

SOCIAL SCIENCES

A Quarterly Journal of the
Russian Academy of Sciences
and the RAS Institute of Philosophy

IN THIS ISSUE

Traditions and Innovations: The Cossack Potential

Worldview Specifics of Supporters of the Western
Path of Development for Russia

Russian Network of Academic Journals as a System

Russian Philosophy and Philosophy in Russia

Muscovy in German-Language Historiography

Bolshevik Ideological Practices in the Early 1930s

Vyacheslav Ivanov and Dostoevsky Studies

SOCIAL SCIENCES

VOLUME 54

NUMBER 4, 2023

CONTENTS

<i>In This Issue</i>		1
<hr/> FOCUS ON RUSSIA <hr/>		
Traditions and Innovations in the Development Policy of Rural Territories in Russia: The Potential of Cossacks	<i>E. Morozova, I. Miroshnichenko</i>	4
Worldview Specifics of Supporters of the Western Path of Development for Russia in Mass Population Strata	<i>N. Tikhonova</i>	25
National Network of Academic Journals as a System: Problems Before and After Sanctions	<i>E. Semenov</i>	49
<hr/> ESSAYS <hr/>		
On the Identity of Russian Philosophy and Philosophy in Russia	<i>A. Guseynov</i>	68
Diversity of Russian Philosophy	<i>M. Maslin</i>	78
The Philosophy of Sense	<i>A. Smirnov</i>	86
Personal Authenticity as a Predictor of Coping with Stress and the Possible Effect of Stress	<i>S. Nartova-Bochaver</i>	99
Estates System, Representation, Regionalism: Muscovy in German-Language Historiography of the Second Half of the 20th Century	<i>I. Kirpichnikov</i>	114

Bolshevik Ideological Practices and the Academia Publishing House in the First Half of the 1930s *E. Kravtsova* 128

Vyacheslav Ivanov and the Emergence of Dostoevsky Studies at the Turn of the 1910s-1920s (M. Bakhtin, B. Engelgardt, V. Komarovich) *O. Bogdanova* 140

ACADEMIC LIFE

Academic Journals 160

Social Sciences, 2023: 1-4 163

The Philosophy of Sense

Andrey SMIRNOV

Abstract. The cleavage in Russian culture which arose as a side effect of the reforms of Peter I cannot be overcome without focus on the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'* which has manifested itself as the core value in the course of centuries of Russian history. The gap between the culture of the upper strata which fell under the influence of Europeanism (“Europe-aping,” according to N. Danilevsky) and the culture of the lower strata governed by the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'* can be bridged through organic assimilation of the “engrafted” (Danilevsky’s term) European culture, one of the big cultures of humankind, by building the European segment into the *vsechelovecheskoye* matrix of Russian culture. Overcoming Europe-aping, still an urgent task, means overcoming the dogmatic idea that Europe produced universal cultural (political, social, economic, juridical, ethical, aesthetical, etc.) forms for all of humankind. The key to fulfilling this task is transition from thinking in terms of *obshechelovecheskoye* to thinking in terms of *vsechelovecheskoye*, an idea which has been developed in Russian thought since the 19th century. Formation and manifestation of the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'* informs Russian history, binding it together in spite of all the ruptures and revolutionary catastrophes. “Humankind” can be conceived of only as a notion based on *sobornost'*, though not on universalism of any kind, for it has developed, in the course of its history, several big cultures, each of which elaborated its intrinsic logic that cannot be reduced to the logic of other big cultures. The basic task that Russian philosophy faces, in order to develop as the philosophy of sense, is to study and elaborate on the actual manifestations of the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'* in the course of Russian history as the logic of a *vsechelovecheskoye* global design for humankind.

Keywords: *sobornost'*, *vsesubyechnost'*, Europe-aping, *vsechelovecheskoye*, *obshechelovecheskoye*.

<https://dx.doi.org/10.21557/SSC.94488913>

A. Smirnov, D. Sc. (Philosophy), Full Member of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Chief Research Fellow, Institute of Philosophy, RAS. E-mail: public@avsmirnov.info.

This article was first published in Russian in the journal *Filosofskiy zhurnal* (Philosophy journal). 2023. Vol. 16. No. 3, pp. 41-54; DOI: 10.21146/2072-0726-2023-16-3-41-54).

Prince Nikolay Trubetskoy (1890-1938), the world-renowned philologist, one of the creators of phonology, the founder and foremost representative of classical Eurasianism, wrote in 1920, in a preface to his book *Europe and Humankind*:

The thoughts expressed in it had been formed in my mind more than ten years ago. Since then I have talked on these topics with various people, wishing to test myself or to convince others... From numerous conversations I got the impression that most of the people I met simply did not understand my thoughts. They did not understand not because I did not speak clearly, but because for the majority of European-educated people these thoughts are almost organically unacceptable, as they contradict some immutable psychological attitudes on which European thinking is based [10, pp. III-IV].

Trubetskoy, born into an illustrious family which gave our country famous philosophers, historians, and public personalities, was himself undoubtedly a European-educated person; not just educated but brilliantly educated. At the same time, he turned out to be one of the few Russian intellectuals who managed to take a reflective attitude toward European thought, European reason and European culture. It is a brilliant specimen of reflection which has few parallels and makes Trubetskoy an outstanding philosopher. Even if his heritage consisted of nothing but the aforementioned words, their significance would have been no less important than the Socratic "I know that I know nothing," which laid the foundation of all European epistemology. However, while European philosophy has already done its work by making the Socratic maxim what it has become after European philosophy accomplished a journey that took two and half thousand years, Russian philosophy has yet to do its work to derive all the inferences from Trubetskoy's statement and put it on solid ground.

The idea that runs through Trubetskoy's book *Europe and Humankind* is that European culture is but one of many local cultures and it would be wrong to think of it as universal and, therefore, obligatory for all. This seemingly simple thought has far-reaching consequences, such that it was bound to be seen as a real threat to the idea that European cultural (i.e., political, social, economic, juridical, ethical, aesthetical, ideological, etc.) forms and European reason have no alternatives and are destined to be predominant. We will come back to it anon; in the meantime, let us note that the 1978 book *Orientalism* [9] by Edward Said, which made such a big splash in the West and is well known in Russian intellectual circles, unlike Trubetskoy's book, does not question the uniqueness and lack of an alternative to Europe, but humbly asks it to allow room for non-European peoples and to stop humiliating them. Said's *Orientalism* does not pose any threat to European dominance, and that is why it has been taken on board by Western culture. By contrast, Trubetskoy's *Europe and Humankind* was deliberately hushed up. Sadly, this was the case in Russia too, to illustrate Trubetskoy's thesis on "organic unacceptability."

What are the sources of these "psychological attitudes" which puzzled Nikolay Trubetskoy? And are they merely psychological?

The sources are in history, many would say. And of course, the reforms of Peter the Great would be mentioned. Indeed, in spite of the change of epochs

and political systems, the abiding pernicious disposition of culture, at least the culture of the upper social strata since the times of Peter, has been total orientation toward the forms of Western culture as an absolute value and belittling of their own native culture. This tendency is manifested in a myriad of facts and traits characterizing public consciousness. It is, however, futile to talk about Peter's reforms in an "either-or" way and pine for pre-Petrine Rus' and its specific setup, if only because this would not answer our question.

Basically, Peter's reforms were necessary. But they were not necessary in the form in which they were carried out. Their side effect, but no less disastrous, was that the foundation of the vitality of culture was thrown out, as it were, in its upper part – not in the whole. What was this foundation and how has public consciousness split? Why was culture still able to save itself and secure this foundation, not allow it to be finally diluted? We will talk about this. But now it is important to note that Peter's Europeanization was an *ad hoc* phenomenon geared to the needs primarily of the army and navy, and – since this could not be done without industry – to the needs of industry development, and hence for European science. All this did not develop from an internal need, did not have its own foundations, but was in its form an engraftment.¹

The reforms were carried out hastily. This was prompted by the overall geopolitical situation: Russia needed to take catch-up measures to avoid being crushed by Europe. But these quick catch-up measures, which were inevitable at the time, were not followed up by robust cultural work by Peter's successors. In other words, Russian culture, having survived the shock of a European engraftment at the top, was unable to organically digest it. It was not by chance that Dostoevsky wrote with undisguised dismay that chips were flying for two hundred years and it was high time for something to have been built in Russia.² Trubetskoy gave an accurate description of the disease: the split of culture into two parts, the upper and the lower [11], which upset the natural (for any living culture) relationship between them. The educated makers of culture constituting its upper layer failed to establish the natural circulation of ideas and meanings from top to bottom, which is the long-term, for many centuries, condition of independent self-centered development of any culture. This proposition can hardly be gainsaid. Multiple reservations can be expressed concerning it, but such nuancing would not challenge the overall validity of the statement. The two grandiose catastrophes our country experienced in 1917 and 1991 were caused basically by *the lack of homogeneity of Russian culture*.

A vast state, as Russia was and is, cannot exist and develop and remain stable, survive cruel wars and recover after defeats unless it relies on albeit vague, but nevertheless persistent, intuitive, clear without words sense, anticipation, a utopian quest of an ideal which is shared by the majority, even the whole mass of the people. This and only this illumines life and gives strength, rendering meaning to what happens and making it possible to look beyond the horizon, to see the sky when your head is bent down to the earth. This vague life impulse, this sensation has to be expressed coherently. Articulated, it takes different forms. It rises from the bottom to the top, from the thick of daily life, from the very

depths of “psychological attitudes,” initially being expressed through grassroots folk arts and crafts. Embroidery, hammer work, wood carving; folk songs, choir singing, folk ditties; fairy tales, spell words, you name it. Something vaguely called “national spirit” is expressed by these forms of creativity which require no institutionalization and are not practiced by “professionals.” The “psychological attitudes” of the people. This is indeed hard to understand for those who have never felt this pulse, this throbbing of real life. It will remain so for the creators themselves: these forms of folk art are as natural as breathing and walking; hence they do not seem to require any reflection. These are all forms of life and forms of self-expression, and not artificial cultural forms. It means that these attitudes should be translated into concepts to be understood; such that they could be reflected upon as well as experienced. The process of conceptualization should be completed, and it has to be completed in the upper layers of culture. It must at long last be accomplished by the Russian philosophy.

This and only this constitutes the self-focused view of Russian philosophy if it is to correspond to the task of self-focused development of culture. This is not about whether or not Russian philosophy has learned someone’s lessons: that is a matter of technique, not substance.

Self-focus, be it of culture or philosophy (or an individual person) is not the same as self-absorbedness, seclusion and insularity. On the contrary, only self-focus unlocks human being, philosophy and culture. We are all familiar with the adolescent syndrome: unable to rely on oneself the growing person looks up to those who can. Not being able to understand what real self-sufficiency is about, the teenager is desperate to copy external features trying to be “like grownups” outwardly, not inwardly. A true grown-up does not copy anyone, having long overcome the adolescent syndrome. Likewise philosophy and culture: not understanding themselves and hence not valuing themselves they seek to copy someone else’s experience. No, you can make your life only from yourself, not from others.

The grassroots level of culture is the custodian of the way of life, of the underlying worldview. The largest mass of people belongs to that level. In old Rus’ and then in Russia it was the rural way of life. What is called *derevnya* (village) was presented in different forms, depending significantly on the location, soil and geographic conditions (forest or steppe, black soil or infertile soil, etc.). All this has not been sufficiently well studied and has not been brought into the “scholarly domain,” which shows our inattention toward ourselves: the view of an adolescent who is attracted by gaudiness and is not aware of being an ugly duckling who would grow into a swan. Anyway, it is the lower level of culture, the “soil” that has at all times been the life basis of culture. Such basic, massive and the most stable and conservative layer can readily be found in any long-living and viable culture. It is represented in different forms in different cultures, but it is always there.

In the second half of the 20th century, our “village prose” (Belov, Rasputin, Soloukhin, Shukshin, et al.) writers were raising alarm over the vanishing rural life: they sensed the danger of too-rapid change (within a couple of generations)

which threatened to wash away this underlying layer that sustained (and fed) the foundations of culture. Today, we witness the dying out of traditional villages in the forested parts of European Russia (Tver, Smolensk, Pskov, and Novgorod oblasts): the last generation that could and wished to live a rural life with its specific habits and relations is practically gone. All this survives today in memory and in art forms that have almost no practitioners left. Preserving that heritage as far as possible is a key cultural task; hopefully, it is being addressed.³

Mass movement of rural dwellers to the cities created a phenomenon known as “the city courtyard” of the 1950s-1980s. It was a bizarre recreation of the way of village life in an urban environment: the *dvor* (courtyard), i.e., an inner area of a rural homestead, became an urban feature. The urban *dvor* of that time was totally different from “communities” in small towns in America or “cottage villages” of more or less elite properties in today’s Russia. The *dvor* preserved communal life which spilled into this strange space of urban *sobornost*⁴ out of flats which trapped their residents within impenetrable walls. It was then, under Khrushchev and Brezhnev, that the long-awaited process began of getting rid of the dire legacy of the Bolshevik method of dealing with the “dwelling question” which created a form of communal life that too rarely had certain charm but on the whole unnaturally deprived the individual of personal territory that was offered by the village homestead which brought together the family. There was an element of charm when the occupants of communal flats managed to keep a balance between personal autonomy offered by their rooms and communal life in the “common spaces.” But that was a rare exception.

The films, plays and literature of the tail end of the Soviet period reflected the process of migration from communal to private flats and the concomitant process of increased autonomy of life style and life interests. Outwardly, it had the form of the dying out of the urban *dvor* just like that of its predecessor, the rural village earlier; the difference was that the urban *dvor* died out much faster, during the lifetime of a single generation. Inwardly, it saw a shift of interests and goals from what the communist ideology called “social interests” to individual interests. The shift impacted not only the material but, most importantly, the spiritual sphere.

The Soviet leadership formed through negative selection, when the least creative people got promoted, when preference was given to narrow-minded and obedient while the brighter ones were squeezed out unless they were prepared to accept the “rules of the game” (and even then they formed a tiny minority in the Soviet leadership and were unable to reverse the catastrophic decline). Their ineptitude consisted above all in their being unable to understand and shore up the logic of Russian culture, invest it in the forms which life was taking at the time. With a well-oiled Soviet system of education and formation of a worldview at their disposal, they managed to lose the battle for the brains of their own people. They failed to do the main thing that would have saved the situation and averted the 1991 collapse. They could not keep the individualization within the framework of *sobornost*’ and *vsesubyechnost*’,⁵ stressing “social interests,” a hollow form in which no one, above all those who purveyed it, believed at that time.

Thus, the basic logic of *sobornost'* released two products of its decomposition: extreme individualism verging on atomization, whose consequences we are experiencing today, with its immorality which threatens to erode the social fabric, on the one hand, and on the other hand, pseudo-communist poor "collectivism" on which history has already pronounced its judgment.

Nostalgia for the Soviet past felt today is nostalgia for vaguely anticipated *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'*. The counter-argument of those who say they do not want to be back in "a society with a shortage of everything" and "queues to buy sausage" is feeble. No one wants to be back in such a society, but very many people miss the sense of *sobornost'* they had in the Soviet society. The "Soviet people," for all the peculiarity of this concept, was an attempt to use the slogans of collectivism, which pervert the very idea of *sobornost'*, to implement the logic of *vsesubyechnost'* which formed (and I am sure still forms) the foundation of the Russian society. But the late Soviet leadership squandered even these gains for which too dear a price had been paid in countless human lives.

This sensation, the vibrancy of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'* should be retained at all costs. The Russian society today bristles up in various, sometimes extravagant forms, against so-called "Western values." Philosophical elucidation of the value of this vibrant sense of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'* which traditionally pulsed through Russian life and wove its fabric, constitutes the key task of the Russian philosophy today. To put it another way, it is the task of understanding ourselves which has always faced philosophy and does so today, the task that singles out philosophy from amongst other forms of spiritual and intellectual activity. It is the task of philosophy and only philosophy to explain the ultimate foundations, bring them into light and prove their validity. The solution of this task would go a long way toward giving society a sense of dignity.

To go back to our question: what are the "psychological attitudes" Trubetskoy refers to? Why do they run so deep that they are practically not realized, manifesting themselves at the level of intellectual instinct and not reflection? As I said earlier, the reason was that Russia had failed to completely assimilate the engraftment of European culture by Peter's reforms, which created a cleavage in Russian culture that led to the two greatest catastrophes in 20th-century Russian history. It means that the European way of life and, most importantly, the European mode of thinking did not become an organic part of Russian culture, remaining a working but not an assimilated element. The time has come to decipher these metaphors and disclose their meaning.

I am referring to the phenomenon which Nikolay Danilevsky (1822-1885) described as *yevropeynichanye* ("Europe-aping").⁶ Despite the acerbic and even insulting connotation of the term in Russian, it accurately describes the mindset and behavior of a large part of the Russian intellectual class. Indeed, the description has not lost its relevance today. But one should look at the underlying meaning of this apt expression. Europe-aping is a persistent phenomenon, but we need to get to the core of it and uncover its essence. It is what stands behind it that is important. To understand it one has to go down to the basic epistemological level, the level of sense-positing.

Danilevsky was the first to offer an extended theoretical interpretation of the category of *vsechelovecheskoye* by contrasting it with the category of *obshechelovecheskoye*.⁷ It is all the more important for us to grasp the essence of these two categories because from the perspective of the Russian public consciousness *obshechelovecheskoye* is directly related to Europe-aping whereas *vsechelovecheskoye* expresses the view of human history free of any “aping.” This needs to be stressed again and again. Strange as it may be, Danilevsky, not least thanks to Nikolay Strakhov (his friend and publisher of his works), was pigeonholed as a Slavophile and conservative. This is how he is described in many modern studies⁸ and even in textbooks.⁹ And yet, Danilevsky has formulated a concept of world history that is not centered on any particular civilization. This is the hallmark of his theory, which makes it impossible to characterize him as a Slavophile, Westernizer, etc. because all these classifications miss the point: Danilevsky does not belong to any of these categories, he is a ground-breaking thinker out of the ordinary. He was the first to explain the history of humankind on the basis of the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'*.

That he does not use these terms makes no difference. To point to the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyechnost'* merely means to decipher the juxtaposition of the categories of *vsechelovecheskoye* and *obshechelovecheskoye* that are central to his theory.

The pivotal category of Danilevsky's theory is that of the “cultural-historical type” (CHT). Proceeding from this concept one can describe all the basic features of his teaching without missing anything important and without unduly concentrating on what is insignificant. The CHT is a dynamic and historical category: CHTs emerge, develop, reach their peak and fade out. CHTs include ethnically and linguistically related peoples; under favorable historical conditions, they may, through a certain amount of “exertion,” achieve the highest possible point for development and create a distinct civilization. History knows ten successful CHTs, some of which have completed their development while others continue to develop; some CHTs perished, destroyed by invaders, before they fulfilled their development potential (Peruvian and Mexican, for example). Each CHT at its peak engenders the highest achievement of the human spirit in one of its possible manifestations. No other CHT can achieve such perfection in that specific sphere, but all can partake of the fruits of the development of any CHT: such supreme achievements constitute the “treasure-trove of humankind.”

Thus, for Danilevsky *chelovechestvo* (humankind) is a category related to *sobornost'*. Humankind cannot be conceived of as a single subject of history, because each of the CHTs that ever existed or will exist realizes only some particular aspect of human spirituality. Danilevsky refers to those aspects as “general categories” (*razryady*) of human activity. They are four: religious, cultural (in the strict sense of the word), political and socio-economic activity [2, p. 516; 1, p. 405]. Here Danilevsky's scheme meets with a problem: if “general categories” explain the differentiation of CHTs, Danilevsky's grouping of these categories obviously does not match the number and diversity of CHTs. Besides, it is unclear how these categories in their various combinations are related to

the core principle of the formation of CHTs, that is, ethno-linguistic kinship of peoples experiencing the common flow of history. Finally, what is the relationship between “general categories” and the ethno-linguistic substratum of CHTs, on the one hand, and the “principles” according to which the CHT can work out its own civilization, principles which cannot be transferred and borrowed and which each CHT must work out independently?¹⁰

Things clear up if we assume that by “principles” Danilevsky means the logic that underlies culture and – with due “exertion” of the peoples capable of constituting a CHT – launches the process of gradual creation of all the attributes of civilization: law and ethics as the key regulatory systems, social and political organization, the spiritual and aesthetic sphere, institutionalization of worldview, ideology and science. The fact that different CHTs yield different peak achievements which other CHTs can appreciate and use, and even reproduce, but not generate themselves, is due to the difference of the logics that inform the unfolding of CHTs. True, that would significantly reduce the number of CHTs, but that does not change the main thing: each CHT (in my terms, each of the big cultures that generate their own civilizations) relies on its inherent logic, which is why it is impossible to equate any CHT to the whole humankind and declare this or that civilization to be universal. In other words, the logic of none of the big cultures can be accepted as the universal logic for the whole humankind. This means that the concept of “humankind” is inherently connected with *sobornost’* in that humanity is a collection of big cultures each of which is unique and cannot be reduced to any other because it is based on its very own logic of sense-positing. Therefore, each of the big cultures (CHTs, according to Danilevsky) has its own intrinsic indestructible value.

That is why those who speak about *obshechelovecheskoye* thus claim that one particular CHT and hence the logic of one big culture is the only one possible. *Obshechelovecheskoye* cannot be any other than forcible reduction of the whole diversity of logics and consequently the diversity of big cultures and civilizations, each representing, according to Danilevsky, one particular side of the human spirit, to one of these logics, to one aspect of the spirit. It is like removing all the colors except one from an artist’s palette; replacing colors with monochrome. Black-and-white photography has its own charm, craftsmanship and highest achievements, but we would not trade it for all the colors. It is not about choosing, but about getting together. Monochrome rules out color, but color does not rule out monochrome. The logic of *sobornost’* and *vsesubyechnost’*, the logic of *vsechelovecheskoye*, gives space for the unfolding of what every individual culture has to offer; but asserting that this particular big culture is universal precludes the unfolding of all the other cultures. The logic of *vsechelovecheskoye*, the logic of *sobornost’* and *vsesubyechnost’*, is stronger than the logic of *obshechelovecheskoye*, the logic of mono-agency and negation of *sobornost’*. It is stronger in purely logical terms: *vsechelovecheskoye* can be unfolded into *obshechelovecheskoye*, but not the other way around. The *vsechelovecheskoye* project can achieve everything the *obshechelovecheskoye* project can achieve; but it also multiplies the *obshechelovecheskoye* thereby removing its repressive character with regard to other logics of cultures.

As a result of Peter's reforms, the upper strata of the Russian society came to regard European culture as *obshechelovecheskoye* (universal) and consequently the only one valuable. Thus, one of the possible logics of culture came to be seen as the only possible one. Rapid and in many ways forcible introduction of the European way of life and thought replaced rather than developed the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyektnost'* which set the pace of Russian culture. The replacement occurred in the upper stratum and was confined to it. There were objective reasons for that: only the upper crust and not the masses could afford a "European lifestyle." But the upper stratum too was not homogeneous. Its best representatives, the brilliant literature beginning from Pushkin, set examples of artistic interpretation of *vsesubyektnost'* and conceptualization of *vsechelovecheskoye* in professional art forms. Thus, cultural "bottom up" movement, the artistic refinement and conceptualization, did not entirely stop in the era of Europe-aping.

The fact remains, however, that notwithstanding all that, there emerged an objective contradiction between the logic of the *obshechelovecheskoye* (translation: European) and the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyektnost'*, i.e., the *vsechelovecheskoye*. It was an objective contradiction in the logical sense too. It is as if in the era of the theory of relativity there emerged a group of scientists who continued to adhere to Newtonian views: they are not exactly wrong, but limited and cannot keep abreast of the objective imperatives of the development of thought. Similarly, Russian Europe-aping, being a form of assimilating an engraftment of the European logic of sense-positing, could have played – and in a way did play – its beneficial role by delivering to Russia not only the long-awaited military parity with Europe, without which it could not have survived, but by fulfilling a far more important task of developing the *vsechelovecheskoye* logic, enriching it with the European variant of its unfolding. For the logic of *sobornost'* and *vsesubyektnost'* does not rule out the European; it rules the European out as the sole and exclusive element that supplants all the rest. In other words, the logic of *vsechelovecheskoye* does not negate and indeed presupposes the free development of the European variant of culture logic – as one variant of the *vsechelovecheskoye*, but not as the sole *obshechelovecheskoye* invariant. The contradiction is also objective in that the Russian upper stratum in the Europe-aping era took the latter for the former; having lost among its masses a living sense of *vsesubyektnost'* (i.e., among the masses of the elite stratum but not the masses of the people, for the Russian intelligentsia had always felt the truth of the people, and the peculiar Russian phenomenon of "going to the people" reflected the yen for *sobornost'* and *vsesubyektnost'*, for *vsechelovecheskoye* which had been lost by the Europe-aping elite), it put the European variant of *obshechelovecheskoye* in its place.

This, then, is the source of the "psychological attitudes" which Trubetskoy described as inexplicable, but which in fact are epistemological, i.e., the manifestations of Europe-aping which confounded him. Little has changed since that time. The contrast between the Europe-aping of the higher social strata and the grassroots gravitation toward *sobornost'* and *vsesubyektnost'*, largely unconscious yet no less intense for that, took new forms but remained an objective

contradiction which, as indicated above, was the underlying cause of the 1991 catastrophe. Whether Russian philosophy will rise to the challenge of the task identified by Danilevsky and Trubetskoy, i.e., whether it will be able to overcome Europe-aping, get rid of the adolescent syndrome and assume responsibility for itself, is an open question, which needs to be answered today because it has never been so urgent.

My answer is an unqualified yes, it is able. It must, and it is able to do this. Our message to “Europe-apers” is this: to be like the West you should *not* be like the West. The West has only become what it is because it never copied anyone, and each time resisted the temptation to take as a gift the fruits of others’ labor and transplant onto its soil a ready-made, highly developed culture of others. And yet, such temptations were real. For example, a far more developed, even if young, Arab Muslim culture in Arabic Spain offered Europeans specimens that were beyond the reach of the Christian culture of the time. Listen to this from an author of that time (Alvarus Paulus, 9th century, Cordoba):

Many of my co-religionists read Arabic verses and tales, study the works of Muslim philosophers and theologians not in order to refute them, but in order to learn how to express themselves in Arabic more correctly and elegantly. Can you find today anyone who can read Latin commentary on the Holy Scriptures? Who among them studies the Gospel, the prophets and apostles? Alas! All the brighter Christian youths know only the language and literature of the Arabs, read and zealously study Arab books, spend huge amounts to collect large libraries and extol the astonishing merits of this literature. If you speak to them about Christian books they reply disdainfully that these books are not worth reading. Woe is me! Christians have forgotten their language and hardly one in a thousand can write a decent Latin letter to his fellow. By contrast, countless numbers can speak Arabic with great elegance and write verses in that language with greater beauty and craftsmanship than the Arabs themselves [6, pp. 11-12].

Is this not a case of Europe-aping in reverse? Substitute the words, and you get an exact, even with excess, description of our Europe-copiers. Those of whom Alvarus Paulus speaks were dubbed “mozarabs” (see, for example, [8, p. 56]), a distortion of *musta’rib* (“Arabized”). So, the “Mozarabism” or Arabization of the Europeans of the time was essentially the same phenomenon as Russian Europe-aping: an attempt to digest an engraftment of a higher, I would say, overwhelmingly higher culture. The West has long ago coped with this task. But we have no other way out except by accomplishing the same task.

To accomplish it, Russian philosophy will have to become a philosophy of sense. It means understanding Russian culture from its foundation, the logic of *sobornost’* and *vsesubyeektnost’* which, to quote Nikolay Lapin, gave an impetus to historical creation of the country at its main historical stages.¹¹ A “philosophy of sense” also because in this case, it would bring out the meaning of Russian history stretching from the past to the future.

References

1. Danilevsky N. Ia. *Russia and Europe: The Slavic World's Political and Cultural Relations with the Germanic-Roman West*. Trans. by S. M. Woodburn. Bloomington, IN: Slavica, 2013.
2. Danilevsky N. Ya. *Russia and Europe in Perspective of Cultural and Political Relation of the Slavic World to the German-Roman*. St. Petersburg: Tip. brat. Panteleevykh, 1895. (In Russian.)
3. Dostoevsky F. M. The Adolescent. Id. *Collected Works in 10 vols*. Vol. 8. Moscow: Khudozhestvennaya literatura, 1957. (In Russian.)
4. Gerdt Ya. V. Genesis of the Cultural-Historical Types Theory by N. Ya. Danilevsky. *Vestnik ChelGU* (= Herald of Chelyabinsk State Univ.). 2008. No. 33, pp. 150-154. (In Russian.)
5. Koznova I. Ye. Historical Memory: Scope of Contemporary Investigations. *Problemy filosofii kultury* (= Issues of philosophy of culture). Moscow: RAS Institute of Philosophy, 2014. Issue 2, pp. 94-128. (In Russian.)
6. Krachkovsky I. Yu. *Arabic Culture in Spain*. Moscow; Leningrad: Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 1937. (In Russian.)
7. Lapin N. I. In Lieu of a Conclusion. On the Methodology of the Study of Local Civilizations and Spheres of Their Being. *Civilization: Polyphony of Meanings. Memoria*. Ed. by A. Smirnov, N. Kasavina, S. Nikolsky. Moscow; St. Petersburg: Tsentr gumanitarnykh initsiativ, 2023, pp. 497-529. (In Russian.)
8. Lévi-Provençal É. *Arabic Civilization in Spain*. Moscow: Nauka, 1967. (In Russian.)
9. Said E. W. *Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient*. Trans. by A. Govorunov. St. Petersburg: Russkiy mir, 2006. (In Russian.)
10. Trubetskoy N. S. *Europe and Humankind*. Sofia: Rossiysko-bolgarskoye knigoizdatelstvo, 1920. (In Russian.)
11. Trubetskoy N. S. The Upper and Lower Levels of Russian Culture (Ethnic Basis of Russian Culture). Id. *On the Problem of Russian Self-Consciousness*. Paris: Izdanie evrasiytsev, 1927, pp. 21-33. (In Russian.)
12. Tsygankov A. S., Gulyaikhin V. N. Philosophical Dialogue between Russia and The West: Translation of Meanings and Hermeneutic "Failure" (On the Example of Dutch Translations of Semyon Frank's Creative Heritage of the 1930s). *Voprosy filosofii* (= The problems of philosophy). 2022. Vol. 9, pp. 173-181. (In Russian.) DOI: 10.21146/0042-8744-2022-9-173-181

Notes

- ¹ Danilevsky distinguishes three types of cultural and civilizational interaction: colonization, engraftment, and organic assimilation. Engraftment produces ripe and tasty fruits grown by the branch engrafted at the host tree, but only at the expense of the latter's natural development and by utilizing its sap, while the rootstock stays wild (see [2, pp. 103-105; 1, pp. 82-83]).

- ² “[F]or me it is more important that the forms precisely be finished and that there be at least some sort of order that is not prescribed, but that we ourselves have finally developed. God, the most important thing for us is precisely at least some order of our own! In this has lain our hope and, so to speak, our rest; finally at least something built, and not this eternal smashing, not chips flying everywhere, not trash and rubbish, out of which nothing has come in the last two hundred years” ([3, pp. 622-623], trans. by R. Pevear and L. Volokhonsky).
- ³ See the numerous works of Irina Koznova about historical memory, including of peasants and, for example, [5].
- ⁴ As Tsygankov and Gulyaikhin have demonstrated, Dutch and, generally, Western writers failed to render *sobornost'* correctly. Instead, they reduced it to the “feeling of connectedness,” “communal spirit,” or “togetherness” [12]. *Sobornost'* implies basically the irreducible capacity of every person to act as an autonomous yet coordinated co-worker for the sake of the “common deed” (*obsheye delo*). Like a number of related terms, including those used in this article (*vsesub'yektnost'*, *obshechelovecheskoye*, *vsechelovecheskoye*), *sobornost'* has to stay transliterated and not translated. These terms lack English equivalents; therefore, any translation would be misleading.
- ⁵ *Vsesub'yektnost'* implies irreducibility of every person in any sense, keeping “all” (*vse-*) at the level of “subjects” (*sub'yektnost'*) of history, unlike, e.g., democracy, which suppresses the minority for the sake of the majority, not to mention admissible collateral damage theories and the like. *Vsesub'yektnost'* is closely related to *sobornost'*. Dostoevsky’s passage about “a child’s tear” in *The Brothers Karamazov* is a vivid illustration of the *vsesub'yektnost'* idea.
- ⁶ “All the forms of Europe-aping with which Russia is so richly endowed can be placed into one of the following three categories: 1. the distortion of the national way of life and substitution of its forms with foreign, non-native forms – distortion and substitution which, once started at the surface, will inevitably penetrate into the internal thoughts and life of the uppermost layers of society, then deeper and deeper; 2. the borrowing of various foreign institutions and their transplantation onto Russian soil, with the idea that if they are better elsewhere, they must be good everywhere; 3. the viewing of internal and external issues of Russian life from a non-native, European perspective, through European glasses or lenses polarized to a European angle, through which things that ought to appear surrounded by rays of the most brilliant light, often look like complete dark and gloom, and vice versa” ([2, p. 288]; quoted from [1, p. 229]; improved trans.).
- ⁷ “*Vsechelovecheskoye* ... must be distinguished from the *obshechelovecheskoye*: it is without a doubt higher than anything individual human, or national. *Vsechelovecheskoye* consists only of the aggregate of everything national that ever existed or exists, in all places and times. It is non-coincident and not realized within one or another nationality; it can only exist in diverse places and all different times” ([2, p. 128]; quoted from [1, p. 102]; improved trans.). The *vsechelovecheskoye* and the *obshechelovecheskoye* are two Russian words that can hardly be rendered into English without distorting their meaning. They both point to the universality of the human mind, human culture, and human civilization, but there is a fundamental difference in logical vehicles used to arrive at the universal. The *vsechelovecheskoye* presupposes “gathering” logically diverse models without imposing any general restriction on them, while the *obshechelovecheskoye* implies an understanding of the universal as grounded in the generic or general, which is well known to the Western reader.
- ⁸ Unfortunately, one seldom comes across correct assessments of the place of Danilevsky’s theory, its innovative character and its being equidistant from the Westernizers and the Slavophiles. See, for example, [4].
- ⁹ The doctrine of the Slavophiles, Danilevsky writes, “if... [it] emphasized the necessity of distinct national development, it was partly from understanding... that the Slavs were destined to complete a universal human task, and that their predecessors had simply not yet managed it. Such a ... task, however, does not exist – at least in the sense that it might at

some point be concretely completed, that sometime, some cultural-historical group would achieve this for itself and for the rest of humanity” ([2, p. 121], quoted from [1, p. 97]). One could not put it more succinctly: the theories of Slavophiles and Westernizers are akin to each other, both being based on the category of the *obshechelovecheskoye*; the difference between them is only that the former thought that the universal task of humankind would be fulfilled by the Slavs and the latter that it would be fulfilled by Romano-Germans. As for Danilevsky’s theory, it is based on the category of *vsechelovecheskoye*. It takes a stunning degree of short-sightedness and inattention to the core distinctions between categories to designate Danilevsky as a Slavophile and “native-soiler.”

¹⁰ The third law of the development of CHTs reads: “The principles of civilization for one cultural-historical type are not transferable to the peoples of another type. Each type produces its own, influenced more or less by foreign civilizations preceding or contemporary to it” ([2, p. 98], quoted from [1, p. 76]).

¹¹ Nikolay Lapin [7, p. 506] identifies them as the stages when this logic “had the form of the Russian Orthodox idea, then of the Great Russian idea, but after the trauma of the Mongol invasion acquired and still preserves a multiethnic and multi-confessional Russian-North Eurasian character.”

Translated by Yevgeny Filippov