"The Moral Belief Problem" in *Ratio* 19, 2006, pp. 249-260

"Propositional Clothing and Belief" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 57, 2007, pp. 342-362.

**526. M. G. Singer**

*Generalisation in Ethics* (New York: Alfred A Knopf, 1961)

"Moral Scepticism" in Carter, *Scepticism and Moral Principles*

"The Principle of Consequences Reconsidered" in *Philosophical Studies* 31, 1977

"Gewirth's Ethical Monism" in Regis, *Gewirth's Ethical Rationalism*

"Ethics and Common Sense" in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie* 4, 1986.

**527. Peter Singer**

"The Triviality of the Debate over "Is-Ought" and the Definition of Moral" in *APQ* 10, 1972.

"Sidgwick and Reflective Equilibrium" in *The Monist* 57, 1974

"Reasoning Towards Utilitarianism" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*

(ed.) *A Companion to Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1991)

"Is There a Universal Moral Sense?" in *Critical Review* 9, 1995

**528. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong**

"Moral Realism and Moral Dilemmas" in *Journal of Philosophy* 84, 1987

"Some Problems for Gibbard's Norm-Expressivism" in *Philosophical Studies* 69, 1993.

"Skepticism and Nihilism about Moral Obligation" in *Utilitas* 7, 1995. pp. 217-236.

"Moral Skepticism and Justification" in Sinnott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge?*

"An Argument for Descriptivism" in *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 37, 1999

"Varieties of Particularism" in *Metaphilosophy* 30, 1999, pp. 1-12.

"Expressivism and Embedding" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 61, 2000, pp. 677-693.

"From 'Is' to 'Ought' in Moral Epistemology" in *Argumentation* 14, 2000.

"Moral Intuitionism Meets Empirical Psychology" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 339-365.

**529. Walter Sinnott-Armstrong and Mark Timmons**

(ed.) *Moral Knowledge?: New Readings in Moral Epistemology* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

**530. John Skorupski**

"Reasons and Reason" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

"Irrealist Cognitivism" in *Ratio* 12, 1999.

Review of Svavarsdottir's "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation", BEARS, 2001.

"The Ontology of Reasons" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

**531. Aaron Sloman**

- "How to Derive 'Better' From 'Is'" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 6, 1969  
 "Transformations of Illocutionary Acts" in *Analysis* 30, 1969.  
 "'Ought' and 'Better'" in *Mind* 79, 1970.

### 532. Michael Slote

- "The Rationality of Aesthetic Value Judgments" in *Journal of Philosophy* 68, 1971, pp. 821-839.  
 "Morality not a System of Imperatives" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 19, 1982  
 "Ethics Naturalised" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, 1992.  
 "Sentimentalist Virtue and Moral Judgement: Outline of a Project" in *Metaphilosophy* 34, pp. 131-143.  
 "Moral Sentimentalism" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice*, 7, 2004, pp. 3-13.

### 533. David Slutsky

- "Causally Inefficacious Moral Properties" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 39, 2001, pp. 595-610

### 534. J. J. C. Smart

- Ethics, Persuasion and Truth* (London: Routledge, 1984)  
 "Ruth Anna Putnam and the Fact-Value Distinction" in *Philosophy* 74, 1999.

### 535. Holly M. Smith

- "Moral Realism, Moral Conflict and Rational Choice" in *Journal of Philosophy* 83, 1986  
 "Deriving Morality from Rationality" in Vallentyne, *Contractarianism and Rational Choice*

### 536. Michael Smith

- "Should We Believe in Emotivism?" in MacDonald and Wright, , *Fact, Science and Morality*, pp. 289-310.  
 "The Humean Theory of Motivation" in *Mind* 96, 1987.  
 "On Humeans, Anti-Humeans and Motivation: A reply to Pettit" in *Mind* 1988.  
 "Reason and Desire" in P.A.S. 88, 1988, pp. 243-258.  
 "Dispositional Theories of Value" in P. A. S. S. 1989.  
 "Realism" in Singer (ed), *A Companion to Ethics*  
 "Valuing: Desiring or Believing?" in Charles and Lennon, *Reduction, Explanation and Reason*  
 "Objectivity and Moral Realism: on the Significance of the Phenomenology of Moral Experience" on Haldane and Wright, *Reality, Representation and Projection*  
*The Moral Problem* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994)

The problem that is of reconciling (1) the Humean theory of motivation, (2) internalism and (3) a realist understanding of moral commitments as beliefs. Smith first defends (3) arguing that the open question argument against naturalism is weakened by reflection on the paradox of analysis. He rejects however the idea that we can find explicit or reductive naturalistic analyses of moral concepts - Jackson-style network analyses in particular are vulnerable to permutation problems - but holds out hopes for a non-reductive, summary-style but still naturalistic analysis. He then turns to (2), arguing, against externalism, that the externalist must see the good person as motivated to do what is right on a de dicto reading of *what is right* and that this involves a 'fetishistic' attitude to morality. Internalism, read as the claim that judgements about rightness motivate us *where we are not practically irrational* is seen as a corollary of *the rationalist's conceptual claim*: that moral requirements are requirements of reason, a claim Smith defends. We should also, he argues, accept (3), accept, that is, that motivating reasons consist, at least in part of desires, given the teleological character of motivating reasons. In spite of accepting (2) and (3), Smith wants to understand value-judgements as beliefs, beliefs about what what it would be rational to do - more precisely what, in conditions of ideal rationality we would wish our (actual, imperfectly rational) selves to do. This, dispositional, theory, is the promised non-reductive summary style analysis promised earlier. It can be seen as naturalistic insofar as fully rational agents can be a part of the natural world. If we are rational we will have desires that cohere with our beliefs about what is rational and these desires will motivate us to act accordingly but we should not see the desires as *motivated* by the normative beliefs. In this way (1), (2) and (3) can be reconciled. This widely discussed book is impressive in the clarity and forcefulness of its argument. It also contains useful discussion of the views of, inter alia, Ayer, Foot, Mackie, Williams, Nagel, Gauthier, Harman, McDowell, Brink, Jackson and David Lewis.

- "Why Expressivists About Value Should Love Minimalism About Truth" in *Analysis* 54, 1994, pp. 12-19.



Expressivists and minimalists can agree that truth has an analytic tie to belief. Given this the Expressivist can argue that moral claims are expressive of desires and desires are, given their functional roles, disjoint from beliefs. Hence moral beliefs are non-truth-assessable. A minimalist might do a Horwich and insist that expressions of desire may be truth-assessable. But this, given the analytic tie, would make them beliefs and folk-psychology, as Smith reads it, rules out any single state being both these things. Minimalist arguments do not show expressivism is false but merely the need for the expressivist to provide an explanation of the cognitive surface syntax of evaluation.

"Minimalism, Truth-Aptitude and Belief" in *Analysis* 54, 1994

Divers and Miller, like Horwich, want to allow that there can be minimal beliefs, beliefs that are not distinct from states of desiring. But there are arguments to the effect that this does not make good folk-psychological sense and his critics do not address these. That the matter is, as D & M observe, controversial is not to the point.

"Internal Reasons" in *PPR* 55, 1995

"Internalism's Wheel" in *Ratio* 8, 1995, pp. 277-302.

"The Argument for Internal Reason: Reply to Miller" in *Analysis* 56, 1996

"Normative Reasons and Full Rationality: Reply to Swanton" in *Analysis* 56, 1996

"In Defense of *The Moral Problem*: A Reply to Brink, Copp and Sayre-McCord" in *Ethics* 108, 1997

"A Theory of Freedom and Responsibility" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

"Response-Dependence Without Reduction" in Casati and Tappolet, *Response-Dependence*

"The Definition of Moral" in Jamieson, *Singer and his Critics*

"The Non-Arbitrariness of Reasons: Reply to Lenman" in *Utilitas* 11, 1999

"Search for the Source" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 49, 1999

"Does the Evaluative Supervene on the Natural?" in Crisp and Hooker, *Well-being and Morality*

"Moral Realism" in LaFollette(ed.), *The Blackwell Guide to Ethical Theory*

"Some Not-Much-Discussed Problems for Non-Cognitivism in Ethics" in *Ratio* 14, 2001

"Evaluation, Uncertainty and Motivation" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 5, 2002.

Evaluative judgements can vary in the dimensions of 1. Certitude: the confidence a subject has in her evaluative judgements; 2. Robustness: the stability of this confidence in the light of new information; and 3. Importance: the strength of the relative desirabilities we impute to things. The strength of the motivation it is rational to have in the light of an evaluative judgement covaries independently with both certitude and importance in ways, Smith argues, his own cognitivist theory of evaluative judgement is well placed to explain. Not so for noncognitivism which identifies evaluations with desires. Desires can vary in strength both with each other and over time. This does not seem like enough structure to accommodate all three structural features that evaluative judgements have. Suppose more structure is importuned by saying that valuing e.g. pleasure is a matter of desiring to desire it. We might then identify certitude with the strength of the second order desire and importance with the strength of the desired first-order desire. But this assignment seems arbitrary. Why is it superior to the converse assignment? Moreover when the second order desire to desire to F is stronger than the second order desire to G the agent will always, on this account, be rational to desire to F more no matter how strong the desired first-order desire to G. Noncognitivism is thus, Smith concludes, ill-suited to capture both the structure evaluative judgements enjoy and the motivational significance of this structure.

"Which Passions Rule?" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, 2002.

Expressivists have to (1) say which subset of desires and aversions are those we express when we make normative claims (2) explain why normative judgements are, functionally speaking, similar to beliefs as well as to desires: for they are linked by support relations to a whole network of other attitudes. To do this, they must acknowledge that the relevant desires belong to sets of such desires which meet a certain standard of coherence, unity and informedness. But in doing that, they acknowledge that normative judgements are responsible to standards of coherence, unity and informedness. Hence normative judgements implicate beliefs about what we would desire were our desires maximally informed, coherent and unified. But there is now reason not to take the small step to saying normative judgements just are such beliefs. That they have the content they do suffices to explain, insofar as our .psychologies tend towards coherence. why such beliefs are functionally similar to desires.

"Neutral and Relative Value After Moore" in *Ethics* 113, 2003, pp. 576-598.

### 537. Quentin Smith

"Concerning the Absurdity of Life" in *Philosophy* 1991.

538. **Tara Smith**

"Moral Realism: Blackburn's Response to the Frege Objection" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 25, 1987.

539. **Francis Snare**

"Externalism in Ethics" in *Philosophical Quarterly*, 24, 1974

"The Argument from Motivation" in *Mind* 84, 1975.

"John Rawls and the Methods of Ethics" in *PPR* 36, 1975.

"The Open Question as a Linguistic Test" in *Ratio* 1975

"Three Sceptical Theses in Ethics" in *APQ* 14, 1977

"The Diversity of Morals" in *Mind* 89, 1980

"The Empirical Bases of Moral Scepticism" in *APQ* 21, 1984.

*Morals, Motivation and Convention: Hume's Influential Doctrines* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991);

*The Nature of Moral Thinking* (London: RKP, 1992)

540. **David Sobel**

"Full Information Accounts of Well-Being" in *Ethics* 104, 1994

"On the Subjectivity of Welfare," *Ethics* 107, 1997

"Well-Being as the Object of Moral Consideration" in *Economics and Philosophy* 14, 1998, pp. 249-281.

"Do the Desires of Rational Agents Converge?" *Analysis* 59, 1999, pp. 137-147.

"Explanation, Internalism and Reasons for Action" in *Social Philosophy and Policy* 18, 2001

"Subjective Accounts of Reasons for Action," *Ethics* 111, 2001

541. **David Sobel and David Copp**

"Against Direction of Fit Accounts of Belief and Desire" in *Analysis* 61, 2001, pp. 44-53

542. **Jordan Howard Sobel**

"On Michael Smith's Internalisms" in *Erkenntnis* 54, 2001

"Blackburn's Problem: On Its Not Insignificant Residue" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, 2001.

543. **Wm. David Solomon**

"Moral Realism and the Amoralist" in *Midwest Studies* 12, 1988

544. **David Sosa**

"Pathetic Ethics" in Leiter, *Objectivity in Law and Morals*

545. **Ernest Sosa**

"Moral Relativism, Cognitivism, and Defeasible Rules" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge*

"Water, Drink and Moral Kinds" in *Philosophical Issues* 8, 1997.

546. **Francis Sparshott**

"On Metaethics: A Reverie" in Couture and Nielsen, *On the Relevance of Metaethics*

547. **W. T. Stace**

*The Concept of Morals* (New York: MacMillan, 1937)

548. **R.F. Stalley**

"Intentions, Beliefs and Imperative Logic", in *Mind*, 81, 1972

549. **Dennis W. Stampe**

"Defining Desire" in Marks, *The Ways of Desire*.

"The Authority of Desire" in *Philosophical Review* 96, 1987, pp. 335-381.

550. **Cynthia A. Stark**

"Hypothetical Consent and Justification." in *Journal of Philosophy* 97, 2000

The standard indictment of hypothetical-consent-based contractualism is that hypothetical consent cannot obligate anybody. Stark argues that this indictment fails when we are concerned with moral principles as opposed to political obligation. While it is problematic how hypothetical consent could justify a political authority in coercing me into obedience to some principle, it is less problematic to suppose it could give me a reason to abide by it. Indeed hypothetical consent can furnish the basis of a justification of political obedience provided we understand the justification of the obligation to obey some principle or institution as independently motivated and not simply as falling, as a matter of conceptual necessity, out of the justification of the principle or institution's legitimacy. Appeal to hypothetical consent need not be, moreover, otiose when it features in a theory that regards correct moral principles as constituted by the outcome of an ideal procedure in which consent essentially features.

551. **James Sterba**

"Justifying Morality" in *Synthese* 72, 1987

552. **Charles L. Stevenson**

"The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms" in *Mind* 46, 1937, pp. 14-31 and *Facts and Values*.

"Ethical Judgements and Avoidability" in *Mind* 47, 1938 and *Facts and Values*

"Persuasive Definitions" in *Mind* 47, 1938 and *Facts and Values*

"Moore's Arguments Against Certain Forms of Ethical Naturalism" in Schilpp, *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore*

The reading of "X is right" as "I approve of X" has the consequence that we may express moral judgements differing both with those of others and with our own at other times and all parties be correct. This, urges Moore, is incoherent. Not so, replies Stevenson, when we relativize to speakers and times in the appropriate ways. But then how are we to understand the parties as differing in opinion if what they say is not incompatible? Here, urges CS, we need a notion of disagreement in attitude which focuses on their incompatible purposes with respect to the influence of what they say.

*Ethics and Language* (New Haven: Yale U. P., 1944)

"Meaning: Descriptive and Emotive" in *Philosophical Review* 57, 1948

"The Emotive Conception of Ethics and its Cognitive Implications" in *Philosophical Review* 59, 1950

Practical reason is properly responsive to facts, but which *facts* are relevant to it depends on what our substantive ethical views are, what we approve and disapprove of. There is nothing very special here about specifically *moral* thinking which can be roughly demarcated in terms of the involvement of particular kinds of feeling such as guilt and remorse and the role played by second-order approvals whereby we approve of our own first order approvals. Emotivism is preferable to naturalistic cognitivism in not narrowly circumscribing in advance the range of facts that can be ethically relevant. In particular we see here the advantage of construing ethical terms as *expressing* rather than *designating* our attitudes, thus avoiding the implausible upshot that ethical thought is "an exercise in introspective psychology". For emotivism, beliefs *mediate* between attitudes. *Reasons* for ethical judgements deal in such beliefs but "remain cognitive statements, open to all the tests of inductive or deductive logic." And there is no reason not to see this as exhausting the cognitive dimension of ethical judgement, favouring "an analysis that delegates all the relevant beliefs to the reasons, allowing the judgment to keep none of them." The relationship between reasons, so understood and expressions of attitude is however causal and not logical. Appeal to such reasons may resolve disagreements but we can't count on this. The cognitivist can't improve on this story by building some descriptive subject matter into the very meaning of ethical terms for any ethical significance attaching to any subject matter he so builds in the emotivist can recognize among the reasons for ethical judgements. As it will always be a contingent matter whether we approve or disapprove of any such subject matter, cognitivism as such does nothing to enhance the prospects of a "rationally obtainable convergence of attitudes".

- "Brandt's Questions about Emotive Ethics" in *Philosophical Review* 59, 1950.  
 "Reflections on John Dewey's Ethics" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 62, 1962  
 "Relativism and Non-Relativism in the Theory of Value" in *Proceedings and Addresses of the A.P.A.* 35, 1962  
*Facts and Values* (New Haven: Yale U. P. 1963)  
 "Value Judgments: Their Implicit Generality" in Bowie, *Ethical Theory*

553. **Robert M. Stewart and Lynn L. Thomas**

- "Recent Work on Ethical Relativism" APQ, Vol. 28, 1991.

554. **A. Stigen**

- "Mrs Foot on Moral Arguments" in *Mind* 69, 1960.

555. **Michael Stocker**

- "Agent and Other: Against Ethical Universalism" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 54, 1976  
 "The Schizophrenia of Modern Ethical Theories" in *Journal of Philosophy* 73, 1976  
 "Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology" in *Journal of Philosophy*, 1979, pp. 738-753.  
 "Values and Purposes: The Limits of Teleology and the Ends of Friendship" in *Journal of Philosophy* 78, 1981.  
 "Akrasia and the Object of Desire" in Marks, *The Ways of Desire*  
 "Emotional Thoughts" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 24, 1987  
*Plural and Conflicting Values* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990)  
 "Emotions and Ethical Knowledge: Some Naturalistic Connections" in *Midwest Studies* 19, 1994  
 "Parfit and the Time of Value" in Dancy, *Reading Parfit*

556. **Daniel Stoljar**

- "Emotivism and Truth Conditions" in *Philosophical Studies*, 70, 1993, pp. 81-101.

557. **Philip Stratton-Lake**

- "Why Externalism is not a Problem for Ethical Intuitionists" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 99, 1999, pp. 77-90.

Why should I care that I ought to  $\phi$ ? What makes the judgement that I ought to  $\phi$  normatively significant? What make it action-guiding? It might be thought that being a belief internalist about morality makes such questions easier. But Stratton-Lake argues that it does not. That I do care does not entail that I should. That a judgement is normatively significant depends simply on whether it contains normative concepts and - where a stronger sort of significance is at issue - on whether it is true. And internalism only helps with action-guidingness if we confuse empirical and normative senses of action-guidingness. The only linkage between judgements and motivations that plausibly holds platitudinously is one whereby the holder of a moral judgement is *typically* and not *necessarily* motivated. And any worry - à la Smith - about moral fetishism is alleviated when we understand that while the morally good agent must, for the externalist be suppose to have a nonderivative *de dicto* desire to do what is right, this is not the whole story about his nonderivative desires

(ed.): *Ethical Intuitionism: Re-evaluations* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002).

558. **Philip Stratton-Lake and Brad Hooker**

- "Scanlon versus Moore on Goodness" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics After Moore*, pp. 149-168.

559. **Sharon Street**

- "A Darwinian Dilemma for Realist Theories of Value" in *Philosophical Studies* 127, 2006, pp. 109-166.

560. **A. Stroll**

- The Emotive Theory of Ethics* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1954)

561. [Barry Stroud](#)

"Practical Reasoning" in Ullmann-Margalit (ed.): *Reasoning Practically*

562. **Sarah Stroud**

"Moral Relativism and Quasi-Absolutism" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, 1998

"Moral Commitment and Moral Theory" in *Journal of Philosophical Research* 26, 2001

563. **Nicholas Sturgeon**

"Altruism, Solipsism and the Objectivity of Reasons" in *Philosophical Review* 83, 1974

"Brandt's Moral Empiricism" in *Philosophical Review* 91, 1982.

"Gibbard on Moral Judgement and Norms" in *Ethics* 96, 1985.

"Moral Explanations" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*, pp. 49-78.

"Harman on Moral; Explanations of Natural Facts" in Gillespie, *Moral Realism*

"What Difference Does it Make Whether Moral Realism is True" in Gillespie, *Moral Realism*

"Contents and Causes: A Reply to Blackburn" in *Philosophical Studies* 61, 1991

"Nonmoral Explanations" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 6, 1992.

"Moral Disagreement and Moral Relativism" in Paul, *Cultural Pluralism and Moral Knowledge and Soc. Phil. Pol.* 11, 1994.

"Anderson on Reason and Value" in *Ethics* 106, 1996

"Evil and Explanation" in Couture and Nielsen, *On the Relevance of Metaethics*

"Thomson Against Moral Explanation" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 1998

"Moore on Ethical Naturalism" in *Ethics* 113, 2003, pp. 528-556.

"Ethical Naturalism" in Copp, *The Oxford Companion to Ethical Theory*, pp. 91-121.

"Moral Explanations Defended" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, pp. 241-262.

564. **L. W. Sumner**

"Normative Ethics and Metaethics" in *Ethics* 77, 1967.

"Hare's Arguments Against Ethical Naturalism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1967

"Value Judgements and Action" in *Mind* 77, 1968.

"Welfare, Happiness and Pleasure" in *Utilitas* 4, 1992.

"Welfare, Preference and Rationality" in Frey and Morris, *Value, welfare and Morality*

"The Subjectivity of Welfare" in *Ethics* 95, 1995.

*Welfare, Happiness and Ethics* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996)

565. **Sigrun Svarasdottir**

"Moral Cognitivism and Motivation" in *Philosophical Review* 108, 1999, pp. 161-219.

SS argues that moral judgements are not necessarily motivating - they motivate only when supplemented with a desire to be moral. Like Brink she appeals to cases where people seem not to be motivated by sincere moral judgements they make. When it is a question what explanatory hypotheses are on the table to explain such cases, she suggests the burden of argument must rest with those who want to restrict the hypotheses so available. She stresses that the internalist must not support internalism in circular ways - by appealing to an account of the meaning of moral judgements that internalism is itself invoked in support of. There may, it is granted to Hare, be cases where cynical, sceptical or alienated people are best understood as using moral language "in inverted commas". But she sees no non-question-begging grounds to insist that we must always so explain the sort of cases of motivational failure she appeals to. The paper closes with a lengthy discussion of Smith's "fetishism" argument. She grants that the morally good person's moral judgements motivate via a *de dicto* desire to be moral but thinks this is neither implausible nor reprehensible when we sketch a full picture of how such a person's motivation might function. In particular there is no reason to suppose *de re* desires to act in morally required ways are not also abundant and do not carry independent motivational weight.

"Objective Values: Does Metaethics Rest on a Mistake?" in Leiter, *Objectivity in Law and Morals*

"Evaluations of Rationality" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics after Moore*, pp. 61-78.

"How Do Moral Judgements Motivate?" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, pp. 163-181

566. **Kyle S. Swan**

"Emotivism and Deflationary Truth" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 83, 2002

**567. Christine Swanton**

"Is the Moral Problem Solved?" in *Analysis* 56, 1996.

**568. Sharon E. Sytsma**

"Ethical Internalism and Moral Indifference" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 29, 1995

**569. John Tasioulas**

"Consequences of Ethical Relativism" in *European Journal of Philosophy* 6, 1998.

"Relativism, Realism and Reflection" in *Inquiry* 41, 1998

**570. Charles Taylor**

"The Diversity of Goods" in Sen and Williams, *Utilitarianism and Beyond Sources of the Self* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989)

"Comments and Replies" in *Inquiry* 34, 1991.

"A Most Peculiar Institution" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*.

"Justice After Virtue" in Horton and Mendus *After MacIntyre*.

"Ethics and Ontology" in *Journal of Philosophy* 100, 2003, pp. 305-320

**571. Daniel Taylor**

"Fallacies in Moral Philosophy" in *Mind* 60, 1951.

**572. Jacqueline Taylor**

"Humean Ethics and the Politics of Sentiment" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

**573. Paul W. Taylor**

"C. I. Lewis on Value and Fact" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 14, 1953

"Four Types of Ethical Relativism" in *Philosophical Review* 63, 1954

"The Normative Function of Metaethics" in *Philosophical Review* 67, 1958.

"Social Science and Ethical Relativism" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1958

"Moral Rhetoric, Moral Philosophy and the Science of Morals" in *Journal of Philosophy* 56, 1959.

"'Need' Statements" in *Analysis* 19, 1959.

"Justifying a Way of Life" in *Indian Journal of Philosophy* 2, 1960.

*Normative Discourse* (Englewood-Cliff, Prentice-Hall, 1961).

"Prescribing and Evaluating" in *Mind* 71, 1962.

"The Ethnocentric Fallacy" in *The Monist* 47, 1963.

"On Taking the Moral Point of View" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978

**574. Jenny Teichmann**

"Mrs P. Foot on Morality and Virtue" in *Mind* 69, 1960.

**575. Larry Temkin**

"Rethinking the Good: Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning" in Dancy, *Reading Parfit*

**576. Sergio Tenenbaum**

"Realists without a Cause: Deflationary Theories of Truth and Ethical Realism" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 26, 1996.

"Ethical Internalism and Glaucon's Question" in *Nous* 34, 2000

"Direction of Fit and Motivational Cognitivism" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 235-264.

577. **Folke Tersman**

- "Utilitarianism and the Idea of Reflective Equilibrium" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 29, 1991  
 "Non-Cognitivism and Inconsistency" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 33, 1995.  
 "Crispin Wright on Moral Disagreement" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 48, 1998

578. **Paul Thagard**

*Coherence in Thought and Action* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2000)

579. **Alan Thomas**

- "Minimalism versus Quasi-Realism: Why the Minimalist has a Dialectical Advantage" in *Philosophical Papers* 26, 1997.  
 "Values, Reasons and Perspectives" in *P. A. S.* 97, 1997

580. **Laurence Thomas**

- Living Morally: A Psychology of Moral Character* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989)  
 "Morality and Psychological Development" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*  
 "Morality and Human Diversity" in *Ethics* 103, 1992.

581. **James Thomson and Judith Jarvis Thomson**

- "How Not to Derive 'Ought' From 'Is'" in *Philosophical Review* 1964.

582. **Judith Jarvis Thomson**

- "In Defense of Moral Absolutes" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1958.  
 "Ethics and the Moral Life" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1961.  
 "Practical Reasoning" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 1962.  
 "A Note on Internalism" in *Philosophy & Public Affairs* 1986.  
*The Realm of Rights* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1990), Introduction  
 "On Some Ways in Which a Thing Can Be Good" in *Social Philosophy & Policy* 1992.  
 "Goodness and Utilitarianism," (Presidential Address) *APA Proceedings & Addresses*, 1994.  
 "The Right and the Good" in *Journal of Philosophy*, June 1997.  
 "Reply to Critics" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 58, 1998. pp. 215-222.  
 "The Legacy of *Principia*" in Horgan and Timmons, *Metaethics after Moore*, pp. 233-254.  
 "Normativity" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* 2, pp. 240-265.

583. **Crystal Thorpe**

"A New Worry for the Humean Internalist

in *Philosophical Studies* 131, 2006, pp. 393-417.

584. **Valerie Tiberius**

- "Full Information and Ideal Deliberation." in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 3, 1997.  
 "Justifying Reasons for Valuing: An Argument Against the Social Account." In *The Southern Journal of Philosophy* 37, 1999.  
 "Humean Heoism: Value Commitments and the Source of Normativity" in *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 81, 2000, pp. 426-446.

A rich and suggestive development of a Humean understanding of normative reasons. Desire-based accounts of normativity are typically rejected because there are so many desires that we don't regard as providing reasons. Quite so, says VT, but some desires (broadly construed) plausibly do provide reasons. In particular what she calls value commitments do. I have a value commitment to X when I have a pro-attitude to X, intend to continue to have this pro-attitude and take this pro-attitude to be justified by some good reason. I take a pro-attitude P to be justified by a reason R if R is constituted by certain considerations C such that I have a further pro-attitude

whereby I approve of the state of affairs in which I stably continue to hold P when I reflect upon C (where there are no further defeating considerations D). Value commitments are things we allow a central role in planning our lives and assessing how they are going. For them to enjoy the requisite authority for this, they must be stable and we must believe them to be justified; and value commitments, as VT characterizes them, do enjoy just these features. A person has normative reason to pursue some end, VT then proposes, when her value commitments direct her to that end. This account allows for there to be standards for the evaluation of commitments but does not guarantee that such standards apply universally. In the case of personal commitments we might plausibly live with this. Moral commitments are more problematic. But the account proposed can still, VT suggests, do justice to the way we experience these as non-optional given, firstly, that it is far from an "anything goes" account and, secondly, that it is, so far, silent on how we should regard the value commitments of others.

"Maintaining Conviction and the Humean Account of Normativity" in *Topoi* 21, 2002

If we are to deliberate successfully at all, we need stability in our commitments, both synchronic (whereby not all our commitments are brought into question at once) and over time if we are to carry out extended courses of action. This gives us reason to cultivate a kind of character such that we are disposed not to reconsider our commitments except in certain, quite circumscribed, circumstances. Given this, we should not be impressed by the claim that normative authority could not derive from passions and sentiments as Humeans urge but must stem from principles binding on all rational agents as Kantians urge. For someone with the character trait in question would not be disposed to see themselves as having any reason to question their commitments even if they failed to believe that there were any Kantian-style rational sanctions to ground the authority of these commitments. And the robustness of their normative commitments would be apt to defeat any philosophically motivated conclusion that only Kantian-style rational principles could deliver normative authority (or at least to defeat any application of those philosophical conclusions to the practical deliberative perspective.

"Practical Reason and the Stability Standard" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 5, 2002, pp. 339-353.

The stability standard is a regulative ideal for practical reason that we meet when our confidence in our choices is supported by reasons in which we feel a confidence that we would maintain were we to engage in appropriate reflection on them. The notion of appropriate reflection here is ineliminably normative and must be understood in terms of normative standards the agent himself would be disposed to endorse. To reject the stability standard would be to think that, were appropriate reflection to render a practical commitment unstable, that would be no reason to change it. And that would be incoherent. To reject the stability standard, Tiberius suggests, would be to fail to count as engaged in practical reasoning at all. Appreciating the role of the stability standard allows us to see how we may reject the unattractive instrumentalist thought that reason has nothing to contribute to the evaluation of our ends while remaining consistent with the plausible instrumentalist thought that reason alone does not prescribe ends.

"Value and Practical Deliberation" in *Philosophical Studies* 111, 2002, pp. 146-172.

The goal that our choices should be acceptable in the light of standards we take it we ought to hold and continue to hold is not a rationally compulsory goal. But it is a necessity for human flourishing of a sort for whose value only someone who shared almost nothing of our ethical practices would feel a need to offer justificatory support. Given this understanding of deliberation, Tiberius develops an account of deliberative stability as a virtue: the virtue, roughly, of sticking to the practical commitments one has made (though not in stubborn or foolish ways). She also seeks to make sense of other normative standards of practical reasoning, notably the virtue of self-knowledge, the Rawlsian principles of postponement and inclusiveness and coherence.

#### 585. J. Tilley

"Moral Relativism, Internalism and the "Humean" View of Practical Reason" in *Modern Schoolman* 69, 1992.

"Two Kinds of Moral Relativism" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 29, 1995

"Cultural Relativism, Universalism, and the Burden of Proof." in *Millennium* 27(2), 1998.

"The Problem for Normative Cultural Relativism." in *Ratio Juris* 11(3), 1998.

"Motivation and Practical Reasons." in *Erkenntnis* 47(1), 1997.

#### 586. Mark Timmons

"Foundationalism and the Structure of Ethical Justification" in *Ethics* 97, 1987.

We can be foundationalists about ethical justification in the sense of holding some ethical beliefs basic and justifying the others with reference to them consistently with denying that any ethical beliefs are immediately



justified. This is possible if the justification of the basic ethical beliefs makes reference only to *non-ethical* beliefs. Daniels has objected to this way of proceeding by questioning whether the non-ethical background beliefs that might look most promising in informing our choice of moral beliefs - beliefs about the nature of persons - cannot themselves be justified except by reference to ethical beliefs. Timmons argues that this worry is inadequately supported by argument in particular when we focus on views of the nature of persons that recognize the plasticity of persons and that avoid rashly universalistic claims.

"On the Epistemic Status of Considered Moral Judgements" *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, Spindel Conference Supplement 1990.

"Putnam's Moral Objectivism" in *Erkenntnis* 34, 1991

"Necessitation and Error in Kant's Ethics" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 1992

"Irrealism and Error in Ethics" in *Philosophia* 22, 1993.

"Moral Justification in Context" in *The Monist* 76, 1993.

"Outline of a Contextualist Moral Epistemology" in Simmott-Armstrong and Timmons, *Moral Knowledge Morality Without Foundations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999)

"The Limits of Moral Constructivism" in *Ratio* 16 2003, pp. 291-423.

#### 587. William Tolhurst

"Supervenience, Externalism and Moral Knowledge" in Gillespie, *Moral Realism*

"The Argument from Moral Disagreement," *Ethics*, Vol. 87, 1987

"On the Epistemic Value of Moral Experience" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy*, *Spindel Supp.*, 1990.

"Internalist Arguments Against Moral Realism" in *APQ* 32, 1995.

#### 588. James Tomberlin

(ed.) *Hector-Neri Castaneda* (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1986)

#### 589. Christopher Tollefsen

"Sidgwickian Objectivity and Ordinary Morality" in *Journal of Value Inquiry* 33, 1999.

#### 590. V. Tomas

"Ethical Disagreement and the Emotive Theory of Values" in *Mind*, 1951.

#### 591. S. E. Toulmin

*The Place of Reason in Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950)

#### 592. Jon Tresan

"De Dicto Internalism Cognitivism" in *Nous* 40, 2006, pp. 143-165.

#### 593. Roger Trigg

*Reason and Commitment* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961)

#### 594. Savas Tsohatzidis

(Ed.): *Foundations of Speech Act Theory: Philosophical and Linguistic Perspectives* (London: Routledge, 1994)

#### 595. Edna Ullmann-Margalit

(Ed.): *Reasoning Practically* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000)

#### 596. Nicholas Unwin

"Morality, Law and the Evaluation of Value" in *Mind* 94, 1985  
 "Can Emotivism Sustain A Social Ethic?" in *Ratio*, 1990  
 "Quasi-Realism, Negation and the Frege-Geach Problem" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 49, 1999, pp. 337-352.

Blackburn has no adequate account of how to understand the negation of an evaluative sentence. If we allow him the equivalence:

E. A accepts H!p = A hoorays that p.

We get this

N1. A does not accept that H!p = A does not hooray that p  
 N2. A accepts not-H!p = ???  
 N3. A accepts H!(not-p) = A hoorays that not-p.

But it is quite mysterious how we should fill in N2. Absence of an attitude is no good. accepting the negation of a sentence must be something positive. The model-set semantics to which Blackburn appeals imports a structure that Blackburn is not entitled to prior to an explanation of how evaluative talk of .perfect. worlds can be understood when embedded in the context of both a conditional and a universal quantifier. An alternative strategy that focuses on higher order attitudes gives us more structure but makes mixed contexts seriously intractable.

"Norms and Negation: A Problem for Gibbard's Logic" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 51, 2002. pp. 60-75

Gibbard, like Blackburn, has no adequate account of how to understand the negation of an evaluative sentence. He tries to unpack this in terms of the ruling out of factual-normative worlds. However if we understand this in terms of ruling out one.s acceptance of certain combinations of normative and factual claims, it will fail adequately to distinguish between denial and mere neutrality. And we cannot understand it in terms of directly ruling out the context of such claims unless we already understand what it is to negate them. In the case of Gibbard.s fully opinionated goddess, Hera, who is never neutral, there will be no space between not accepting some normative claim and accepting its negation. But for us imperfectly opinionated beings there is such a space and there is no satisfactory way to explain what it is for us to rule out some evaluative content understood as Gibbard recommends.

#### 597. J. O. Urmson

"On Grading" in *Mind* 59, 1950  
 "Some Questions Concerning Validity" in *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 1953  
*The Emotive Theory of Ethics* (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1968)  
 "A Defence of Intuitionism" in *P. A. S.* 75, 1975

#### 598. Peter Vallentyne

*Contractarianism and Rational Choice* (Cambridge: C. U. P., 1991)

#### 599. Pekka Väyrynen

"Particularism and Default Reasons" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 7, 2004, pp. 53-79.  
 "Resisting the Nuck-Passing Account of Value" in *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 295-324.

#### 600. J. David Velleman

*Practical Reflection* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989)  
 "The Guise of the Good" in *Nous* 26, 1992  
 "What Happens When Someone Acts?" in *Mind* 101, 1992  
 "The Story of Rational Action" in *Philosophical Topics* 21, 1993  
 "The Possibility of Practical Reasoning" in *Ethics* 106, 1996  
 "Deciding how to Decide" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*  
 "Motivation by Ideal" in *Philosophical Explorations* 5, 2002, pp. 89-104.

#### 601. Godfrey Vesey

(ed.): *Philosophy and the Arts* (London: Macmillan, 1973)

602. **Enrique Villanueva**

(ed.): *Naturalism and Normativity* (Atascadero: Ridgeview, 1993)

603. **Bart Voorzanger**

"No Norms and No Nature: The Moral Relevance of Evolutionary Biology" in *Biology and Philosophy* 2, 1987.

604. **C. H. Waddington**

*The Ethical Animal* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967)

605. **James Wallace**

*Virtues and Vices* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1978)

*Moral Relevance and Moral Conflict* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988)

606. **R. Jay Wallace**

"How to Argue About Practical Reason" in *Mind* 99, 1990, pp. 355-385.

*Responsibility and the Moral Sentiments* (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1994)

"Reason and Responsibility" in Cullity and Gaut, *Ethics and Practical Reason*

"Three Conceptions of Rational Agency" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 2, 1999. pp. 217-242.

Review of Svavarsdottir's "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation", BEARS, 2001.

Review of Richard Joyce: *The Myth of Morality* in *Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews* 2003.

"Moral Motivation" in Dreier, *Contemporary Debates in Moral Theory*, pp. 182-196.

607. **R. Jay Wallace, Philip Pettit, Samuel Scheffler and Michael Smith**

(Eds.) *Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004)

608. **Margaret Urban Walker**

"Feminism, Ethics and the Question of Theory" in *Hypatia* 7, 1992

609. **Bruce Waller**

"Noncognitivist Moral Realism" in *Philosophia* 24 1994

610. **Geoffrey Warnock**

*Contemporary Moral Philosophy* (London: Macmillan, 1967)

*The Object of Morality* (London: Methuen, 1971)

"On Choosing Values" in *Midwest Studies* 3, 1978 "Comments on Frankena's Three Questions" in *The Monist* 63, 1980.

611. **Mary Warnock**

*Ethics Since 1900* (London: Oxford University Press, 1960)

612. **R. Wasserstrom**

"On the Breakdown of Moral Arguments: A Reply to Philippa Foot" in *Philosophical Quarterly* 10, 1960.

613. **Michael Watkins and Kelly Dean Jolley**

"Pollyanna Realism: Moral Perception and Moral Properties in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 80, 2002, pp. 75-85.

#### 614. Ralph Wedgwood

"Theories of Content and Theories of Motivation" in *European Journal of Philosophy* 3, 1995  
 "Non-Cognitivism, Realism and Truth" in *Philosophical Studies* 69, 1997, pp. 73-91.

If Gibbard's normative logic has the resources to handle the Frege-Geach problem, RW argues, it is at the cost of going cognitivist. For it is only by going cognitivist that Gibbard can expect to explain the *point* of consistency and conformity to warrant in normative contexts. For motivating these notions requires us to introduce into Gibbard's story the notion of a "winning" world/norm system pair that is a suitable idealization of the speaker's community's norms where the property of *holding at a winning world/norm pair* (a) is normatively significant and (b) disquotes and these together, urges RW, suffice to make it truth.

"The Essence of Reponse-Dependence" in Casati and Tappolet, *Response-Dependence*  
 "The Fundamental Principle of Practical Reasoning" in *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 6, 1998.  
 "The Price of Non-Reductive Moral Realism" in *Ethical Theory and Moral Practice* 2, 1999  
 "Conceptual Role Semantics for Moral Terms" *Philosophical Review* 110, 2001, pp. 1-30.  
 "Internalism Explained" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 65, 2002, pp. 349-369.  
 "Practical Reason and Desire" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 80, 2002, pp. 345-358.  
 "Practical Reasoning as Figuring Out What is Best: Against Constructivism" in *Topoi* 21, 2002.

There are two views of practical reasoning: the constructivist view whereby what makes a choice correct is that it is the outcome of the right sort of mental procedure and the recognitional view where the correctness of a choice is determined independently of the mental procedure by which it is arrived at. On the recognitional view, procedural or internal norms for mental procedures for choosing are to be explained in terms of their reliability in arriving at independently correct choices. On the constructivist view there is no procedure-independent understanding of a correct choice to be had. Substantive versions of the recognitional view specify some substantive feature F and urge that we choose acts that have it. But, for any F, there is plausibly no non-question-begging answer to Korsgaard's normative question: Why take being F as rationally decisive and not some other feature of the act? This is taken by some as a fatal problem for the recognitional view. However the very same problem bedevils constructivism. For any mental procedure P one can always raise the question: Why take being an outcome of P as rationally decisive and not some other feature of the action? We can however escape the problem by accepting a version of the recognitional view that is not substantive but formal: such a view says simply that we should make correct choices, choosing things that are good or choiceworthy. Here it does fail to make any sort of sense to ask: Yes, but why take this feature as rationally decisive? The view might seem vulnerable to a charge of triviality, of telling us nothing at all about how we may determine what is the correct thing to do. By itself, Wedgwood concedes, the view does indeed tell us nothing of this sort but the objection is defused if it nonetheless has . as he briefly argues it does - nontrivial consequences when conjoined with other plausible claims.

"Sensing Values" in *Philosophy-and-Phenomenological-Research* 63, 2002.

A clear and effective response to Johnston's "Authority of Effect". RW argues that said authority is less hard to square with either projectivism or dispositionalism than Johnston urges and that even if we were to accept Johnston's realism about the values affect is supposed to "disclose", that would fall far short of warranting an understanding of effect as a kind of sensory perception.

"The Metaethicists' Mistake" in *Philosophical Perspectives* 18, 2004, pp. 405-426. "The Meaning of 'Ought'" in Shafer-Landau, *Oxford Studies in Metaethics* I, pp. 127-160.

#### 615. Ota Weinberger

"'Is' and 'Ought' Reconsidered" in *Archiv für Rechts- und Socialphilosophie* 71, 1984  
 "The Expressive Conception of Norms" in *Law and Philosophy* 4, 1985  
 "The Logic of Norms Founded on Descriptive Language" in *Ratio Juris* 4, 1991.

#### 616. C. Wellman

*The Language of Ethics* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University Press, 1961)  
 "Ethical Implications of Cultural Relativity" in *Journal of Philosophy* 1963  
 "Emotivism and Ethical Objectivity" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1968

*Challenge and Response: Justification in Ethics* (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1971)  
 "Ethical Disagreement and Objective Truth" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 12, 1975

617. **W. K. Werkmeister**

*Theories of Ethics* (Lincoln, Nebraska: Johnsen, 1961)

618. **Richard Werner**

"Ethical Realism" in *Ethics* 93, 1983  
 "Ethical Realism Defended" in *Ethics* 95, 1983

619. **Edward Westermarck**

*The Origin and Development of the Moral Ideas* (London: MacMillan, 1906).  
*Ethical Relativity* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1932)

620. **Jonathan Westphal**

"On Value and Value" in *Philosophy* 1991.

621. **Kenneth R. Westphal**

(ed.) *Pragmatism, Reason and Norms: A Realistic Assessment* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1998).

622. **J. Wheatley**

"A Note on the Emotive Theory" in *Philosophy*, 1959

623. **Morton White**

*What Is and What Ought To Be Done* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981)  
 "Normative Ethics, Normative Epistemology and Quine's Holism" in Schlipp and Hahn, *The Philosophy of W. V. Quine*, pp. 649-662.

624. **Warner A. Wick**

"Moral Problems, Moral Philosophy and Metaethics: Some Further Dogmas of Empiricism" in *Philosophical Review* 62, 1953  
 "Generalization and the Basis of Ethics" in *Ethics* 72, 1962.

625. **David Wiggins**

"Deliberation and Practical Reason" in *P. A. S.* 76, 1976  
 "Truth, Invention and the Meaning of Life" in *Proc Brit Ac.* 62, 1976 and *Needs, Values Truth*  
 "Weakness of Will, Commensurability and the Objects of Desire" in *P. A. S.* 79, 1979  
*Needs, Values, Truth* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1987).  
 "A Sensible Subjectivism?" in *Needs, Values, Truth*, pp. 185-214.  
 "Truth as Predicated of Moral Judgements" in *ibid.*  
 "Moral Cognitivism, Moral Relativism and Motivating Beliefs" in *P.A.S.* 91, 1991, pp. 61-85..  
 "Cognitivism, Naturalism and Normativity: A Reply to Peter Railton" in Haldane and Wright *Reality, Representation and Projection*

DW distinguishes an explanatory Humean naturalism consistent both with noncognitivism and with recognizing the *sui generis* character of moral concepts and the kind of naturalist cognitivism that was the target of Moore's Open Question Argument. This argument can be read as raising a puzzle about the content of moral judgements, naturalistically understood, can be normative. It can be improved by drawing attention to "the difference between conceptualising our experience in a manner that is conditioned by the ethical and conceptualising it in a scientific manner." Normativity is glossed in terms of being categorical: moral judgements give all who accept them a reason that is independent of their desires. It is something that must surely to the *content* of moral

judgement and it's hard to see how it could so accrue to naturalistic content. Both the noncognitivist and the nonnaturalist cognitivist are better placed than Railton's naturalist to make sense of normativity. But the nonnaturalist cognitivist can also find room for the possibility of *objective vindication*: we may think something is obligatory because it *really is*. He can allow a conceptual connection between moral judgement and the will to act accordingly but "only a presumptive and normal connection", a connection required if I am to grasp "the sense of the distinctively moral and political language that sustains the practices in which I participate."

"A Neglected Position" in *ibid.*

Because it is not always transparent which properties are natural, Railton's substantive naturalism is at least a "starter". But there are qualitative differences between the aspirations of science and those proper to human interpretative understanding. If V is some value property and X some natural property, the only adequate way to characterize V is in terms of the proper, engaged response to it. V must connect with the will in ways empirical engagement with a natural property does not require. With a fixed number of cases we might hope to find an X coextensive with V but given indefinitely many new cases, any understanding of value in terms of X would have to catch onto the point of attributions of V, make the interests that drive such attributions its own. This might be a proper aspiration but only insofar as it involves an aspiration to humanize our understanding of the natural. Such a study might advance our understanding of our evaluative practices and make us alive to possible alternatives but would always work from the inside. It is from such an internal perspective that the only vindication these practices stand in need of should proceed.

"Categorical Requirements: Kant and Hume on the Idea of Duty" in Hursthouse, Lawrence and Quinn *Virtues and Reasons*

"Objective and Subjective in Ethics, With Two Postscripts on Truth" in *Ratio* 1995.

"Replies" in Lovibond and Williams, *Identity, Truth and Value*

#### 626. Eric Willard

"Is there Ethical Knowledge?" in *Southwestern Philosophical Review* 14, 1998

"A Fallacy in Korsgaard's Argument for Moral Obligation" in *The Journal of Value Inquiry* 34, 2000

"Advice and Moral Objectivity" in *Philosophical Papers* 29, 2000

"Good Advice and Rational Action" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 60, 2000

"Unconscious Violinists and the Use of Analogies in Moral Argument" in *Journal of Medical Ethics* 26, 2000

"On the Rationality of Desiring the Forbidden" in *Analysis* 62, 2002

Smith has defended the practicality requirement: You are practically rational if you don't desire to do what you believe you have reason to do; while meeting objections by contending that practical reason is self-effacing. Sometimes you should not believe you have reason to do what you in fact have reason to do. Suppose this is true. There can then plausibly be counterexamples to the PR: cases where you should desire to do what you in fact have reason to do but you should not believe you have reason to do it. EW's example is this: a couple with a declining sex life consult a marital therapist who wisely advises them to refrain from sex for a week. Believing (rationally but falsely) that they have reason to refrain from sex endows sex with all the attraction of the forbidden and reawakens their desire for it (which was the therapist's cunning plan all along). So they desire (rationally) to do what they in fact have reason to do (have sex) but (rationally) do not believe that they have reason to do it.

"Theories of Practical Reason" in *Metaphilosophy* 33, 2002

#### 627. John T. Wilcox

"Blackstone on Metaethical Neutrality" in *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 41, 1963.

"Stevenson and the Referent of an Ethical Statement" in *Analysis* 23, 1963.

"From 'Is' to 'Ought' Via Psychology" in *Review of Metaphysics* 18, 1964.

"One More Flaw in G. E. Moore's Critique of Subjectivism" in *Ethics* 84, 1973.

*Truth and Value in Nietzsche: A Study of his Metaethics and Epistemology* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1974)

#### 628. Hugh T. Wilder

"Practical Reason and the Logic of Imperatives" in *Metaphilosophy* 11, 1980.

#### 629. Bernard Williams

"Ethical Consistency" in *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, Supplementary Volume 39, 1965 and *Problems of the Self*

Classic paper on dilemmas. When beliefs conflict I want to find the wrong one and lose it, without residue or regret. When desires conflict things are different. BW argues here that moral conflicts are more akin in these respects to conflicts of desire in a way that is awkward for the cognitivist. We should not think of the "ought" judgement that is decided against as inapplicable or eliminated. Rather we should accept that sometimes we have  $O_p$  and  $O_q$  where  $\neg \diamond (p \ \& \ q)$ , maintaining coherence by rejecting the agglomeration principle:  $O_p \ \& \ O_q \rightarrow O(p \ \& \ q)$ .

"Consistency and Realism" in P.A.S.S. 40, 1966 and *Problems of the Self*

"Morality and the Emotions" in Casey, *Morality and Moral Reasoning*

*Morality: An Introduction to Ethics* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1972).

*Problems of the Self* (Cambridge: C.U.P 1973)

"The Truth in Relativism" in P.A.S. 75, 1975 and *Moral Luck*.

"Conflicts of Values" in Ryan, *The Idea of Freedom* and *Moral Luck*

"Internal and External Reasons" in Harrison, *Rational Action* and *Moral Luck*, pp. 101-113.

All normative reasons, argues BW, are internal reasons. More precisely, if some agent A has a normative reason to  $\phi$  then a decision by A to  $\phi$  can be reached by him via some *sound deliberative route* from the motivations he has in his actual *subjective motivational set*. By an *internal reason*, he means any normative reason which satisfies this condition - as he thinks all normative reasons must. By the agent's *subjective motivational set*, Williams means the set of his existing motives. By a *sound deliberative route*, he means not merely the correction of one's beliefs and sound means-end reasoning but also such things as: ascertaining how best to satisfy some element in one's set in the light of other elements; deciding which of conflicting elements one attaches most weight to; finding constitutive solutions- e.g. deciding what would make for entertainment given that that is what one wants; exercises of the imagination. The likes of brainwashing, hypnotism or deceit are ruled out. He argues that that to come to accept that I have a normative reason to  $\phi$  is to acquire a motivating reason to  $\phi$ . My accepting the normative reason claim can feature in an explanation of my subsequently  $\phi$ ing. But he can make no sense of how accepting that I have an external reason might be supposed to motivate me.

*Moral Luck* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1981)

"Ethics and the Fabric of the World" in Honderich, *Morality and Objectivity*

*Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy* (London: Fontana, 1985)

"The Scientific and the Ethical" in Brown, *Objectivity and Cultural Divergence*

"Hylomorphism" in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 6, 1986.

"The Structure of Hare's Theory" in Seanor and Fotion, *Hare and Critics*

"What Does Intuitionism Imply?" in Moravcsik and Taylor, *Human Agency: Language, Duty and Value*

"Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame" in *Logos* 10, 1989 and Williams *Making Sense of Humanity*.

To say someone has a reason to  $j$  makes little sense unless it is possible for them to  $j$  for that reason. Hence it is obscure what reasons could be if they are not internal reasons in Williams sense. The constraints Williams places on what can count as sound deliberation reflect what an agent already has in his S and, so conceived, cannot without argument be extended to include moral and prudential constraints. Talk of blame, like talk of reasons, makes little sense unless the agent could have acted in the way she is blamed for failing to act. Hence it is unclear how we can sensibly blame those who lacked an internal reason for acting in the way we wish they had. The picture is complicated somewhat by the way blame, like advice, presents a consideration that contributes to what it is talking about.. There is a degree of indeterminacy in when we may say someone has an internal reason and consequently in when someone is properly blamed but this is less a problem than a way the account is true to the phenomena, an .intelligible obscurity. far to be preferred to the .unintelligible mystery. of externalism.

"Who Needs Ethical Knowledge?" in Griffiths, *Ethics and Making Sense of Humanity*

*Making Sense of Humanity* (Cambridge: C.U.P., 1995)

"Replies" in Altham and Harrison, *World, Mind and Ethics*.

"Truth in Ethics" in *Ratio*, 1995

"History, Morality and the Test of Reflection" in Korsgaard, *The Sources of Normativity*

### 630. Timothy Williamson

"Ethics, Supervenience and Ramsey Sentences" in *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 62, 2001.

631. **Theo van Willigenburg**

"Reaching Moral Conclusions on Purely Logical Grounds" in *Methodology and Science* 22, 1989.

632. **J. Wilson**

*Reason and Morals* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961)

633. **Peter Winch**

"The Universalizability of Moral Judgments" in *The Monist* 49, 1965  
*Ethics and Actions* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1972)

634. **Ludwig Wittgenstein**

"Lecture on Ethics" in *Philosophical Review* 74, 1965.

635. **David Wong**

*Moral Relativity* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984).

"Castaneda's theory of Deontic Meaning and Truth" in Tomberlin, *Hector-Neri Castaneda*

"Commentary on Sayre-McCord's "Being a Realist about Relativism" in *Philosophical Studies* 1991.

"Relativism" in Singer, *A Companion to Ethics*.

636. **Allen Wood**

*Kant's Ethical Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)

637. **Michael Woods**

"Reasons for Action and Desire" in *P. A. S. S.* 46, 1972, pp. 189-201.

638. **Thomas E. Wren**

"Social Learning Theory, self-Regulation and Morality" in *Ethics* 92, 1982.

(Ed.) *The Moral Domain: Essays in the Ongoing Discussion between Philosophy and the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1990).

"The Possibility of Convergence Between Moral Psychology and Metaethics" in Wren, *The Moral Domain Caring about Morality: Philosophical Perspectives in Moral Psychology* (Cambridge, Ma.: MIT Press, 1991).

639. **Crispin Wright**

"Review of Simon Blackburn: *Spreading the Word*" in *Mind* 94, 1985, pp. 310-319.

"Moral Values, Projection and Secondary Qualities" in *P.A.S.S.*, 1988.

"Realism, Antirrealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism" in *Midwest Studies* 12, 1988, pp. 25-49.

*Truth and Objectivity* (Cambridge, Ma: Harvard University Press, 1992)

"Truth in Ethics" in *Ratio* 8, 1995, pp. 209-226.

640. **Darryl F. Wright**

"Diagnosing the Naturalistic Fallacy: *Principia Ethica* Revisited" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 32, 1994.

641. **Georg Henrik von Wright**

*Norm and Action: A Logical Inquiry* (London: RKP, 1963)

"Is and Ought" in Bulygin, Gardies and Niiniluoto, *Man, Law and Modern Forms of Life*

"Is There a Logic of Norms?" in *Ratio Juris* 4, 1991



642. **K. Yasenchuk**

- "Assimilative Moral Realism and Supervenience" in *Dialogue* 34, 1995  
 "Moral Realism and the Burden of Argument" in *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 35, 1997

643. **Nick Zangwill**

- "Quasi-quasi-realism", *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 50, 1990.  
 "Moral Modus Ponens", *Ratio*, 1992 pp. 177-193.

Concerns Blackburn's quasi-realist treatments of the Frege-Geach problem. Discussing the Hale-Wright objection that moral *modus ponens* on SB's account is not valid as a matter of *logic*, NZ argues that the issue is whether we are in a position to explain why our thought involving attitudes should have a causal structure that mimics our that of our thought involving beliefs. Given such an explanation, it would be no big deal if the obligation binding us to the causal transitions in question were not strictly logical. Worries NZ takes more seriously are: how the quasi-realist is to explain the sameness of meaning of ethical propositions in embedded and unembedded contexts and whether the sort of story SB tells about conditionals can be extended to other embedded contexts (propositional attitude contexts for example).

- "Quietism", *Midwest Studies in Philosophy* 17, 1992, pp. 160-176.  
 "Quasi-realist Explanation", *Synthese*, 1993.  
 "Moral Mind-independence", *Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 1994.  
 "Moral Supervenience", *Midwest Studies*, vol. 20, 1995.  
 "Explaining Supervenience: Moral and Mental", *Journal of Philosophical Research*, 1997  
 "Direction of Fit and Normative Functionalism" in *Philosophical Studies* 91, 1998, pp. 173-203.  
 "Dilemmas and Moral Realism" in *Utilitas* 11, 1999.  
 "Against Analytic Moral Functionalism" in *Ratio* 13 2000.

Zangwill argues, against Jackson, that moral platitudes will not help us bridge the fact-value gap. Because there are no moral platitudes. Those who disagree profoundly with our basic moral beliefs - those such as Herman Goring - are certainly mistaken but the mistake they perpetrate is not a *conceptual* mistake.

- "Externalist Moral Motivation" in *American Philosophical Quarterly* 40, 2003, pp. 143-154.

644. **Paul Ziff**

*Semantic Analysis* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960), especially chapter VI.

645. **David Zimmerman**

- "Force and Sense" in *Mind*, 89, 1980  
 "Meta-Ethics Naturalized" in *Canadian Journal of Philosophy* 10, 1980  
 "The Force of Hypothetical Commitment" in *Ethics* 93, 1983  
 "Moral Realism and Explanatory Necessity" in Copp and Zimmerman, *Morality, Reason and Truth*

646. **Michael J. Zimmerman**

The "Is-Ought": An Unnecessary Dualism" in *Mind* 1962.

647. **Sidney Zink**

- "Warranted Judgments in Dewey's Theory of Valuation" in *Philosophical Review* 51, 1942.  
 "The Good as Harmony" in *Philosophical Review* 53, 1944.  
 "The Principles of Inclusiveness and Harmony in Perry's Theory of Value" in *Philosophical Review* 53, 1944.  
 "Methodological Guidance and Ethical Detachment" in *Philosophical Review* 61, 1952.  
 "Objectivism and Mr Hare's *Language of Morals*" in *Mind*, 1961  
*The Concepts of Ethics* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1962)